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COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
3 Months Ended
Mar. 31, 2013
COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES  
COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES

9.                                    COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES

 

The Company had purchase commitments aggregating approximately $66.8 million at March 31, 2013, which represented commitments made by the Company and its subsidiaries to various suppliers of raw materials for the production of its products. These obligations vary in terms, but are generally satisfied within one year.

 

The Company had contractual obligations aggregating approximately $95.5 million at March 31, 2013, which related primarily to sponsorships and other marketing activities.

 

The Company had operating lease commitments aggregating approximately $18.4 million at March 31, 2013, which related primarily to warehouse and office space.

 

In March 2012, the Company acquired an approximately 75,425 square foot, free-standing, three-story office building located in Corona, CA, including the real property thereunder and improvements thereon (the “March 2012 Property”), which the Company has not occupied, as well as additional parking spaces, for a total purchase price of $9.7 million. In October 2012, the Company acquired an approximately 141,000 square foot, free-standing, six-story office building, including the real property thereunder and improvements thereon, located in Corona, CA (the “October 2012 Property”) adjacent to the March 2012 Property, for a purchase price of $18.8 million. The Company intends to complete the necessary improvements to the October 2012 Property and occupy the building as the Company’s new corporate headquarters in the third quarter of 2013. The October 2012 Property should more effectively address the future growth needs of the Company, compared to the March 2012 Property.  In December 2012, the Company commenced marketing efforts to sell the March 2012 Property and met the criteria established by ASC No. 360 for classifying the March 2012 Property as an asset held for sale. As a result, the March 2012 Property is included in prepaid expenses and other current assets in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet as of March 31, 2013 and December 31, 2012.

 

Litigation – In May 2009, Avraham Wellman, purporting to act on behalf of himself and a class of consumers in Canada, filed a putative class action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in the City of Toronto, Ontario, Canada, against the Company and its former Canadian distributor, Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd., as defendants (the “Wellman Action”).  The plaintiff alleges that the defendants misleadingly packaged and labeled Monster Energy® products in Canada by not including sufficiently specific statements with respect to contra-indications and/or adverse reactions associated with the consumption of the energy drink products.  The plaintiff’s claims against the defendants are for negligence, unjust enrichment, and making misleading/false representations in violation of the Competition Act (Canada), the Food and Drugs Act (Canada) and the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 (Ontario).  The plaintiff claims general damages on behalf of the putative class in the amount of CDN$20 million, together with punitive damages of CDN$5 million, plus legal costs and interest. The plaintiff’s certification motion materials have not yet been filed. The Company believes that any such damages, if awarded, would not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position or results of operations. In accordance with class action practices in Ontario, the Company will not file an answer to the complaint until after the determination of the certification motion.  The Company believes that the plaintiff’s complaint is without merit and plans a vigorous defense.

 

On October 17, 2012, Wendy Crossland and Richard Fournier filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Riverside, styled Wendy Crossland and Richard Fournier v. Monster Beverage Corporation, against the Company claiming that the death of their 14 year old daughter (Anais Fournier) was caused by her consumption of two 24-ounce Monster Energy® drinks over the course of two days in December 2011.  The plaintiffs allege strict product liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranties and wrongful death.  The plaintiffs claim general damages in excess of $25,000 and punitive damages.  The Company believes that the plaintiffs’ complaint is without merit and plans a vigorous defense.  The Company also believes that any such damages, if awarded, would not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position or results of operations.

 

Securities Litigation – On September 11, 2008, a federal securities class action complaint styled Cunha v. Hansen Natural Corp., et al. was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (the “District Court”). On September 17, 2008, a second federal securities class action complaint styled Brown v. Hansen Natural Corp., et al. was also filed in the District Court.

 

On July 14, 2009, the District Court entered an order consolidating the actions and appointing lead counsel and the Structural Ironworkers Local Union #1 Pension Fund as lead plaintiff. On August 28, 2009, lead plaintiff filed a Consolidated Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws (the “Consolidated Class Action Complaint”).  The Consolidated Class Action Complaint purported to be brought on behalf of a class of purchasers of the Company’s stock during the period November 9, 2006 through November 8, 2007 (the “Class Period”).  It named as defendants the Company, Rodney C. Sacks, Hilton H. Schlosberg, and Thomas J. Kelly. Plaintiff principally alleged that, during the Class Period, the defendants made false and misleading statements relating to the Company’s distribution coordination agreements with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (“AB”) and its sales of “Allied” energy drink lines, and engaged in sales of shares in the Company on the basis of material non-public information.  Plaintiff also alleged that the Company’s financial statements for the second quarter of 2007 did not include certain promotional expenses.  The Consolidated Class Action Complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and sought an unspecified amount of damages.

 

On November 16, 2009, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b), as well as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  On July 12, 2010, following a hearing, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, with leave to amend, on the grounds, among others, that it failed to specify which statements plaintiff claimed were false or misleading, failed adequately to allege that certain statements were actionable or false or misleading, and failed adequately to demonstrate that defendants acted with scienter.

 

On August 27, 2010, plaintiff filed a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws (the “Amended Class Action Complaint”).  While similar in many respects to the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, the Amended Class Action Complaint drops certain of the allegations set forth in the Consolidated Class Action Complaint and makes certain new allegations, including that the Company engaged in “channel stuffing” during the Class Period that rendered false or misleading the Company’s reported sales results and certain other statements made by the defendants.  In addition, it no longer names Thomas J. Kelly as a defendant.  The Amended Class Action Complaint continues to allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and seeks an unspecified amount of damages.

 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint on November 8, 2010.  At a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint held on May 12, 2011, the District Court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion to dismiss as to certain of plaintiff’s claims, including plaintiff’s allegations relating to promotional expenses, but denying the motion to dismiss with regard to the majority of plaintiff’s claims, including plaintiff’s channel stuffing allegations.  On September 4, 2012, the District Court issued a Notice of Ruling (the “Order”) adopting the May 12, 2011 tentative ruling as its final ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss.  On October 22, 2012, the District Court denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the Order or certification of an interlocutory appeal from the Order.  The District Court has set a schedule for briefing and discovery in connection with plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and has scheduled a hearing on that motion for June 20, 2013.  Fact discovery in the action has been stayed pending resolution of the class certification motion.

 

The Amended Class Action Complaint seeks an unspecified amount of damages.  As a result, the amount or range of reasonably possible litigation losses to which the Company is exposed cannot be estimated. Although the ultimate outcome of this action cannot be determined with certainty, the Company believes that the allegations in the Amended Class Action Complaint are without merit.  The Company intends to vigorously defend against this lawsuit.

 

State Attorney General Inquiry – In July 2012, the Company received a subpoena from a state attorney general in connection with an investigation concerning the Company’s advertising, marketing, promotion, ingredients, usage and sale of its Monster Energy® brand of energy drinks. As the investigation is in an early stage, it is unknown what, if any, action the state attorney general may take against the Company, the relief which may be sought in the event of any such proceeding or whether such proceeding could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business, financial condition or results of operations.

 

Derivative Litigation – On September 13, 2012, two derivative complaints were filed in California Superior Courts, purportedly on behalf of the Company, by shareholders of the Company who made no prior demand on the Company’s Board of Directors.  One action, in the Superior Court for the County of Riverside, was styled Iron Workers District Council of Tennessee Valley & Vicinity Pension Plan v. Sacks, et al.  The other action, originally filed in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, was styled Rumbaugh v. Sacks, et al.

 

The Iron Workers complaint named as defendants certain officers, directors and employees of the Company, including Rodney Sacks, Hilton Schlosberg, Harold C. Taber, Jr., Benjamin M. Polk, Norman C. Epstein, Mark S. Vidergauz, Sydney Selati, and Thomas J. Kelly.  The Rumbaugh complaint named each of the same individuals as defendants, with the exception of Thomas J. Kelly.  The Company was named as a nominal defendant in each action.

 

The factual allegations of the two complaints were substantially similar.  Each alleged, among other things, that the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Company by causing the Company to market, advertise and promote its Monster Energy brand of energy drinks in a way that has exposed, and will continue to expose, the Company to costly investigations into its compliance with federal and state laws and regulations pertaining to food and beverage advertising.  The complaints further alleged that, beginning in February 2012, the Individual Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties by making statements in press releases and public filings about the Company’s earnings and financial condition and by failing to disclose that the Company was improperly advertising, marketing and promoting its Monster Energy brand of energy drinks.  The Iron Workers complaint further alleged that while the Company’s shares were purportedly artificially inflated because of those improper statements, certain defendants sold Company stock while in possession of material non-public information regarding the Company’s “true” business health.  The Iron Workers complaint asserted causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.  In addition to those causes of action, the Rumbaugh complaint also asserted causes of action for abuse of control, gross mismanagement and waste of corporate assets.  Plaintiffs sought an unspecified amount of damages to be paid to the Company, adoption of corporate governance reforms, and equitable and injunctive relief.

 

By stipulation of the parties, the Rumbaugh complaint was transferred to Riverside Superior Court.  On March 4, 2013, and March 6, 2013, respectively, on the parties’ stipulation, the Iron Workers and Rumbaugh matters were dismissed with prejudice as to the named plaintiffs and without prejudice as to any other Company shareholder.  No consideration was offered or exchanged to induce or reward either Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal.

 

On May 3, 2013, a derivative complaint was filed in United States District Court for the Central District of California, purportedly on behalf of the Company, by a shareholder of the Company who made no prior demand on the Company’s Board of Directors.  The action is styled Eric Spitzer v. Sacks, et al, United States District Court for the Central District of California.  Through his counsel, Spitzer had previously served a request that the Company produce certain books and records pursuant to section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.  Counsel for the Company and Spitzer exchanged correspondence relating to the demand.  After Spitzer refused to narrow his demand, the Company ultimately denied the demand in a letter dated February 14, 2013.

 

The Spitzer complaint named as defendants certain officers, directors, and employees of the Company, including Rodney Sacks, Hilton Schlosberg, Harold C. Taber, Jr., Benjamin M. Polk, Norman C. Epstein, Mark S. Vidergauz, Sydney Selati, and Thomas J. Kelly.  The Company is named as a nominal defendant.

 

Spitzer alleges, among other things, that the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Company by causing the Company to (a) engage in illicit activity regarding the promotion, marketing, advertising, ingredients, usage and sale of its Monster Energy brand of energy drinks; (b) lack adequate internal and financial controls; and (c) issue financial statements that were materially false and misleading, all in a way that has exposed, and will continue to expose, the Company to costly investigations.  The complaint further alleges that, beginning in February 2012, the Individual Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties by making statements in press releases and public filings about the Company’s earnings and financial condition and by failing to disclose that the Company was improperly advertising, marketing, and promoting its Monster Energy brand of energy drinks.  The complaint further alleges that while the Company’s shares were purportedly artificially inflated because of those improper statements, certain defendants sold Company stock while in possession of material non-public information.  The complaint asserts causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty abuse of control, gross mismanagement, and unjust enrichment.  Spitzer seeks an unspecified amount of damages to be paid to the Company, adoption of corporate governance reforms, and equitable and injunctive relief.

 

Although the ultimate outcome of this matter cannot be determined with certainty, the Company believes that the complaint is without merit.  The Company intends to vigorously defend against this lawsuit.  At this time, no evaluation of the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome or range of potential loss can be expressed.

 

San Francisco City Attorney Litigation.  On October 31, 2012, the Company received a written request for information from the City Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco concerning the Company’s advertising and marketing of its Monster Energy® brand of energy drinks and specifically concerning the safety of its products for consumption by adolescents.  In a letter dated March 29, 2013, the San Francisco City Attorney threatened to bring suit against the Company if it did not agree to take the following five steps immediately:  (i) “Reformulate its product to lower the caffeine content to safe levels”; (ii) “Provide adequate warning labels”; (iii) “Cease promoting over-consumption in marketing”; (iv) “Cease use of alcohol and drug references in marketing”; and (v) “Cease targeting minors.”

 

On April 29, 2013, the Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, Monster Energy Company, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the San Francisco City Attorney in United States District Court for the Central District of California, styled Monster Beverage Corp., et al. v. Dennis Herrera.  The Company seeks a declaration from the Court that the San Francisco City Attorney’s investigation and demands are impermissible and preempted, subject to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, are unconstitutional in that they violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibitions against compelled speech, content-based speech and commercial speech, are impermissibly void-for-vagueness, and/or violate the Commerce Clause.  The San Francisco City Attorney’s response to the complaint is currently due on June 11, 2013.

 

On May 6, 2013, the San Francisco City Attorney filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, civil penalties and restitution for alleged violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code sections 17200, et seq., styled People Of The State Of California ex rel. Dennis Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney v. Monster Beverage Corporation, San Francisco Superior Court.  The City Attorney alleges that the Company (1) mislabeled its products as a dietary supplement, in violation of California’s Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, California Health & Safety Code sections 109875 et. seq.; (2) is selling an “adulterated” product because caffeine is not generally recognized as safe (“GRAS”) due to the alleged lack of scientific consensus concerning the safety of the levels of caffeine in the Company’s products; and (3) is engaged in unfair and misleading business practices because its marketing (a) does not disclose the health risks that energy drinks pose for children and teens; (b) fails to warn against and promotes unsafe consumption; (c) implicitly promotes mixing of energy drinks with alcohol or drugs; and (d) is deceptive because it includes unsubstantiated claims about the purported special benefits of its “killer” ingredients and “energy blend.” The City Attorney seeks a declaration that the Company has engaged in unfair and unlawful business acts and practices in violation of the Unfair Competition Law; an injunction from performing or proposing to perform any acts in violation of the Unfair Competition Law; restitution; and civil penalties.

 

The Company denies that it has violated the Unfair Competition Law or any other law and believes that the City Attorney’s claims and demands are preempted and unconstitutional, as alleged in the action it filed in United States District Court.  The Company intends to vigorously defend against this lawsuit.  At this time, no evaluation of the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome or range of potential loss can be expressed.

 

            In addition to the above matters, the Company has been named as a defendant in various false advertising putative class actions and in a private attorney general action, each of which contains allegations similar to those presented in the Wellman Action.  In these actions, plaintiffs allege that defendants misleadingly labeled and advertised Monster Energy® brand products that allegedly were ineffective for the advertised benefits (including, but not limited to, an allegation that the products do not hydrate as advertised because they contain caffeine).  The plaintiffs further allege that the Monster Energy® brand products at issue are unsafe because they contain one or more ingredients that allegedly could result in illness, injury or death. In connection with these product safety allegations, the plaintiffs claim that the product labels did not provide adequate warnings and/or that the Company did not include sufficiently specific statements with respect to contra-indications and/or adverse reactions associated with the consumption of its energy drink products (including, but not limited to, claims that certain ingredients, when consumed individually or in combination with other ingredients, could result in high blood pressure, palpitations, liver damage or other negative health effects and/or that the products themselves are unsafe).  Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs assert claims for violation of state consumer protection statutes, including unfair competition and false advertising statutes, and for breach of warranty and unjust enrichment.  In their prayers for relief, the plaintiffs seek, inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages, restitution, attorneys’ fees, and, in some cases, injunctive relief.  Furthermore, the Company is subject to litigation from time to time in the normal course of business, including intellectual property litigation and claims from terminated distributors.  Although it is not possible to predict the outcome of such litigation, based on the facts known to the Company, management believes that such litigation in the aggregate will likely not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position or results of operations.