WEBMASTER NOTE: This is the unedited transcript of the Roundtable Discussion on Conflict Minerals held on October 18, 2011 which we received directly from the transcriber. We are posting the transcript in this form to make it available as soon as possible. 0001 1 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 3 4 5 ROUNDTABLE ON CONFLICT MINERALS 6 7 8 9 Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10 12:30 p.m. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 24 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 25 Station Place Auditorium 0002 1 PARTICIPANTS: 2 3 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 4 Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner 5 Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner 6 Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner 7 Meredith cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance 8 Paula Dubberly, Deputy Director, Division of Corporate Finance 9 Felicia Kung, Chief, Office of Rulemaking, Division of 10 Corporate Finance 11 John Fieldsend, Special Counsel, Office of Rulemaking, 12 Division of Corporate Finance 13 Brian Croteau, Deputy Chief Accountant, Professional Practice 14 Group, Office of the Chief Accountant 15 16 PANELISTS: 17 David Bouffard, Public Relations, Signet Jewelers Ltd. 18 Mike Davis, Conflict Resources, Global Witness 19 Bennett Freeman, Sustainability, Calvert Investments 20 Andrew Matheson, Boston Silicon Materials 21 Sandy Merber, Counsel, ITR&S, General Electric Company 22 Yedwa Zandile Simelane, AngloGold Ashanti Limited 23 Irma Villarreal, Counsel, Kraft Foods, Inc. 24 Susan Baker, ESG Research, Trillium Asset Management 25 Benedict S. Cohen, Chief Counsel, The Boeing Company 0003 1 Panelists (Cont'd.) 2 3 Darren Fenwick, Government Affairs, Enough Project 4 Lawrence M. Heim, Director, Elm Consulting Group 5 Tim Mohin, Director, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 6 Kay Nimmo, Manager, ITRI, Ltd. 7 Jennifer Prisco, Global Supply, Tyco Electronics Corp. 8 Michael Riess, Director, Materials Management Corp. 9 Darrel Schubert, Chairman/Auditing, Ernst & Young, LLP 10 11 GUEST SPEAKERS: 12 RICHARD DURBIN, U.S. Senator 13 JAMES MCDERMOTT, U.S. Congressman (by videotape) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0004 1 C O N T E N T S 2 3 PAGE 4 Opening Remarks 5 Meredith Cross, Moderator 6 6 Chairman Schapiro 7 7 Commissioner Aguilar 8 8 Commissioner Walter 9 9 Commissioner Paredes 9 10 11 Introductions: Paula Dubberly, Deputy Director 12 12 13 Panel One: 14 David Bouffard 13 15 Mike Davis 17 16 Bennett Freeman 20 17 Andrew Matheson 24 18 Sandy Merber 27 19 Yedwa Zandile Simelane 30 20 Irma Villarreal 35 21 Commissioner Walter 82 22 Chairman Schapiro 85 23 Sen. Durbin 86 24 Rep. McDermott (By video) 91 25 0005 1 Contents (Cont'd) 2 3 Panel Two: 4 Susan Baker 96 5 Benedict S. Cohen 100 6 Darren Fenwick 109 7 Lawrence M. Heim 112 8 Tim Mohin 115 9 Kay Nimmo 118 10 Jennifer Prisco 121 11 Michael Riess 122 12 Darrel Schubert 124 13 Brian Croteau 151 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0006 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 MS. CROSS: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome. 3 I'd like to offer a special welcome and thank you to our 4 panelist for joining us today to discuss the implementation of 5 Section 1502 of the "Dodd-Frank Act" regarding disclosure and 6 the use of certain minerals in an issuer's products. This is an 7 important undertaking and your views and input are critical to 8 our information gathering process in developing recommendations 9 for the Commission for adoption of the rules. 10 I'm Meredith Cross, Director of the Division of 11 Corporation Finance, and I'm joined to my right by Paula 12 Dubberly, Deputy Director in the Division, Felicia Kung, Chief 13 of the Office of Rulemaking, and John Fieldsend, Special 14 Counsel. We'll be pressed for time today in an effort to 15 maximize the time allotted to panelists. We won't be able to 16 accommodate questions or comments from the audience. We do 17 encourage you to submit comments, however, which you may do in 18 writing or via e-mail through our website, SEC.gov. 19 Today I'm pleased to introduce the Chairman of the 20 SEC, Chairman Mary Schapiro, who will lead us off with some 21 brief opening remarks. We are also joined by Commissioner 22 Walter who will be here shortly, Commissioner Paredes and 23 Commissioner Aguilar, and we are grateful for their support of 24 this important roundtable. 25 With that, I would like to turn it over to Chairman 0007 1 Schapiro for any opening comments or remarks she may have. 2 CHAIRMAN SCHAPIRO: Thank you, Meredith. I want to 3 thank you and your staff for your incredible hard work in 4 organizing the roundtable. 5 As you all know, the Commission has proposed rules 6 to implement Section 1502 of the "Dodd-Frank Act," and the staff 7 is now working to formulate recommendations for our 8 consideration for the adoption of final rules. In adopting this 9 provision of the statute, congress expressed its hope that these 10 new reporting requirements contained in the federal securities 11 laws will help to curb the violence in the Eastern Democratic 12 Republic of the Congo. 13 Congress was concerned that the exploitation in 14 trade in conflict minerals originated in the DRC is helping to 15 finance conflict that is characterized by extreme levels of 16 violence, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and is 17 contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation. Our 18 responsibility is to give affect through rulemaking to 19 congressional intent. 20 Because expertise about these events does not reside 21 within the Commission or our staff, the Commission proposed 22 rules to carefully follow the direction of congress. We have 23 gained additional insights and perspective from the commentators 24 and the many groups and individuals that have come to meet with 25 us on this topic. In fact, we have received about 250 comment 0008 1 letters on our proposal and I, my fellow commissioners and the 2 staff have had over 90 meetings with a wide range of interested 3 parties and experts. This ongoing dialog has been extremely 4 constructive and this roundtable is a continuation of that 5 valuable input from all stakeholders. 6 So I personally am looking forward to very 7 productive and informative roundtable. I want to thank 8 everybody on the panels, in particular, for taking the time from 9 their busy schedules to participate today, and I want to welcome 10 all of you in the audience to the SEC. 11 MS. CROSS: Thank you, Chairman Schapiro. If any of 12 the commissioners have anything they'd like to say before we 13 start, I welcome your comments. 14 COMMISSIONER AGUILAR: Meredith, thank you. I also 15 want to extend my welcome to the participants here today as well 16 as to the public audience, whether they're here or watching by 17 web cast. 18 Last July congress gave the Commission the important 19 responsibility of implementing the conflict minerals disclosure 20 process mandated by Section 1502 of the "Dodd-Frank Act." We 21 take this obligation very seriously, and we are committed to 22 adopting a rule that's consistent with the significant public 23 interest underlying the law. 24 Effective rulemaking requires careful consideration 25 of many factors, and I am very appreciative of the many comment 0009 1 letters that we received from NGOs, investors and issuers, as 2 well as representatives of the Congolese civil side and the U.S. 3 public. Today we continue this valuable process by hearing from 4 a broad range of stakeholders, who have agreed to participate in 5 today's roundtable. 6 And I very much appreciate your willingness to be 7 here today and I thank you, but I also want to extend my thanks 8 to the members of the staff who have put together today's 9 program, as you can tell from the panel that they've spent a lot 10 of hard work doing that. I want to thank them before today's 11 proceedings begin. That's all the comments I would have, 12 Meredith. 13 COMMISSIONER WALTER: I'd just like to add my 14 welcome to everyone who has taken the time to come here today 15 and who give us the benefit of their views. We'll all be very 16 interested in hearing about the issues that are before us, and 17 using your input to help our end product be better. Thank you 18 so much. 19 COMMISSIONER PAREDES: And I'll round it out by 20 adding my thanks to the staff as well as the panelists; very 21 much look forward to the conversation. 22 MS. CROSS: Thank you, Chairman Schapiro and 23 commissioners. Before we move on, I need to provide the 24 standard disclosure that the comments you hear today are those 25 of the individuals and they don't necessarily reflect the views 0010 1 of the Commission or the Commission staff. 2 As most of you know, the Commission proposed rules 3 to implement Section 1502. At the request of commentators. The 4 Commission extended the comment period and we have received 5 many, many helpful comments on the proposal. The comment period 6 is again open in light of this roundtable and we welcome 7 comments on all of the issues and topics that are discussed here 8 today. 9 The staff will work expeditiously following the 10 roundtable to bring recommendations to the Commission for final 11 rules to adopt. We are cognizant of the need to develop rules 12 that faithfully and efficiently implement the statute. The 13 rules the Commission proposed would require any issuer for which 14 conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or 15 production of a product manufactured or contracted to be 16 manufactured by that issuer to disclose in the body of its 17 annual report whether its conflict minerals originated in the 18 Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country. 19 If so, that issuer would be required to furnish a 20 separate report as an exhibit to its annual report that includes 21 among other matters a description of the measures taken by the 22 issuer to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of 23 custody of its conflict minerals. These due diligence measures 24 would include, but would not be limited to an independent 25 private sector audit of the issuer's report conducted in 0011 1 accordance with standards established by the comptroller general 2 of the United States, the GAO. 3 Further, any issuer furnishing such a report would 4 be required in that report to certify that it obtained an 5 independent private sector audit of its report, provide the 6 audit report, and make its report available to the public on its 7 internet website. Today, we hope to explore a number of topics 8 raised by commentators. In particular, we hope to explore ways 9 issuers believe they can or need to track conflict minerals 10 through the supply chain, possible approaches for workable due 11 diligence, and appropriate reporting approaches for the final 12 rules. 13 Let me quickly review today's format. Each panelist 14 may begin with a very brief introduction, opening statement or 15 description of their views. Then we will start the dialog by 16 asking a question or asking you to respond to a statement. We 17 will not call on anyone in particular unless you are a 18 particularly shy crowd, which we don't expect. 19 If you want to be sure to have the chance to say 20 something, please turn your nameplate sideways to be sure to get 21 our attention, like this. I want to very much thank all of you, 22 all of today's panelists for coming. I know you are extremely 23 busy and many of you have traveled quite far to be here today. 24 Your participation today demonstrates dedication to the 25 rulemaking process. 0012 1 I have worked on many rules over many years, and it 2 is this kind of public input in the process that results in the 3 most thoughtful, effective and workable regulation. So thank 4 you very much for being here. 5 Our first panel will focus on what is covered by the 6 rule, including possible definitions of key terms and what would 7 need to be done under the rule. How can minerals be tracked 8 through the supply chain? This latter point will also be 9 discussed in the next panel, since it is at the core of the 10 provision. 11 I will now turn this over to Paula to introduce the 12 panelists. Paula? 13 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you, Meredith, and thank you to 14 all of our panelists. Let me introduce the panelists, and after 15 I do that we will get to the opening statements. 16 Starting on the right: David Bouffard, Vice 17 President, Public Relations, Signet Jewelers, Inc.; Mike Davis, 18 Campaign Leader for Conflict Resources, Global Witness; Bennett 19 Freeman, Senior Vice President, Sustainability Research and 20 Policy, Calvert Investments; Andrew Matheson, President, Boston 21 Silicon Materials LLC. Previously, Mr. Matheson worked for a 22 major tantalum processor, where his duties included tantalum ore 23 procurement. 24 Sandy Merber, counsel, International Trade 25 Regulation and Sourcing, General Electric Company; Yedwa 0013 1 Simelane, Senior Vice President, Corporate Affairs, AngloGold 2 Ashanti Limited; Irma Villarreal, Chief Securities Counsel and 3 Assistant Corporate Secretary, Kraft Foods, Inc. Just a note: 4 Susan Baker of Trillium Asset Management was originally 5 scheduled to be on this panel, but Lauren Campari of Boston 6 Common Asset was unable to make it here today, so Ms. Baker will 7 now participate in the second panel in order to even out the 8 panels. 9 Now I'd like to give each of the panelists an 10 opportunity to make brief opening remarks or statement. Why 11 don't we just go in order, starting with David Bouffard? 12 Panel One: What is covered by the rule and what steps will be 13 required to comply with the rule? 14 MR. BOUFFARD: Thank you. I am David Bouffard. I 15 am the vice president of public relations for Sterling Jewelers, 16 Inc., with U.S. Operations of Signet Jewelers Limited, which is 17 the world's largest specialty retail jeweler. We appreciate the 18 invitation to appear at today's roundtable, facilitated through 19 the National Retail Federation, and commend the Commission for 20 bringing together a wide array of diversion viewpoints to 21 discuss this important topic. 22 Today I'm speaking on behalf of Signet in describing 23 our ongoing efforts to comply with the applicable requirements 24 of Section 1502. Importantly, we are committed to the goals of 25 the legislation, and we sincerely hope sharing our efforts today 0014 1 in preparing for compliance will be helpful to the Commission. 2 I want to make it clear from the outset that we at 3 Signet and the jewelry and retail industries as a whole abhor 4 the horrific human rights abuses in the DRC. And while Signet 5 has no reason to believe that any of our products contain gold 6 sourced from DRC conflict-ridden areas, we nevertheless take our 7 responsibility under the legislation very seriously. 8 To that end we have decided not to await the 9 Commission's adoption of final rules. As leaders in our 10 industry and in the area of responsible gold sourcing, we have 11 already begun developing, despite the absence of an existing 12 global infrastructure, a responsible supplier chain of custody 13 program. Our goal is to ensure to the maximum extent possible 14 that the products sold in our stores do not contain any gold 15 originating from conflict mines in the DRC. 16 Therefore, Signet has already instituted the 17 following measures. First, we've already informed our supplier 18 partners, over 300 companies worldwide, that Signet is 19 implementing a program to identify our suppliers' gold supply 20 chain with a view over time toward establishing a traceable 21 source of conflict free gold and other metals included in 22 products sold through our retails stores in the U.S. as well as 23 the U.K. Secondly, we're working from the ground up, 24 essentially starting from scratch to create an auditable supply 25 chain mechanism to confirm that the gold we sell at retail 0015 1 originates through banks defined as good delivery by LBMA and 2 refineries which follow the GeSI-EICC refinery validation 3 program currently in development. 4 Also, very importantly, we intend to follow OECD 5 guidelines on gold that are only now being developed. And it's 6 worth noting that the OECD established a second working group 7 for gold, and has made gold the last in developing minerals 8 specific to Legends' guidelines, recognizing the unique 9 complexities of the gold supply chain. 10 Thirdly, we've been working with the responsible 11 jewelry counsel, the world's leading jewelry trade association 12 dedicated to a responsible supply chain, and establishing a 13 robust chain of custody standards and implementation guidance 14 applicable throughout the gold supply chain, and one that 15 non-RJC members can adopt as well. The RJC chain of custody 16 work also aims to support implementation of the OECD guidance. 17 While OECD GeSI, EICC and RJC initiatives were all 18 under way well before the legislation was enacted in 2010, it's 19 important to emphasize that final standards and other guidance 20 from the OECD in the various private sector initiatives, will 21 not be in place until next year at the earliest. And we cannot 22 reach our goal until the standards are finalized. Supply chain 23 testing and implementation would then follow over the years to 24 come. And although we are committed to complying with Section 25 1502, we face some significant obstacles. 0016 1 First, there is no reliable infrastructure within 2 the DRC and neighboring countries to track the origin of 3 minerals from any potentially conflict-tainted mine. And we 4 understand that such an infrastructure may be years away from 5 implementation. Second, we have no direct relationship with 6 refineries closest to the source of the raw material that are 7 many points removed down the supply chain from the final 8 products sold at retail. 9 Third, even after we obtain information from our 10 suppliers, we are dependent on them for the accuracy of that 11 information, and there is currently no viable certification and 12 validation system at the mine, refinery, or intermediate 13 supplier level, and it will take time after development to 14 ultimately implement a refinery validation or any other supplier 15 chain traceability protocol, which can provide a reasonable 16 basis for disclosure. This is why a phased-in approach to 17 reporting a disclosure is so important. 18 And I want to be clear on that point. We are not 19 advocating loopholes that would absolve companies from any 20 responsibility to comply with the law, nor are we seeking any 21 delay in the effective date of the final Commission rules. 22 Again, we believe a reasonable phased-in approach to reporting 23 recognizes the complexities of the global gold supply chain. 24 In closing I want to emphasize that we are committed 25 to the goals of the legislation and that we have a process 0017 1 currently under way to try to meet those goals. And while it 2 will take time to fully implement the process, we believe it can 3 be done, and done effectively. 4 We are pleased to offer our direct assistance to the 5 Commission and its staff to share our detailed work plan and 6 progress. We offer that assistance beginning today and for as 7 long as it takes the SEC to adopt its final rules. Thank you, 8 and I'd be happy to take any questions. 9 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Davis? 10 MR. DAVIS: Thank you very much, first of all for 11 the invitation to come and join in this roundtable. 12 I work with Global Witness. We're a London-based 13 NGO and we specialize in researching and monitoring a link 14 between natural resource exploitation and armed conflict and 15 corruption. We've been researching and monitoring the situation 16 in Eastern Congo for certain years now. Two of my colleagues 17 returned from the latest field visit just a couple of days ago. 18 The first thing I wanted to remind everybody of, 19 which goes to the heart of why we're here and having this 20 discussion is the conflict in Eastern Congo has gone on now for 21 around 15 years and has cost millions of lives. Revenues from 22 the minerals trade provide both the means and the motivation for 23 the warring parties that includes rebels, militia, army units, 24 to continue their operations and their involvement in the 25 conflict. There are means, because they're a source of revenue 0018 1 for groups which otherwise would not have very much, and it 2 enables some of the most notorious armed groups to maintain 3 operations. 4 It's also an incentive, but because as long as there 5 are opportunities there for men with guns to capture and control 6 and profit from the minerals trade, they're going to continue 7 doing so, and it will be impossible to establish a clean trade 8 and use that as a basis for development in the region. We can 9 only break these links between mineral exploitation and conflict 10 through clear and robust measures to address the role of supply 11 chains in sustaining that armed violence. 12 And, to that end, we believe the implementation of 13 Dodd-Frank's 1502 provision can go a long way. There are a 14 number of very positive developments that we want to draw 15 people's attention to which have emerged since last July, which 16 we believe relate to the passage of the law. In recent months, 17 the Congolese government has ended five-year illegal occupation 18 of one of the key mining areas in Eastern Congo by its own 19 military units. It's introduced a traceability system. Last 20 month it made it a legal requirement that companies involved in 21 the mineral sector abide by the OECD due diligence guidance, 22 which my colleague here just referred to. 23 The tin and tantalum industries developed a due 24 diligence system for tracing and verifying minerals in Eastern 25 Congo based on the OECD standards. This program is already 0019 1 under way in parts of Katanga province where it covers 85 to 90% 2 of mineral production, and accounts for 550 tons of material per 3 month. Some international companies have already gone in 4 directly and begun setting up their own, entirely controlled 5 closed pipeline sourcing of Tantalum from areas of Katanga. 6 And, at an international level, electronics industry 7 associations have come together to develop a system for 8 assessing the supply chain controls adopted by metal refiners, 9 which are the key bottleneck in the supply chain for these 10 materials. This conflict-free smelter program is now well 11 advanced and stands to help companies in conducting the due 12 diligence which this law requires. 13 In some respects, however, the mineral sector in 14 Eastern Congo remains in limbo. Production appears to have 15 increased since the end of the government-mandated ban on mining 16 expired at the end of March; however, it remains low and it's 17 impact on ordinary people's livelihoods. One of the main 18 reasons for this limbo situation continuing is that 15 months 19 after the passage of the "Dodd-Frank Act" it's still not clear 20 to companies and investors what standards they will need to 21 meet. It's crucial that the SEC issues its regulations quickly 22 so that the current momentum towards a clean mineral trade from 23 Eastern Congo is sustained and isn't lost. 24 I want to finish by highlighting a few key benefits 25 which we believe Dodd-Frank 1502 can bring. First of all, to 0020 1 Congolese people, the reduction in the scope of murderous armed 2 groups to prey upon the mineral sector and derive financing from 3 it. For U.S. taxpayers: at the moment U.S. taxpayers pay 4 between $500 and 600 Million a year through direct aid and 5 contributions to peacekeeping operations to make Congo a more 6 stable place. 7 In effect, they are subsidizing the lack of proper 8 controls on the international mineral supply chain. And then 9 for companies, this is an opportunity to improve their own 10 commercial performance through better supply chain controls in 11 reducing their risk. It's an opportunity to be a part of a 12 solution and potentially add value to their brands. We are 13 convinced that international companies are crucial to 14 establishing a clean minerals trade that brings peace and 15 prosperity to Eastern Congo, and we are very interested in 16 talking to all businesses here and others that may be tuning in 17 about how they can be part of that. Thank you. 18 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Mr. Freeman? 19 MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, Commissioners and Staff. I 20 am very pleased to have the opportunity to make a brief 21 statement on behalf of Calvert Investments. 22 As a sustainable and responsible investor Calvert 23 values companies' prudent management of risk and their global 24 supply chains. We've been particularly concerned in recent 25 years by the use of certain minerals to fund the continuing 0021 1 bloody conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2 That is why we have joined other investors and 3 shareholder advocates in a multi-stakeholder group, also 4 including major companies and human rights NGOs to promote 5 responsible sourcing in the DRC and to support the enactment of 6 Section 1502. And we've worked together since the enactment of 7 1502 to support the development of a rule that ensures its full 8 and swift, yet effective and reasonable implementation. 9 Let me turn to the two sets of issues that are the 10 focus of this first panel -- scope of the rule and tracking of 11 the supply chain -- and highlight two particularly salient 12 issues pertaining to each of these themes on which Calvert has 13 an investor perspective. First, turning to the scope of the 14 rule I'll address the appropriate entities to be covered in our 15 view and then the process of disclosure. 16 We believe that the entire supply chain must 17 participate to develop effective traffic systems for conflict 18 minerals. If certain issuers that use these minerals were 19 exempted, that would prohibit both the development of such 20 systems and also the flow of information required for investors 21 to gain a full understanding of issuers' exposure to these 22 minerals. 23 We believe that reporting standards should be 24 consistent with the statutory language of 1502 and should 25 therefore apply disclosure rules equally to all stipulated 0022 1 conflict: minerals; tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold. Let me 2 single out gold. Our view is that it's particularly important 3 that gold is part of the disclosure process. The provision of 4 any special conditions or exemptions for gold or any other 5 mineral would weaken the intent of the disclosure rules. 6 We believe that all companies across the value and 7 supply chain should be covered by the rule a well, all companies 8 from mined product, to ensure the greatest possible degree of 9 transparency for investors and consumers alike. As investors, 10 it is critical that we are able to assess standardized 11 disclosures from all companies that may use these minerals in 12 their products. My full statement that we'll submit for the 13 record provides our viewpoint with respect to coverage of 14 foreign, private issuers, small issuers and others. 15 Let me turn, though, to particularly important set 16 of issues really at the heart of the whole process of the whole 17 discussion here of who's to be covered, and that's the 18 disclosure process. We understand that companies need a 19 reasonable period of time to develop and implement systems to 20 comply with the rule and to disclose progress, but this brief 21 period should be one of continuous and rapid improvement, during 22 which issuers work with governments, NGOs and industry peers to 23 develop infrastructure to determine and trace the origin of 24 minerals from mine through smelter to product. 25 We understand that initial reporting may be uneven, 0023 1 yet the objective should be to trace and to disclose such 2 origins with growing transparency, consistency and credibility 3 year by year across the value chain. And we are encouraged, 4 encouraged by certain factors already apparent; that 5 internationally accepted due diligence guidelines are already in 6 place; that many companies are already using supply chain audit 7 systems; and that on the ground training and monitoring systems 8 are developing rapidly as well. 9 Let me turn very briefly to the issues around 10 tracking the supply chain. We believe that responsible supply 11 chain risk management is absolutely essential to investors. The 12 situation in the Congo that compelled the enactment of 1502 does 13 present tough supply chain management challenges, but these 14 challenges can be addressed with a rule that takes into account 15 established international standards as well as the experience or 16 the gain that many companies face in dealing with similar 17 challenges around the world, even though the particular 18 challenges on the ground in the DRC are unique in many ways. 19 We are looking for a high due diligence standard 20 together with robust third-party audits that will allow 21 investors to assess a company's willingness and ability to avoid 22 sourcing conflict minerals. And we particularly hope that a 23 rule refers explicitly to established international standards, 24 above all to the OECD due diligence guidance and supplements for 25 responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict affected in 0024 1 high risk areas. 2 That would give us more confidence as investors and 3 we think greater guidance to issuers. Third party auditing, we 4 believe, needs to be very clear, strong. A focus should include 5 smelters' tracing documentation and mechanisms. We also believe 6 there should be a smelter auditing protocol, which is performed 7 by an independent third party. 8 Let me conclude by really expressing an 9 understanding for why the Commission and staff chose to convene 10 this roundtable, given the complexity and sensitivity of issues 11 at stake in this particular rulemaking process, and the acute 12 concerns that have been expressed by some of the parties. We 13 have confidence, though, that these issues, however difficult, 14 can and should be resolved on the basis of the comment period 15 already concluded, supplemented by this timely roundtable and 16 the diverse parties and viewpoints it is bringing into sharper 17 focus. 18 We look forward to the issuance of a rule consistent 19 with the legislative intent of Section 1502 that will give 20 confidence to investors such as Calvert in the responsible 21 sourcing of minerals in the DRC. And we appreciate the 22 opportunity to share our views today. Thank you. 23 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Mr. Matheson? 24 MR. MATHESON: Good afternoon. I would like to 25 start by reminding us briefly of the passage of time here, since 0025 1 the issue first became a prominent problem in business. It's at 2 least 10 years since the U.N. initiative's report on the nexus 3 between conflict mineral exploitation and violence in the 4 Eastern DRC. 5 Ten years is a long time, and hard on the heels of 6 the initial report there was a significant amount of corporate 7 interest and corporate response in the United States and 8 overseas. So straight away we saw corporate leadership in 9 initial efforts to tackle the problem. We've had legislation, 10 serious legislation, moot in the United States on a bipartisan 11 basis; for example, the Brownbeck-Durbin bill in the Senate for 12 at least three years. 13 That again is a significant amount of time. I am 14 very sensitive to the need for adequate systems to be put into 15 place to ensure compliance with the rule; but three years is 16 plenty of time and ten years is a long time. And I think it's 17 disingenuous of industry groups or particular firms to suggest 18 this is a problem that's going to require a multi-year process 19 to come to terms with, given the ample warning and the egregious 20 nature of the issue at hand that we're all aware of, and that 21 this has taken significant attention and time over this past 22 decade. 23 I'll point out further that many industry groups led 24 by the EICC and GeSI, but not alone, have invested significant 25 time, resources, and money in developing systems and procedures 0026 1 to address the issue of conflict minerals as close to sources as 2 is practical, which means that the smelt, which is the natural 3 chokepoint. I think if we look for evidence that this issue 4 matters to investors and for companies, this is the best 5 evidence we can look for. 6 Companies are the custodians of shareholder value 7 and they're deploying resources, well aware of the cost and 8 certainly better aware of the cost than anyone on this panel to 9 address the issue. That tells me and it should tell all of us 10 this is a problem that corporations deemed to be worth solving 11 in the interest of their shareholders. I think that's 12 unambiguous. 13 Finally, let's recall also that this is not just a 14 problem for the U.S.; that foreign firms that operate here with 15 regulator security as a part of the process, and the global 16 supply chains mean that overseas supplies are also part of the 17 process. So, again, I don't think there's any need for us to be 18 concerned that this is singling out the United States or U.S. 19 corporations for any particular disadvantage here. And, in 20 fact, the opposite is likely to be true. 21 The sooner we grasp that the better place we'll be, 22 the better place we'll be to compete in the global market as the 23 standards that we're talking about here become more widespread. 24 Thank you. 25 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Just a note to the 0027 1 panelists: When you're speaking, if you could, be sure to be 2 close to the mike so everybody in the back can hear you. And 3 also, if you hear a slight echo, don't worry about that. You 4 don't hear that on the Internet at all, so please speak close to 5 the mike. Mr. Merber? 6 MR. MERBER: Well I'd like to thank the Commission 7 and its staff for the opportunity to be here this afternoon and 8 for the thoughtful attention they've given to this rulemaking 9 process from the beginning. As a participant in the multi 10 stakeholder group that Bennett mentioned, which has provided 11 comments to the SEC at all stages of the proceeding, I'd also 12 like to acknowledge the spirit of cooperation with which a group 13 of issuers, non-governmental organizations and socially 14 responsible investors have come together to address many of the 15 difficult issues that are faced in the rulemaking. The issues 16 are difficult, but we share the common objective of implementing 17 Section 1502 in the manner that most effectively helps to 18 alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. 19 In my opening comments, I'd like to make a few very 20 brief points, really one central point, and of course I'm going 21 to be happy to elaborate on them in the course of the roundtable 22 discussion that follows. But let me start by providing a little 23 bit of context. The conflict minerals, the four that we're 24 dealing with here, tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold, appear in a 25 very broad range of industrial components, including all 0028 1 electronics, many metal alloys and elsewhere. 2 As a result, a company like General Electric has 3 many, many thousands of suppliers that provide items containing 4 conflict minerals. And many of these suppliers are suppliers of 5 complex equipment themselves, who have, again, thousands of 6 suppliers in their supply chains. And everyone has more than 7 one source of everything that they buy. At least that's the 8 goal. And one other complication, which is that all of this is 9 very fluid. 10 Companies change suppliers. Our suppliers change 11 suppliers, and their suppliers change suppliers all the time, so 12 there's a lot of complexity in the supply chain. Now, don't get 13 me wrong. I don't say this to imply that the task isn't doable, 14 but as a context in which to calibrate the expectations of how 15 the task ought to be done; most importantly, the implementing 16 regulations under Section 1502 should provide issuers with the 17 flexibility to design and execute reasonable company of origin 18 inquiries and due diligence processes that are appropriate for 19 their specific situations. 20 Now, these processes should be fully and completely 21 disclosed in the report, so that investors can make judgments 22 about the effectiveness of the process, about the sincerity of 23 the effort and anything else that they would like to draw from 24 the contents of the report. And so the report needs to be full 25 and complete, but it should be a report of a process that has a 0029 1 certain amount of flexibility in its design; you know, at the 2 downstream level, that is from the smelter to the finished 3 product that's being reported on. 4 For example, a reasonable country of origin 5 determination process may include contractual obligations that 6 are followed up and verified by various means, including 7 statistical sampling, and possibly a tiered approach. So that 8 one approach may be used for significant suppliers of conflict 9 minerals, and another for the less significant suppliers, which 10 allows one to spend one's resources on the most important parts 11 of the supply chain, and then over time building up the kind of 12 tracking and traceability that allows you to attempt to get back 13 from the product to the smelters of origin. 14 If the rules do describe or discuss a due diligence 15 process, or reasonable standard of origin process, that should 16 be in the context of providing a safe harbor so that issuers 17 will know that if they comply with certain standards that will 18 presumptively be judged to be reasonable, but that it not be the 19 only means by which reasonableness can be accomplished. And I 20 say this because any attempt at this point to too closely define 21 what the reasonable country of origin process or due diligence 22 process ought to be will either necessarily be too unattainable 23 for some supply chains or not sufficiently rigorous for other 24 supply chains; and, therefore, believe that the appropriate 25 thing is to leave flexibility at this point, but require full 0030 1 and complete disclosure of what's been done so that investors 2 can make judgments. 3 And then also as Bennett alluded to earlier, the 4 process should take account of continuous improvement year over 5 year. And I think that it's appropriate for issuers to help out 6 in that process, but identifying in the reports after the first 7 year the changes and improvements that have been made, so that 8 year over year continuous improvement can be judged by the 9 investor community. 10 So that's one of the central themes I'll be talking 11 about today is the flexibility to do this as efficiently and 12 effectively as possible, by no means saying that it can't be 13 done, just the question of how we go about it. 14 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Ms. Simelane? 15 MS. SIMELANE: Thank you. I wish to begin by 16 thanking the Commission for the invitation to participate as a 17 panelist today and to share the perspective of an Africa-based 18 global mining company. 19 AngloGold Ashanti is the world's largest gold 20 producer. We are headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa, 21 and our share is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and 22 the New York Stock Exchange. Our shareholders are 23 geographically dispersed with 53% in the U.S. AngloGold Ashanti 24 is signatory to the Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and 25 Security, a member of the Responsible Jewelry Council, and they 0031 1 report under the Extractive Industry's Transparency Initiative. 2 We have 20 operations on four continents, which last 3 year produced 4.52 million ounces of gold. Nearly 4 three-quarters of that came from Africa-based operations. We're 5 operating gold mining in Tanzania and two projects in the 6 Democratic Republic of the Congo, besides our operations in West 7 Africa and South Africa. Given this presence in Africa, 8 AngloGold Ashanti believes we have an informed perspective on 9 the proposed rules set forth by the SEC. 10 I think I need to stop by saying AngloGold Ashanti 11 fully supports the state of congressional purpose of Section 12 1502, and that is to seek to end the exploitation and trade of 13 minerals as a source of financing conflict in the DRC. We 14 believe encouraging socially responsible economic development in 15 this region must be recognized as an important part of the 16 strategy to end the conflict and bring about peace and stability 17 in the DRC. 18 However, until the issue of unregulated and illegal 19 Tanzania mining is addressed in the DRC, the aim of the 20 regulations will not be achieved. Also, the lack of accredited 21 refineries in the region is problematic. Better governments, 22 stronger institutions on the ground in the DRC, and security 23 should be primary concerns. The SEC should be lauded for 24 organizing today's roundtable, which hopefully will serve to be 25 for policymakers and the public on factors and issues that must 0032 1 be considered in the conflict minerals rulemaking. 2 I think the SEC would have benefited from more 3 African voices in today's discussion, which have been useful to 4 hear from the governments of nations such as Tanzania and the 5 DRC, and those of the Great Lakes regions, whose citizens will 6 be directly affected by this rule and are already be directly 7 impacted by the de facto embargoes. Also missing are the 8 African-based businesses that will directly be impacted by the 9 rule, such as refiners, traders and manufacturers. 10 I think it's important to put into perspective our 11 activities. The end product of our mining process is not a 12 marketable commodity. That doesn't occur until it has been 13 refined by our refinery to a level of purity acceptable to the 14 world markets. The jewelry we produce has no commercial use in 15 its unrefined state. We submit that gold mining does not 16 constitute the manufacture of a product, and that the final rule 17 should reflect that fact. 18 Companies affected by the rule won't benefit if 19 there is an alignment on the single, authoritative source of 20 reference for guidance, such as the OECD due diligence guidance. 21 It is our view that the OECD's guidance should constitute a 22 global framework and should be relied upon by the SEC in 23 implementing rules, a position already endorsed by the 24 Department of State. However, it must be noted that while the 25 OECD's framework for the three Ts is relatively well developed, 0033 1 the framework for gold has yet to be completed. 2 The gold supply chain is more complex than that of 3 the other minerals covered by Section 1502. The World Gold 4 Council, the association of the global gold industry of which we 5 are a member, published a draft conflict free gold standard in 6 June, and is working diligently to have a chain of custody 7 process in place by the end of 2011. This work is being done in 8 parallel with the OECD's gold working group to produce a gold 9 supplement that commands broad stakeholder support. 10 In addition, the ICG allows regional certification 11 mechanism has been tested in relation to the three Ts, but 12 little attention has to date been given to the specifically 13 challenges to go. We also have concerns regarding the lack of 14 clarity on the auditing standards that align with the goals of 15 Section 1502 and the Commission's proposed rule. 16 The lack of clear guidance make it impossible for 17 the companies to do the necessary planning. We therefore urge 18 the SEC to be mindful of this when considering the timetable for 19 the introduction of the final rule. To allow sufficient time 20 for the necessary management system and controls to be put in 21 place, we recommend the effective date of the rule as it relates 22 to gold should be no earlier than January 2014, and the 23 conflicts mineral report is separated from filing of the 20F, I 24 think, which is inline with what was said earlier by the SEC 25 staff. 0034 1 In order to minimize the potential adverse impact of 2 the rules on responsible gold mining in the DRC and adjoining 3 countries, we also suggest that references made to the conflict 4 minerals map publish and to be regularly updated by the 5 Secretary of State. The SEC's implementation of Section 1502 6 should be focused on the area specifically mapped as conflict 7 areas by the State Department, thereby avoiding stigmatization 8 of the remainder of the DRC in adjoining countries. 9 Finally, we urge the SEC to consider the effects 10 that Section 1502 will have on responsible economic development 11 in the DRC and countries adjoining thereto. Mining is a 12 long-time economic business, and decisions made now will have 13 long-time effects in the DRC, 10 to 20 years from now. The SEC 14 should be mindful that its actions could have unintended adverse 15 consequences on legitimate mining in the region of interest and 16 Africa more generally. 17 A concerned voice in our January 31, 2010 comment 18 letter was the potential to stigmatize gold that is being 19 responsibly mined in the DRC and adjoining country, and perhaps 20 possibly African gold production. This would adversely impact 21 the responsible development of the region's available gold 22 resources and undermine the laudable humanitarian goals that 23 underlie Section 1502. 24 We are also concerned about the unintended de facto 25 embargoes that already are occurring as the result of the 0035 1 legislation, and therefore urge the SEC to strive to minimize 2 the potential adverse impacts of its rule on responsible gold 3 mining in the DRC and adjoining countries. 4 Again, on behalf of all the AngloGold Ashanti, we 5 appreciate the opportunity to participate in this panel and look 6 forward to the discussion. Thank you. 7 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Ms. Villarreal? 8 MS. VILLARREAL: Good afternoon. Thank you for the 9 invitation to participate today. 10 I am happy to have the opportunity to be able to 11 reinforce points made in the Society of Corporate Secretaries 12 and Governance Professionals March and June Comment letters. 13 Those letters were intended to assist the Commission in 14 understanding the implications of its proposed rules for public 15 companies, including, the perhaps unintended consequences on 16 companies like Kraft Foods. Society member companies take 17 compliance with the federal securities laws very seriously. We 18 have put significant compliance programs in place to ensure we 19 meet our disclosure obligations. 20 When the Commission issued its proposed rules, many 21 companies, including mine, were surprised that the disclosure 22 requirements would apply to them. Because we may use tin in 23 some of our packaging for our biscuits, cookies and coffee, for 24 example, we are subject to the rules. So on behalf of many 25 companies like ours, I am happy to comment specifically on some 0036 1 of the reporting issues raised by the proposed rules, which will 2 be the subject of the next panel. 3 Section 1502 requires only that the Commission have 4 issuers annually provide a conflict minerals report; however, 5 the proposed rules would require the report to be an exhibit to 6 the form 10K. Issuers use the form 10K to give shareholders and 7 the securities markets disclosure about the financial health of 8 their companies. Providing the conflicts mineral report as an 9 exhibit to the form 10K is problematic for a number of reasons. 10 Issuers take seriously our obligation to provide 11 investors with accurate and reliable information. We maintain 12 disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the integrity of 13 the information we provide. And our CEOs and our CFOs must 14 certify the information in those forms 10K. Issuers may not be 15 able to achieve the same level of certainty about the data 16 gathered from suppliers of conflict minerals. Fear of 17 competition could make suppliers reluctant to provide the 18 information. Their systems may not be reliable or accurate, or 19 they simply may not have the information. These concerns, 20 coupled with imposing these new and complex requirements, could 21 also put issuers at risk of being unable to timely file their 22 forms 10K. 23 Most public companies are also preparing their proxy 24 statements during this same timeframe, and often the same 25 personnel are responsible for preparing both documents. To 0037 1 address these concerns, we suggest requiring companies to file a 2 standalone form CM report, which would be easier to find for 3 shareholders, consumers and others who are interested in this 4 information. 5 Many company websites already include a discussion 6 of corporate social responsibility programs and initiatives, and 7 this new conflict minerals report would complement that 8 information. A standalone report also would permit different 9 deadlines for the forms 10K and CM, placing less stress on 10 issuers' internal resources, while still accomplishing the goal 11 providing conflict minerals information to shareholders. 12 Again, thank you for the invitation to participate. 13 We appreciate the opportunity to provide the Commission with 14 information we hope will be helpful to the implementation of the 15 statutory provision. Thank you. 16 MS. CROSS: Thank you very much for those very 17 thoughtful opening statements. They're very helpful to us. 18 I'm going to start off with the questions now, and 19 what you'll see in part through our questions are areas where 20 there were issues raised in the comment letters where there 21 hasn't been a thorough discussion of them. So we're hoping to 22 get more thoughts on some of these ideas. So these may not be 23 all the questions you're expecting, but we'll go ahead and get 24 started and look forward to your thoughts. 25 So the first one, Section 1502 defines the term 0038 1 "conflict mineral" as columbite-tantalite, cassiterite gold, 2 wolframite, or their derivatives. The Commission used the same 3 definition in the proposed rules. Several commentators, 4 however, requested that the rule specify the specific conflict 5 minerals derivatives be the so-called "three Ts," tantalum, tin 6 and tungsten, with gold being covered as a mineral itself. 7 Because although the conflict minerals may have other 8 derivatives, such as Niobium oxygen and iron, only the three Ts 9 are significant. 10 Many commentators refer to the covered minerals as 11 the three Ts and gold. Should the Commission specify that the 12 conflict mineral derivatives for the purpose of the final rules 13 be limited to tantalum, tin and tungsten? If not, would there 14 be significant impact on companies, the DRC or other groups of 15 stakeholders or a rule that does not limit the derivatives to 16 the three Ts be workable? 17 MS. DUBBERLY: The three Ts, plus gold. 18 MS. CROSS: Oh. Plus gold, correct. So with that, 19 anybody have any thoughts on that? 20 MR. MERBER: Okay. I'll jump in. I'm not a 21 metallurgist, so I can't answer with the authority of a chemist 22 on the subject. But it seems to me that to accomplish the 23 essential purpose of the rule, that limiting it to the three Ts 24 plus gold would be the most effective measure. Because if you 25 include the other elements that may be derived from the same 0039 1 ore, but aren't the principal objectives of mining that ore, 2 then you're probably not exerting very much pressure on that 3 supply chain, while at the same time vastly complicating the 4 problem of having to go back and look at additional elements. 5 You know. You mentioned iron. Iron is in a lot of 6 things, and to have to trace that back would simply distract 7 from the principal objective of making sure that these intended 8 extracts from those ores be traced. 9 MR. MATHESON: The economic interest is in the three 10 Ts plus gold. So, for example, many of these are also 11 radioactive and they do contain recoverable amounts of uranium 12 and thorium. And in some parts of the world those elements will 13 be reclaimed, but they're not driving the exploitation of 14 minerals in the Congo. Similarly, Niobium; it's a very 15 widespread material in automotive applications in construction; 16 but, again, it's not the primary driver for exploitation in this 17 part of the world. 18 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. I'm not a metallurgist 19 either. I just wanted to make the point that I think, actually, 20 in terms of the issue that the rule is designed to address, 21 which is now very well-known. The language which is in the 22 provision 1502 is sufficiently clear, and we have to keep in 23 mind that when we are looking at the pattern of exploitation and 24 violence in Eastern Congo, we are looking at ores. And I think 25 there is a risk here if we jump into a separate set of terms, 0040 1 which was based through refined metal of creating some ambiguity 2 about the extent to which the ores which are traded 3 internationally as are refined metals derived from them, and I 4 think that could actually cause greater confusion that it 5 actually resolves. So we would propose leaving the language as 6 it is. 7 MS. CROSS: All right. If no one else wants to 8 comment on that particular question, I'll move on to the next 9 one. Manufacturing is not defined in Section 1502. Although 10 the traditional definition of manufacturing does not generally 11 include mining, under the proposed rules companies that mine 12 conflict minerals would be viewed as manufacturing those 13 minerals. 14 Should mining be included in a definition of 15 manufacture? Is mining a transformative process akin to 16 manufacturing? 17 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. A number of panelists, 18 including me, have already made several references to the OECD 19 due diligence standards for minerals which come from conflict 20 affected in high risk areas. And in those standards, as many 21 people here will note, have also been endorsed by the U.N. 22 Security Council and the International Conference on the Great 23 Lakes region of Africa, as well as being implemented in law by 24 the Congolese government makes it very clear that these 25 standards should cover mining. 0041 1 And there's a very good reason for that, which is 2 that mining is the first link in the chain, which in the case of 3 Eastern Congo is giving rise to the beneficiation of armed 4 groups. It absolutely has to be covered, and I think when we 5 look at the positive trends in the sector in Eastern Congo, 6 which have been in part brought about by the instruction of the 7 law. 8 One of the things which is likely to come out of 9 that is that there will be more mining, more industrial mining 10 as opposed to artisanal mining. And there will probably be more 11 companies going to invest, and some companies have already 12 shaped up to begin doing so, including in the regions which are 13 reflected by this law. It's absolutely critical they are 14 covered, because they're the first corporate actor in the chain, 15 and they are the one which is best placed to deal with some of 16 these issues to do with rent seeking by armed groups, theft of 17 minerals and control of areas which should be given over to 18 legitimate, civilian economic activity. 19 So from our perspective, it's absolutely crucial 20 that mining is covered. And as I noted in the beginning of my 21 comment, that's already enshrined in the international due 22 diligence standards governing this kind of supply chain. 23 MS. CROSS: I suppose as a follow-up question the 24 rulemaking that the Commission put out stuck very close to the 25 statutory language. And so to the extent that if questions are 0042 1 raised as to whether the term "manufacture" would include 2 mining, that's part of the reason for our question. Is it akin 3 to a transformative process like manufacturing? I can 4 understand why you might want to cover mining, but is mining 5 manufacturing, I think is the question that I'm attempting to 6 pose here. 7 MR. SIMELANE: I think as already submitted, what I 8 mentioned earlier, I said it's two separate things. What we'd 9 like to say is that mining is not manufacturing. The other is 10 that whether or not to include mining as being important part of 11 the supply chain is a different issue. So it is not to say that 12 mining shouldn't be covered. 13 Although just saying is that if you even look at the 14 North American industrial classification system, where you're 15 looking at mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction, it has a 16 different definition of what manufacturing is. So it's 17 important that the SEC makes a distinction in that rule. So if 18 you do include mining, it must be a deliberate notation that 19 mining is included, because it is part of the supply chain or 20 start of the supply chain, but mining is not manufacturing. 21 MS. DUBBERLY: Okay. Thank you. So we're going to 22 turn now to necessary to the functionality or production. This 23 question I've drafted up here is pretty long, so if you'll bear 24 with me, you'll see I'm trying to get out a number of different 25 points. So if you hear anything in the setup that you're 0043 1 interested in talking about, we'd love to hear it. 2 The Commission did not define when a conflict 3 mineral would be considered necessary to the functionality of a 4 product. The Commission provided guidance in the proposing 5 release that a conflict mineral would be considered necessary to 6 the production of a product if it is intentionally included in 7 the final product's production process, regardless of whether 8 the conflict mineral is not ultimately in the final product, and 9 would not be considered necessary to the production of a product 10 if it isn't a tool or machinery necessary to produce their 11 product. 12 A number of commentators suggested definitions for 13 when a product should be considered necessary to the 14 functionality or production of a product. One such definition 15 could be if the mineral was necessary or essential to the 16 product's use, purpose, marketability, functioning or economic 17 utility. 18 Should the Commission define or provide guidance 19 regarding when a conflict mineral is necessary to the 20 functionality or production of a product? If so, should the 21 Commission consider a substance, ingredient or component as 22 necessary to the functionality of a product if a conflict 23 mineral is intentionally added to the product and/or meets any 24 additional test, such as whether the conflict mineral is 25 essential to the product's use, purpose, marketability, 0044 1 functioning economic utility? 2 How should the Commission define any of these tests? 3 For example, when would a conflict mineral be considered 4 essential to a product's use? Should there be another test, 5 such as whether the conflict mineral is essential to a product's 6 basic function? 7 Should the Commission limit any definition or 8 guidance by stating that none of the following would be deemed 9 to be necessary for the functionality or production of a product 10 a naturally occurring impurity, an unintentional byproduct of 11 the manufacturing process, an ancillary or incidental feature, 12 attribute or quality incorporated for purposes of ornamentation, 13 decoration or embellishment any conflict mineral integrated into 14 any manufacturing tool, equipment or process used in the 15 production of an end product or a residual metal catalyst used 16 to chemically react and manufacture a product that does not 17 otherwise contribute to the performance of the end product? 18 So I know that was wide-ranging, but I anybody has 19 any thoughts? 20 MR. FREEMAN: I'll just address one angle, I think, 21 that you're getting at, and I'm sure others. Yeah. I'm sure 22 others will have views to add as well that may be more 23 comprehensive than mine, but I think you're getting in part at a 24 de minimis standard here. We don't think that functionality 25 should be the salient test of whether a particular product is 0045 1 included here. 2 It may appear on the face of it that that would be a 3 reasonable approach, since some products may contain only very, 4 very small amounts of a particular metal. But take the example 5 of cell phones. Gold is a component used in cell phones. It 6 may not be critical to the functionality of the cell phone as a 7 global communication device, but when one takes into account the 8 fact that there were 1.6 billion cell phones sold globally last 9 year, that adds up to be a very significant volume of that 10 particular metal. 11 So our view is that even a small portion of a 12 particular end product that may be tied to one of these minerals 13 should nonetheless covered for this reason, and therefore we 14 would be uncomfortable with a de minimis standard. I hope that 15 that addresses at least one angle of your -- 16 MS. CROSS: Actually, my next question is about de 17 minimis, so right now we're focusing on necessary functionality. 18 So you'll get to answer again. 19 MS. VILLARREAL: Thank you. Can I also tell you 20 that from an issuer perspective the simpler you can make the 21 three Ts and gold for those of us who don't have any types of 22 those people on our staffs to try to figure out what, besides 23 tin and gold and tantalum is. We had discussions around that, 24 and derivatives and those things would just make it that much 25 more difficult for us to understand what it is we're looking 0046 1 for. 2 So please make it a little simpler. But another 3 discussion we've had is what is essential to the production, and 4 we started going down the path. And this is probably a good 5 place for me to let you know that we have about 40,000 distinct 6 products that Kraft Food produces in the world and we have about 7 100,000 suppliers, direct and indirect suppliers. 8 And when I started talking to my procurement people 9 about tell me whether or not we have anything that is important 10 to the production of any of our packaging, because that may be 11 the place where we have some of those conflict minerals, and 12 they started talking to me about, well, there's the press that 13 we need to make the Capri Sun package. So obviously that press 14 is going to have probably some tin. It's made from iron or 15 something, so that's probably going to have something. 16 We have trucks. It's essential for trucks to go to 17 pick up the cocoa in the fields in Africa to bring them to where 18 they need to go. So is that going to be? Yes. If we don't 19 have those trucks bringing the cocoa where it needs to go to be 20 processed, I mean there are all kinds of things, and it was 21 getting a bit overwhelming, and I was getting a little bit 22 hyperventilating when we were going through all of that. And, 23 so, anything you can do to help us, because when they started 24 talking to me about all those different things, I really don't 25 know how to help them with the scope when we're looking at 0047 1 100,000 suppliers and 40,000 distinct products that we're 2 manufacturing. 3 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Merber? 4 MR. MERBER: Just to comment on one piece of this, 5 just to keep the discussion going, the point that Irma touched 6 on with respect to the capital equipment that you use in 7 producing products, the three Ts and gold may be essential to 8 the functionality of that capital equipment, without which you 9 couldn't make the product you're making. But if one were to 10 include reporting on that conflict mineral used "in the 11 production of the finished product on which we would be 12 reporting," since capital equipment may be in place for many, 13 many years, and already will be in our factories -- and we don't 14 know the origin of the conflict minerals in the capital 15 equipment -- it would require unknown reporting on everything 16 made on a particular piece of equipment for the useful life of 17 that equipment. 18 And I think that would not provide the investors 19 with information about what's going on today in the supply chain 20 of the issuer. And I think that what's important to investors 21 is what's going on today in the supply chain. So by being over 22 inclusive in what is necessary to the production of would 23 actually I think undercut the basic objective of the regulation 24 by Washington everything out into a known for a long period of 25 time. 0048 1 MS. SIMELANE: I think it's not really answering 2 your question directly, but I think it's important to note what 3 gold is concerned. It is actually possible for companies to 4 bypass this by using your recycled gold or actually even 5 sourcing gold from other sources other than from the DRC -- if 6 you know what I mean -- because gold is very recyclable. So if 7 you're going to be looking for what companies can do actually 8 just to use the one that already exists and bypass the replacing 9 it, effectively back on the gold that comes from the DRC. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. And we'll address some of 11 recycle in the next panel. Mr. Davis, did you have a point you 12 wanted to make? 13 MR. DAVIS: Yes, just very quick, just to say that 14 in our opinion what the Commission put forward in the proposed 15 rule is clear enough on this point. 16 MR. MATHESON: And, you know, I think Sandy makes a 17 fine point that there are some legacy issues in capital 18 equipment, and one needs to be careful not to draw these rules 19 too broadly. By the same token, to a great extent many of these 20 materials and the components built from them are somewhat 21 interchangeable. So one can't draw these rules too narrowly. 22 I rest this isn't terribly helpful in the context of 23 the question, but one can't draw them too narrowly, because 24 essential in its stricter sense would mean only a very small 25 proportion of these products would really be covered by the 0049 1 legislation. And I don't believe that's the intent of the 2 congress. The intent is to address the trade in minerals, so we 3 need to be careful about how narrowly we draw the rules as well. 4 MS. CROSS: If I could -- since this is such an 5 important point -- I might have some follow-up questions here; 6 see if I could focus you all a little bit. For example, you 7 have a product and there's some small ornamentation on it that 8 has a conflict mineral in it, but it's really not a big part. 9 The product works fine without it. It's a little star on it or 10 something. 11 Is that within what is intended by the statute if 12 you happen to have anything on a product that has a conflict 13 mineral in it without regard to whether it makes the product 14 work or not? We certainly had suggestions from commentators 15 that we should exclude ornamentation. 16 Looking down the list, this is probably one of the 17 areas of biggest comment is we need to put some contours around 18 this so that we give life to the meaning in the provision, 19 because it says necessary to functionality. That must mean 20 something. It isn't written to say it's in there. It says it's 21 necessary to functionality. So we're in part trying to tease 22 out from the panel, if we could try one more time, if there's 23 things that are not necessary to functionality that wouldn't 24 require the conflict minerals reporting. 25 MR. MATHESON: Well I have to say if an element of a 0050 1 design is involved in the product, then it's hard for me to 2 imagine any circumstance in which it's not being put there 3 deliberately. So ornamentation, if it's there explicitly, it's 4 there because it's been designed there. And I think that shows 5 an intent, need or value to the ornamentation. If some of these 6 happen to show by chance, it would actually be typical, I think, 7 in most industrial contexts, be regarded as an error or a 8 quality problem. And in no sense adding any representing the 9 product. 10 So I think the question actually is I understand the 11 direction of the question, but I think it's a poorly phrased or 12 a poorly framed issue. If something's there, it's there because 13 somebody designed it to be there, and therefore I believe it 14 should be covered by the regulation. 15 MS. CROSS: So under this approach, we have comments 16 that say if it's intentionally added that it should be -- 17 MR. MATHESON: Well I could see if you had a -- 18 MS. CROSS: So I guess that's your perspective. 19 MR. MATHESON: I believe so. I mean if it's piece 20 of a spent catalyst that happens to end up in a product that you 21 can't take out or you don't need to take out to provide the 22 utility you're offering your customers, that's one thing. But 23 if something that's part of a design that's intentionally 24 something that you sell, or that you've explicitly thought about 25 in putting there, I don't see why that should fall outside the 0051 1 regulation, because you thought about it. 2 MR. MERBER: Okay. Thank you. I think the other 3 piece of this is that -- and I think someone already has 4 mentioned -- the desire for simplicity when simplicity is 5 available. You know. We've made some statements in our 6 corporate citizenship report about conflict minerals, you know, 7 before the legislation. We're about to come out with our 8 statement of principles in a much more detailed way. We won't 9 distinguish between conflict minerals that are necessary for 10 functionality and those that aren't necessary for functionality 11 in what we feel our citizenship responsibility is in this area. 12 I think that also just as a practical matter to go 13 through all of our thousands and thousands and thousands of 14 suppliers of materials that include conflict minerals and try to 15 sort them between those that are by some definition necessary 16 and by some other definition not necessary is probably more 17 difficult than dealing with the conflict minerals, generally, 18 throughout the supply train. So in the multi stakeholder 19 comments, you know, we talked about the standard of 20 intentionally added, and I think that that is an appropriate way 21 to go. 22 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Davis and then Mr. Bouffard after 23 that. 24 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. I'd just like to follow-on 25 for that. We would also view the key litmus test as being 0052 1 whether it's intentionally added or not. I think if you start 2 to go down the road to making exemptions for things like 3 "ornamentation," you just open a huge can of words. I mean 4 ornamentation could conceivably cover most jewelry, for example, 5 and then that gets to the heart of what the law is actually 6 going to achieve with regards to gold. So I would merely 7 endorse the comments made about the key thing being the 8 intentional usage. 9 MR. BOUFFARD: Thank you. I think it's important to 10 look at it from another perspective, which is the practicality 11 of what we're trying to build in terms of a global gold supply 12 chain. Gold is the primary metal I can speak on, for example. 13 And we're working with, for example, GeSI-EICC on a refinery 14 protocol, for example, that's under development. 15 And the idea behind that is refineries are willing 16 to join that initiative, for example, and produce gold that 17 comes through that's auditable and certifiable, et cetera. And 18 those refineries, for example, are either going to be in the 19 program or not in the program. So if you're asking about gold 20 ending up in its end state, it still has to go through that 21 choke point in our supply chain, which is the refinery. 22 And a responsible gold supply chain would have a 23 certifiable and auditable point, so regardless of where the gold 24 came through after the choke point, it could still be measured. 25 It could still be accounted for, for example. 0053 1 MS. CROSS: All right. Now that I pressed you on 2 that I can move on to the next question, which falls upon the de 3 minimis point. As proposed, the rules do not include a de 4 minimis conflict minerals exemption or threshold. Some 5 commentators argued that the rule should include such an 6 exemption or threshold and provided different ways to measure 7 when the amount of conflict minerals in a product should be 8 considered de minimis. 9 Other commentators suggested that an issuer with a 10 de minimis amount of conflict minerals in its products should 11 not have to provide a conflict minerals report. On the other 12 hand, other commentators agreed with the rules as proposed that 13 there should not be any de minimis exemption or threshold, given 14 that many products contain only small or trace amounts of these 15 minerals, but the minerals are nevertheless crucial to their 16 function. 17 These commentators noted that the necessary to 18 functionality test was included in Section 1502, specifically 19 because a de minimis test would undermine the goals of Section 20 1502. Should the Commission include a de minimis conflict 21 minerals exemption or threshold to the rules? Would including a 22 de minimis exemption be consistent with the statutory language 23 and goals? 24 If a de minimis threshold is appropriate, how should 25 the rules define when the amount of conflict minerals in a 0054 1 product is de minimis? And how could the Commission address the 2 fact that a de minimis amount could be crucial to a product? 3 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. I'm really going to follow 4 on from what my colleague from Calvert said a moment ago in 5 response to the previous question. We would counsel against 6 using any kind of de minimis criteria, because as he pointed 7 out, in many of the products which you use these conflict 8 minerals, the actual amount in each item is very small. That 9 applies to gold. It also applies to Tantalum too. 10 Moreover, I think we need to keep focused on what 11 the intention of the law is here. The intention of the law is 12 to reduce the scope of extremely murderous and abusive armed 13 groups in a certain part of the world to derive financing and 14 benefit from the purchasing and usage choices, which companies 15 and ultimately consumers make. You can't really boil that down 16 to a level at which it's acceptable to be part of that. 17 We're not talking here about a situation which is 18 comparable to the level of toxicity of a chemical to an end user 19 in a product. The intention of the law here is to prevent 20 harmful consequences in the country of origin, and I don't think 21 there's really any basis of saying, well, if the contribution to 22 that harm is this amount, it's acceptable. And if the 23 contribution to this harm is lower or higher, then we treat it 24 in a different way. 25 MR. MATHESON: I'd like just to remark that if we 0055 1 look at some specific issuers here who are affected directly by 2 a question of de minimis, that's usually computer chip 3 manufacturers, as an example. There's very, very small amounts. 4 I've got no idea how much, but probably micrograms or less of 5 tantalum in logic chips. And yet the major logic chip 6 manufacturers are right at the forefront of the EICC and GeSI 7 initiative, precisely to deal with this problem. So I think if 8 you look from the interest of the issuers, we can see that it's 9 specific, because I'm sure this isn't the only one, and I'm sure 10 it's quite representative that the issuers believe de minimis is 11 not an appropriate standard to impose. 12 MS. CROSS: All right. So the next question deals 13 with the definition of the term "contracting manufacturer." So 14 Section 1502 applies to a person described, and a person is 15 described if conflict minerals are necessary to the 16 functionality or production of a product manufactured by such 17 person. As proposed, the rules would define contracting 18 manufacturer to apply to issuers that contract for the 19 manufacturing of products over which they have any influence 20 regarding the manufacturing of these products and for generic 21 products offered under an issuers own brand name or a separate 22 brand name, regardless of whether the issuer has any influence 23 over the manufacturing specifications of the product, provided 24 that the issuer has contracted to have the product manufactured 25 specifically for itself. 0056 1 Some commentators suggested should the Commission 2 consider applying the definition only to issuers that exercise 3 direct and immediate influence over the sourcing of materials, 4 parts, ingredients or components of the product? If so, how 5 would the Commission define when issuers exercise such direct 6 and immediate influence? 7 Alternatively, should the Commission consider 8 further limiting the definition to exclude retailers, service 9 providers, and other non manufacturing issuers, by indicating 10 that issuers would not be deemed to contract a manufacture of 11 product by virtue of the fact that issuers specify or negotiate 12 certain contractual terms, assemble a product primarily from off 13 the shelf parts or components, affix its brand, marks, logo or 14 label to a generic product manufactured by a third party, or 15 service, maintain and repair a product manufactured by a third 16 party? If an issuer is not deemed to contract a manufacturer 17 product because the issuer specifies or negotiates certain 18 contract terms, how would one differentiate allowable contract 19 terms and those that would be considered contracting the 20 manufacturer? 21 And if an issuer is not deemed to contract a 22 manufactured product because the issuer assembles the product 23 primarily from off the shelf parts or components, does the 24 Commission need to define an off the shelf product? If so, what 25 would be a reasonable definition of "off the shelf?" Would the 0057 1 term be self-explanatory? Please. 2 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. Thank you. We would strongly 3 suggest that the Commission does not exempt those that are 4 contracting the manufacture of items, even if that may seem on 5 the face of it like an exercise in outsourcing the exercise of 6 assembling ready finished parts. I mean in the end the 7 inference we're talking about here and responsibility that goes 8 with it, which is what the law gets at, is to do with money. 9 It's about purchasing. It's about how much as the 10 company acts in the supply chain you're paying your supplier and 11 what it is you're asking them to do, the issue of the extent 12 which you as the manufacturer for example are playing a hands-on 13 role in using or manipulating the materials is secondary. And I 14 think if the Commission were to go down this route of making 15 exemptions of this kind, you would open potentially a very large 16 loophole indeed. 17 My colleague was talking a moment ago about the role 18 of tantalum for chipmakers. Now there are a lot of items in 19 supply chains which use chips, and chips are actually made quite 20 high up the supply chain, if you like, a step or two after the 21 metal has been refined. And I think if the Commission were to 22 go down the route of taking a view that those companies which 23 are assembling items from finished component parts might find 24 that you inadvertently exempted a very large proportion of the 25 issue as this law is designed to cover. 0058 1 MR. MATHESON: So I'm just trying to think beyond 2 simply retailing an item how the question may capture products. 3 Perhaps, I might say I'm Andrew Matheson Stores, Inc. I'd like 4 to have a DVR I can sell and put my name on it. And that seems 5 to me to be absurd. And that's it. So Mr. Freeman, please make 6 it for me. 7 That seems to me to be in practice an absurd 8 situation that no responsible company I'd have a wish to invest 9 in would dream in a million years of letting yourself in for. 10 So I think, again, I think what I want to invest in my wish, the 11 investor wants to know that the companies they invest in act 12 responsibly with care, thought and attention to the value of the 13 brand, which in the case of anything which is retailing is a 14 significant part of the value of the asset. 15 In fact they were attentive to and responsible for 16 the process they operate, and also perhaps they operate 17 ethically. So I think the question is really not, again -- and 18 I understand people probably could ask these questions, but I 19 don't think it's a terribly well-formed question. I can't see 20 it in reality as a particularly common occurrence. 21 MS. DUBBERLY: So just to press the point a little 22 bit, I think that the commentators have written in that the 23 phrase in the statute is you manufacture or you contract and 24 manufacture. And so in for instance the retail situation they 25 may sell DVDs, but they're saying we specified that it plays X 0059 1 number of DVDs, very basic things, but that is it, and maybe 2 they put their label on it and they sell it. But they aren't 3 really contracting to manufacture, which is the term that the 4 statute doesn't necessarily say retail. It says "manufacture" 5 and "contracting manufacture." 6 MS. CROSS: And just to be clear, the purpose for 7 the discussion is that we have substantial comments to this 8 effect. So to suggest that this doesn't -- that people are not 9 doing this, we're reviewing the comments and people are 10 suggesting that there should be a distinction based on whether 11 one has influence, because if you have influence you have a 12 better chance of being able to say this should be in my supply 13 chain or not in the way your contract is structured. 14 So the question was a multi part question, because 15 we have many comments suggesting very specific ways to deal with 16 this issue for companies that do essentially buy generic 17 products to put their name on and sell in their stores. They 18 may not be the company that you would choose to invest in, but 19 it's a common practice. So I think part of it is trying to make 20 the rules applicable to the full range of public companies that 21 report with us. 22 So that's the reason for the question. We have a 23 significant comment to this effect, so we're pressing a bit to 24 see how we should think about this. 25 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Bouffard? 0060 1 MR. BOUFFARD: Thank you. Again, I think it's 2 important that we remember what we're all trying to build here 3 regardless of the mineral to which you are referring. We're all 4 trying to build a responsible supply chain for these minerals. 5 We've determined that writing a purchase order is a 6 contract to manufacture. We've looked at it as broadly as 7 possible. And at the same time we're largest in our sector, and 8 only a few that are affected though, because of the fragmented 9 nature of the industry. At the same time the responsibility for 10 contracting to build a piece of jewelry, for example, is that 11 manufacturing process. 12 Is it going to include products that originate in a 13 mine, go through a refinery, go through a manufacturer and 14 finally end up at retail? And the only way to have companies 15 that are responsible companies participate in that development 16 of a global supply chain that is with a traceability element, 17 such as those who worked with RJC and OECD, et cetera, for gold, 18 is going to take everybody's participation from government to 19 industry to manufacturers and to retailers. 20 MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. I agree with that point 21 that Mr. Bouffard made, and I'd also want to associate myself 22 with the very sharp point that my seat mate Mr. Matheson made. 23 At Calvert, we look at the full value chain. We look at 24 companies, manufacturers. We look at contractors, and here take 25 the case of one of the issues that's been raised by a number of 0061 1 commentators to this process, which is whether companies private 2 labels should be covered. And we think that they should. 3 We wanted to be able to see whether there is going 4 to be a presence of so-called conflict minerals throughout the 5 value chain from beginning to end here. And I think I would 6 just step back and observe that it's become well-established 7 practice now for over a decade in a number of industries -- not 8 just the electronics industry sectors -- that regardless of the 9 status of the manufacturer versus the contractor, private label 10 or otherwise, that consumers and investors alike are interested 11 in the integrity of an entire supply chain all the way to the 12 final product. And, certainly, we evaluate human rights-related 13 risk in our portfolios at Calvert in this full and comprehensive 14 manner. 15 MS. VILLARREAL: Just a brief point; I want to make 16 sure that we're remembering that it's not that those minerals 17 aren't going to be disclosed because the manufacturer of those 18 products will be required to disclose the retailer. And we have 19 many issuers who are small and mid-size companies who don't have 20 exactly what you said. They don't have the power to make the 21 contracts and have the influence over those manufacturers to 22 force them to do things. 23 They are getting the products that are off the 24 shelves. To require them also to be considered a manufacturer 25 and disclosing is almost punitive. And those manufacturers are 0062 1 going to be required to do that anyway for that particular 2 product. 3 MS. DUBBERLY: Anybody else want to talk on this 4 topic? 5 MS. CROSS: And I did want to note that when I press 6 on these questions it's so that we can have this dialog. I 7 don't want to suggest I have a point of view, but I'm trying to 8 make sure that we discussed the issues that are being raised in 9 the comment letters, which is the purpose of this discussion. 10 MR. MATHESON: So just on that last point, you know, 11 it seems to me to be absurd to require people who have already 12 been certified to be effectively certified again. You know. In 13 the example that was given, if I'm a small to medium-sized 14 retailer, I'm sourcing from a company which has already passed 15 through the process. 16 I don't see why -- and that's my spectrum of home 17 grown products. It seems to me to make no sense to require me 18 to go through a further certification process. If I can 19 document I'm buying products that are being properly audited and 20 comply with regulations, comply with the law, that should be 21 fine. So I don't see an issue there. And I guess the question 22 is what happens to firms that are supplying that are not covered 23 by the law. 24 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Now we'll turn to the 25 reasonable country of origin inquiry after you've figured out 0063 1 that your products have the minerals. You have to determine 2 after reasonable country of origin inquiry whether the conflict 3 minerals originated in the DRC countries. 4 The reasonable country of origin inquiry was 5 designed to be less exhaustive than the due diligence required 6 if minerals are found to originate from the DRC country. In the 7 release the Commission noted that the proposed rules would not 8 state what a reasonable country of origin inquiry would entail, 9 because it believed that necessarily would depend on the 10 issuer's particular facts and circumstances. 11 The Commission noted, for instance, that an issuer 12 could satisfy the reasonable country of origin inquiry standard, 13 if it received reasonably reliable representations from the 14 facilities smelting the minerals directly or through its 15 suppliers. Should the Commission specify or define a reasonable 16 country of origin inquiry or is that facts and circumstances 17 approach workable? If you think there should be a definition, 18 do you have specific ideas of what should be included in it? 19 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. Yes, we think that the 20 Commission should define a reasonable country of origin inquiry. 21 It's an absolutely crucial part of implementation of the law 22 and terribly important that issuers get it right. And we think 23 that without some specific explanation of what it is that the 24 law expects and the quality of the responses on that point may 25 not be as high as it needs to be. 0064 1 And we would suggest that picking up from the point 2 you made, the reference to smelters, the key part of conducting 3 a reasonable country of origin inquiry is to identify the 4 smelter as the choke point in the supply chain, and then seek to 5 verify the smelter's own claims about the country of origin of 6 the materials that they're using. They're always doing that 7 through third parties. One of them I mentioned in my opening 8 remarks. 9 There's a particular smelter violation program that 10 some industry groups have been developing, which seeks to give 11 third party verdict on the controls that smelters are exercising 12 on their supply chains. There may be other means that industry 13 groups can come up with, pooling their resources and thus saving 14 costs. But we don't believe that it's sufficient to rely on the 15 representations alone of smelters, for example. 16 We have to keep in mind that many smelters have 17 quite knowingly and recklessly used conflict materials from 18 Eastern Congo, and for many years without making any serious 19 efforts to remedy their supply chain controls. And so we do 20 think it's essential, first of all, that the issuer identifies 21 that smelter, seeks the smelter's account of what the country of 22 origin is, and seeks third-party verification of those claims. 23 And when they do that, the issuer should be keeping 24 in mind what red flag issues to look out for, which are set out 25 in the OECD standards and also elsewhere too, which includes 0065 1 looking at, for example, claims by a smelter that the materials 2 originate from a country which is not known to produce these 3 minerals' that the smelter declares that the country of origin 4 is one which known to be a trafficking point for minerals coming 5 out of Eastern Congo. And also we think another red flag issue 6 to look out for is any claims that the point of origin is 7 actually another smelter that may in part have processed the 8 materials, because that could provide a way of escaping a full 9 account of where the minerals originate from. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: So just to make sure I'm following, 11 for the reasonable country of origin, when the issuer is then 12 trying to figure out what country the mineral came from -- you 13 know -- through their suppliers, you're suggesting they should 14 have more. You want a certification from the smelter to come up 15 through the chain, plus review? Is that sort of it? 16 MR. DAVIS: No. I'm not saying it has to be a 17 certification. I mean we're talking about a due diligence 18 process here, and we would certainly accept that within that 19 there needs to be some flexibility about how exactly companies 20 gather the information that they need. 21 The point to make here is that the smelter has 22 recognized choke points in the supply chain, and so if companies 23 are making a reasonable country of origin inquiry, it has to 24 involve identifying the smelter. And the second point to make 25 is that the issue is having identified the smelter and asked the 0066 1 smelter what the country of origin is, they should be looking to 2 get some other independent source of information, which is going 3 to help validate the claims that the smelter makes, so not 4 simply relying on the smelter's word. 5 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Ms. Villarreal? 6 MS. VILLARREAL: Thank you. I find it terribly 7 helpful when the Commission includes examples for those of us 8 who have to help our companies comply. So some examples of 9 reasonable reliance on supplier representation, such as 10 demonstrating by contractual obligations with direct suppliers 11 to use DRC conflict free only minerals, and certifications from 12 or notifications to suppliers that the components are products 13 that were supplied are DRC conflict free, things like that would 14 be terribly helpful to us. So if you could do something like 15 that, that would be great. 16 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Bouffard and then Ms. Simelane. 17 MR. BOUFFARD: Thank you. I think it's important 18 that we're talking about the country or origin to talk about 19 that. And along without talking about the subjects around it, 20 for example, leads back to the phased in approach and why that's 21 important here as well. 22 Currently, as we have options for reporting: yes, 23 no, and unable to determine; and having to provide a very 24 comprehensive conflict mineral report, we would prefer the 25 category of "indeterminate," for example. That way, we would 0067 1 not have to, while the work is being developed, to create the 2 responsible supply chains that we're talking about, and we're 3 inspired by the responsible smelter programs that are underway. 4 And we're trying to work with GeSI and EICC to 5 develop a responsible refinery protocol. So that's where that 6 comes into play. So while we're providing a reporting 7 indeterminate, for example, we would not have to complete a 8 conflict minerals report, which is take our focus off the work 9 we're doing; would not have to go through the audit, but we 10 would be fully disclosing the due diligence that we're 11 undertaking. 12 And, again, that would begin immediately on the 13 effective date of the rules and would continue on an annual 14 basis while the work is done. We would disclose that our 15 company's products do contain conflict minerals, but we would 16 like to say that the country of origin of that conflict mineral, 17 for example, is indeterminate, because the globally recognized 18 systems of making this reliable inquiry simply do not exist yet. 19 And that's why a phased-in approach is important and 20 that's why time is important for us to conduct our due diligence 21 efforts, but we'd like to do it without a conflict minerals 22 report, remembering that management has to certify the company 23 is taking all reasonable efforts to comply. 24 MS. SIMELANE: I'm not sure about how the smelters 25 on the three Ts work, but I just think the issue really is 0068 1 working with the non-issuers and what work would be done on the 2 ground to make sure they're actually complying. They don't have 3 loopholes on the system. Because I think in the way that we do 4 business we have our own smelters that then go straight into the 5 refineries. So any of the large gold responsible mining 6 companies would have their own smelters, so there isn't the 7 issue that is represented on this question. 8 MR. MERBER: Thank you. This is a very difficult 9 issue and I think it has to be divided kind of into two separate 10 pieces. You know. One is representations or how one can be 11 assured that the smelter, itself, is conflict free. And in that 12 we support the EICC GeSI program, and hope that one will be 13 developed for gold to have smelter-free, you know, conflict-free 14 smelters identified. 15 Now once conflict-free smelters are identified, then 16 the other question is understanding the extent to which you can 17 know that those are the only smelters that are in your supply 18 chain. And that's where I think that there needs to be a 19 particular amount of flexibility, because supply chains differ. 20 If, for example, you know, our company makes light 21 bulbs that have tungsten filaments, we buy tungsten directly 22 from smelters. It's relatively easy for us to know whether a 23 tungsten smelter, when the tungsten smelter program is fully in 24 place, we'll know whether that tungsten smelter is verified or 25 not. But that's one extreme example. 0069 1 The other extreme example is taking the page from 2 the previous question where you may have contracted for the 3 production of something. So, say we contract with somebody for 4 the production of a room air conditioner or a refrigerator, each 5 of which is a very complicated piece of equipment by itself that 6 has many, many, many parts that contain conflict minerals. 7 Knowing how to find out what the smelters of origin are for all 8 of the conflict minerals in those products is a long task. It's 9 arduous. It will take some time to do. 10 We could impose a contract requirement on that 11 contract manufacturer that would supply us only with 12 refrigerators that have conflict minerals from verified 13 smelters, but it will take time for that supplier to us to trace 14 back through its supply chain through similar, contractual 15 provisions. So that in the first year of the program, in the 16 beginning when we issue a contract, the contract can't say that 17 everything in a complicated piece of equipment has to be from a 18 verified smelter, because there's no way for a supplier to 19 comply with that. You know. 20 There's always a red flag when your suppliers agree 21 to comply with something that you know they can't do. So the 22 difficult thing is in making as much progress as possible to 23 trace back to those smelters so that we can direct the suppliers 24 in the supply chain to use the ones that are verified, and that 25 of course has to marry up at some point in time with a 0070 1 reasonably verified universe of smelters to choose from, which 2 doesn't exist in all metals at this point. 3 So it takes time, even to be able to contractually 4 obligate our direct suppliers to supply us with material only 5 that traces back to conflict free smelters. So that's why I 6 think that the important thing is that there be disclosure, 7 disclosure, disclosure about what's been done. So we could be 8 able to say, look. Here's what we've obligated our direct 9 suppliers to do and it's not in all cases necessarily going to 10 be that everything in their chain has to go back to a 11 conflict-free smelter, because that's not possible for them to 12 do. 13 But we need to be able to say, look. When you 14 bought it from the smelter, we want to make darned sure if 15 there's a conflict-free smelter available, you use it. And we'd 16 like to see you impose that on your direct suppliers, so that if 17 they're buying directly from the smelter, they're buying only 18 from conflict-free smelter. That gets us down two levels. 19 Over time, we can get down every level, but it will 20 take time to do that, because, you know, our suppliers, as I 21 say, we've got thousands of suppliers and they have thousands of 22 suppliers. So we can get there. And doing that, we'll start to 23 impose the pressure on the system that we want to see. You 24 know. 25 If we start doing that, then the pressure on the 0071 1 smelters to get verified will start to exist from the very 2 beginning, but we won't get to the bottom of our product for a 3 little bit of time. And so what we'd like to be able to do is 4 have the freedom to develop the program that does that as 5 effectively as possible, and at the same time then disclose 6 completely what we've done and let the investors judge whether 7 what we've done is appropriate. 8 MS. DUBBERLY: So maybe I could just one second 9 follow-up on that point and sort of a couple of points as well. 10 And I think Mr. Bouffard also made this point is so while you're 11 having this disclosure, it will take time to get to the final 12 sort of point. How much time are you folks talking about, and 13 what do you want? What would you feel comfortable should be 14 disclosed, exactly? 15 MR. BOUFFARD: Well, thank you. And I think it's 16 important when we're talking again about this phased-in 17 disclosure and the amount of time that it's going to take, that 18 companies who are willing to disclose and are proud of the 19 effort that they're undertaking to provide their due diligence 20 efforts ought not to be implicated for doing so, and such as the 21 conversation about the country of origin. 22 But in terms of time, we're still waiting; and, 23 again, I think we need to differentiate between tantalum, 24 tungsten and tin and gold, and we're again inspired by the work 25 the tantalum industry has done. And we believe that's a model 0072 1 that can be brought over to gold, for example. However, we're 2 still waiting for OECD guidelines. 3 RJC is still working on its chain of custody 4 protocol. That ought to be done by this year. I believe the 5 OECD guidelines ought to be done by the early part of next year. 6 So we're already into 2012, and the project that we're working 7 with, with 300-plus suppliers, it's going to take us time to 8 determine -- and we will -- the full supply chain of our 9 suppliers, and then begin to look at what banks, what refineries 10 that they're working with currently, and what opportunities 11 there are to fall into a program that would be a responsible 12 goal to resupply chain that would meet the goals of the 13 legislation. 14 So even if that were to come together as we continue 15 to work on it every day, we're still into next year. And once 16 that protocol is built conceptually, would turn into a pilot 17 that we could model, perhaps the following year. But once 18 you're talking about hundreds of vendors around the world, it's 19 going to take time for it to be fully implementable. 20 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Simelane? 21 MS. SIMELANE: I just wanted to comment on the one 22 seated next to me about the smelting and the refining. I just 23 think -- and he made the comment about in some metals that the 24 processes are not fully there. I just think we need to 25 differentiate between the smelting and the refinery in the gold 0073 1 industry, because at smelting stage, as I said earlier, you 2 don't have any commercially viable product. 3 It's only at the refinery. And if you want to 4 comply with this legislation, it would be the manufacturers 5 would have to use LBMA certified refineries, because they're 6 working very hard to try and comply with this legislation so 7 they know their customer and they can trace back on the 8 reasonable country of origin inquiry. So there is a difference, 9 I think, with gold that you can use certified refineries. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Mr. Davis, did you want 11 to say something? 12 MR. DAVIS: Yes, thank you. Two points really. 13 First of all I'd very much like to encourage and commend those 14 representatives on the panel who are from companies which are 15 already making real efforts to comply with the law. And we 16 think that's a hugely positive thing. I did, however, want to 17 make a point that looks at the context of this issue a little 18 more broadly. 19 We have worked on this question of natural resource 20 exploitation fueling on violence in the Congo for some years 21 now. And I have to say we go through various stages in which 22 the centers of debate about how the supply chain works shifts 23 around with one constituent group of company or another, making 24 the argument about it so complicated. So I think there's an 25 element of demystification that's required here. 0074 1 Around about three years ago, the center of this 2 debate was how it was so incredibly complicated to figure out 3 which mines and which Contoire in Eastern Congo -- that's 4 trading houses fed with smelters. Research by us and by the 5 U.N. group of experts and other NGOs cracked that, and then the 6 debate moved on. And then about a year and a half ago we were 7 at the point where the discussion was about how incredibly 8 complicated it was for companies which use quite large 9 quantities of tantalum, for example, to make chips and other 10 components -- how complicated it was for them to find those 11 smelters. And then some of them actually did it and the debate 12 moved on. 13 And now here we are having the next iteration of the 14 same discussion, this time with the manufacturers who, just to 15 pick up from what Mr. Matheson said at the beginning, have in 16 many cases known about this issue for quite some years, coming 17 forward and saying it's very complicated, we can't do it. And 18 while we absolutely have to encourage and help those companies 19 which want to make rapid progress on this, I think we also need 20 to keep in mind that there's a limit to how much infrastructure 21 and apparatus is required to do this. 22 Companies, big companies, successful companies, 23 which are issues to the SEC, are successful, because they have 24 already in place good product quality management. They have 25 discussions with their suppliers about the items which they are 0075 1 buying to put in their own product. If they didn't, their 2 businesses would fail. And so I think we need to keep in mind 3 that these discussions already take place, and that what we're 4 talking about here is for a certain company, which buys from 5 certain supplier -- in the discussions which they already have 6 with those suppliers -- asking them additional questions and 7 making additional checks which enable them to comply with this 8 law. We're not looking at a situation where for companies big 9 or small, their supply chain and the items which go into that 10 products are a complete mystery to them. They're not. 11 The other thing that I wanted to say briefly is 12 something about timing and it's a little broader. We have to 13 keep in mind that what this law requires companies to do is to 14 disclose what they're doing, what they're doing to control their 15 supply chains, what due diligence they're doing. We recognize 16 it's a process. We as an NGO have been very much involved in 17 helping to create these due diligence standards, which the OECD 18 has signed off on and which the U.N. group of experts have 19 developed and parallel. 20 We recognize it's a process. We want to see 21 companies succeeding. We're not looking for failure here. But 22 the thing that we have to keep in mind is the basis of this 23 piece of legislation is reporting and disclosure. And to pick 24 up from what Sandy said, companies can begin reporting now on 25 what it is they're doing. They may feel there's more they want 0076 1 to do in the next iteration, in the next report, that there's 2 more progress that they can make. And that's completely 3 understandable. 4 We welcome that, but I think that's a separate issue 5 from the idea that because implementation will improve over 6 time, we therefore have to defer implementation until a moment 7 when companies will be able to report to a certain level of 8 detail. I don't think that's what the law requires, and I think 9 it's a distraction. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Mr. Matheson and then Mr. 11 Merber, and then Ms. Villarreal. 12 MR. MATHESON: Thank you. A couple of observations. 13 First of all, the EICC-GeSI program is an audited program. I 14 think auditing is the fundamental backbone here of credible 15 tracing. Self-declaration doesn't work. It's been used in the 16 industry for the past decade, and we know it hasn't stopped the 17 problem. 18 So that process isn't ready to be implemented yet, 19 and until there are standards for all these four minerals or 20 metals, it's going to be impossible to have a validated scheme 21 that allows us to audit accurately what's going on. We should 22 all keep that in mind. 23 That doesn't mean that we can't start now tracing 24 back from early ends back to the smelters, and in fact looking 25 at Apple's corporate responsibility report. They've done it. 0077 1 So there's a company with a range of products, granted not as 2 complex as say an industrial conglomerate like GE, but 3 nonetheless a complex set of products with a large number of 4 supplies. And they trace back and they represent they've mapped 5 back to their smelters in fairly short time. That tells me two 6 things. One, that it's a manageable process, that it can be 7 done fairly quickly provided it receives appropriate focus. 8 Secondly, where they've gone before, it makes the 9 path easier for those that follow. If they have a supply that 10 in common with RIM or INTEL or Dell, those followers, assuming 11 they're following, will be able to take advantage of the work 12 that's already being done. So we shouldn't imagine this is 13 something that has to be done afresh for each company. They'll 14 be very large and very significant network benefits to the 15 steady implementation of due diligence by the original 16 companies. 17 So, yes, we need to wait until the auditing process 18 is complete and verifiable. We don't need to wait forever. We 19 shouldn't imagine this is going to be a program that has to be 20 drawn up for many years. I don't think that's true. Thank you. 21 MR. MERBER: Well, thank you. A couple of things. 22 First, you know, I agree with much of what Mike Davis said and 23 what Andrea just said. I want to be perfectly clear. I wasn't 24 saying that this is complicated, and therefore we can't do it. 25 What I was saying is the rule has to recognize the situation of 0078 1 all of the issuers that have to comply with it; and, that for 2 some issuers, the task is more difficult for other issuers. 3 It's not as difficult to trace back, for example, to the 4 smelters of origin. 5 I wasn't arguing that, therefore, some issuers 6 shouldn't have to start to do that. I wasn't arguing that the 7 law shouldn't be implemented in time, that it shouldn't be 8 implemented properly, promptly, or that the effort to begin the 9 task, even though it is not going to be completed for some time, 10 won't be very, very beneficial. It's a very worthwhile thing to 11 do, because it starts to exert that pressure on the supply chain 12 immediately to work to wards the compliance smelters. 13 So I definitely was not saying it's complicated we 14 can't do it. You know. There are questions over how one would 15 have to describe the products where the origin of the conflict 16 minerals is not determinate. That doesn't concern me very much. 17 What concerns me is our ability to describe and disclose in our 18 report that we've made a good faith effort to do what we could 19 to help resolve this problem -- not the words we have to use in 20 the report. And I think, ultimately, I hope that the report we 21 So we're not arguing that, but, you know, this 22 question of whether we're able at this point to understand the 23 origin of every bit of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold in our 24 product, because we have a good relationship with our suppliers, 25 is really overstated. The tantalum isn't necessarily the 0079 1 important functional element that we're dealing with. We're 2 dealing with functional specifications, often, and not with 3 specific material specifications. 4 I mean you can look at the experience of the EU in 5 implementing the REACH law, which is somewhat similar, and its 6 stake in companies years and years and years. And they've made 7 a lot of progress to get an ability to report quite a bit about 8 these chemicals in their products, but it's taken years. And I 9 think we just have to recognize that it will take years; but, 10 clearly, not saying that the law shouldn't be implemented on 11 time; not saying that we shouldn't do everything we can to 12 start. It's just that as this flows down through the supply 13 chain, it's going to take a little bit of time before we get 14 ultimately to knowing the smelter of origin for all of the 15 conflict minerals in our product. 16 MS. VILLARREAL: Thank you. And I respectfully need 17 to make some comments about the fact that this has been going 18 on, and I understand that this has a long history in legislation 19 back 10 years, and three years, and of course the major users of 20 these conflict minerals have been already working hard to 21 understand their supply chains and the use of these minerals, 22 and are to be commended for doing that. 23 However, companies like Kraft Foods, we're new to 24 this. We had no idea that this legislation was going to be 25 covering companies like us, and that's just recently come to 0080 1 mind based on industry letters that started saying you guys 2 better be paying attention to this. Because most of the 3 writings in this area were pointing to the usual companies, 4 electronics, jewelry companies, the companies that you know 5 would have those minerals in them, so those of us in the food 6 industry didn't think we would have that impact. But people 7 started digging in saying this is going to cover packaging. 8 This is going to cover promotional and marketing materials. 9 Well, we have all kinds of promotional and marketing 10 materials and we are just now starting to look at all of those 11 things. As I told you, we have 100,000 suppliers. We are 12 worldwide. We have 40,000 products. We have promotional 13 materials for all those things. We have things like 14 flashlights, many fridges, USB drives. We have all kinds of 15 things, because we have to market our products. This 16 legislation covers all of those things. Whoever would have 17 thought that? 18 So, respectfully, this is not something that we can 19 just turn on a dime and start doing for 2012. It's going to 20 take us some time. We don't have the ability to talk to 100,000 21 suppliers to ensure what and who has conflict minerals. And 22 then with all those promotional materials, that's a whole other 23 align. I don't even have information for you on where the 24 suppliers are in those items. 25 MR. FREEMAN: Thank you. I'm going to try to 0081 1 synthesize a few of the very useful points made in the last 10 2 or 15 minutes or so, as well as to respond to Kraft. I want to 3 be very clear here, at least on behalf of Calvert. We are not 4 expecting perfection. We are not expecting that companies will 5 be able to turn on a dime and meet all the requirements here 6 overnight. 7 What we are expecting is a willingness to make this 8 work as quickly as possible, bearing in mind as I emphasized 9 earlier in my opening remarks that this will inevitably be a 10 process of continuous improvement and learning. And so many 11 efforts have been under way, electronics the last decade, 12 they're directly relevant here. Preparations have been made in 13 anticipation of the passage of something like Section 1502 for 14 the last several years. 15 Companies like Kraft, in different industries that 16 may not have expected to be covered by something like Section 17 1502, nonetheless have significant experience in looking at 18 their supply chains on other matters: content in their supply 19 chains that they've been developing now for a good long period 20 of time that is adaptable -- not exactly replicable, but 21 adaptable to the challenge that's at stake here. So it covered. 22 We are looking for companies to move immediately, but we will 23 be looking for clear progress and we are hoping that there will 24 not be a phase-in period here, which we think would dilute and 25 delay the kind of pressure on suppliers that Sandy Merber at GE 0082 1 is expecting. 2 We think that that kind of pressure is a very 3 salutary thing. We want to see it. We've seen it on other 4 issues; but, as long term investors who look very carefully at 5 human rights risk across our portfolios, we know progress when 6 we see it. We know it's not overnight, but we expect it to be 7 made in connection with 1502, immediately, even as it builds 8 year to year. Thank you. 9 MS. DUBBERLY: Commissioner Walter? 10 COMMISSIONER WALTER: Thank you. If I can sort of 11 follow on on that to try to put together some strands that I'm 12 hearing, hypothetically, if we were to acknowledge the necessary 13 evolution over the course of time that information will become 14 more perfect and acknowledge that that gets taken into account 15 in evaluating whether a disclosure of the measures that someone 16 has taken constitutes due diligence. 17 Does that take care of the problem so that year one 18 the disclosure would be at one level? Year two, one logically 19 would expect that more would have been done. Year three, 20 perhaps, we would have reached perfection, perhaps not, but 21 there also may be evolving techniques that make perfection an 22 evolving concept. Is that what's needed? Because it seems to 23 me that from the get-go there's at least a substantial question, 24 or a substantial likelihood that everyone should be able to 25 describe what they are doing. And if what they are doing is 0083 1 what they can do and we recognize that that is not necessarily 2 going to be complete from the outset, does that alleviate some 3 of the concern? 4 MR. BOUFFARD: Thank you. I think it's important 5 that we don't try to put year one, year two, for example, 6 Because those of us who are working this issue are learning how 7 long this may take; and, again, once we understand what the 8 global supply chain looks like in working with governments, 9 industry, civil society, banks, refiners when it comes to gold, 10 then we'll better understand. And that's why we offered our 11 help earlier, to share the information that we're learning with 12 you, so that perhaps we can come up with a timeframe. 13 But, again, that timeframe is not geared towards 14 delaying the legislation. It's the topic of the phased-in 15 approach in terms of reporting and disclosure is important 16 again, because those of us who are doing the important work are 17 not to be implicated while doing so. And we can work together 18 to determine exactly how much time it is going to take. The 19 three Ts are further along than gold. I think everybody 20 understands that, so gold is an example where we ought to take 21 for perhaps a longer look at. 22 MS. CROSS: We need to wrap-up here in just a 23 minute. I guess if there's a couple quick comments, then I'll 24 do the wrap-up for the panel. Ms. Simelane? 25 MS. SIMELANE: I think that comment made by the 0084 1 Commissioner is absolutely crucial, and I think it goes back to 2 a comment made earlier between self-declaration and the 3 auditing. I don't think companies have a problem with 4 self-declaration, but what's the use of that isn't in line with 5 what is intended with Section 1502. 6 I think what we battle with is the auditing 7 standard, so that it is a meaningful report. So I think that 8 would be very helpful, Commissioner, if you are giving the phase 9 approach is more definite. I don't think the legislation is 10 intended to be onerous or punitive to issuers. Therefore, if 11 that phase-in approach is not considered, it would be onerous 12 and punitive, and cost a lot of money for companies to comply 13 with almost immediately, which would be impossible at this point 14 in time. 15 MR. DAVIS: Very quickly, yeah, just to reiterate 16 we're looking for progress here and we're not looking to catch 17 companies out or document failure. We want to see companies 18 make a good faith effort to meet the requirements of this law. 19 We think the best approach is to have the law implemented in 20 full from the start. And we have to take into account that 21 while many companies, several of which are represented here, are 22 making laudable attempts to move on this now, there are others 23 which are not showing an inclination to make a move at all until 24 they're absolutely required to do so. So I think a phase-in 25 approach would just mean that, sadly, quite a large constituency 0085 1 within the group of users will not actually do anything for some 2 time. 3 MS. CROSS: Okay. So this ends our first panel. 4 The second panel will pick up with the same topic, and then also 5 move on to the reporting. We're going to take a brief break to 6 change panelists. We'll start promptly at 2:50 when we'll hear 7 from Sen. Durbin and Rep. McDermott, the primary authors of 8 Section 1502. 9 Again, I'd like to thank our panelists very much. 10 This was a very productive panel discussion and I'm sure our 11 rules will benefit from it. Thank you. 12 (Recess.) 13 CHAIRMAN SCHAPIRO: Okay. If everybody's back 14 together, it's my great pleasure to welcome Sen. Richard Durbin 15 from Illinois to our roundtable today. Sen. Durbin and Cong. 16 Jim McDermott from Washington state are primary authors of the 17 Section 1502 statutory language. 18 In addition to Sen. Durbin's efforts toward curbing 19 the violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he has a 20 longstanding interest in the work of the SEC and our efforts to 21 protect investors and facilitate capital formation. We very 22 much appreciate him taking the time from his busy schedule to 23 speak with us today, and we look forward to his remarks. 24 Cong. McDermott also hoped to be with us today, but 25 unfortunately had a scheduling conflict. However, he has 0086 1 provided us with a video statement, which we will play, 2 following Sen. Durbin's remarks. Please welcome Sen. Durbin. 3 (Applause.) 4 SEN. DURBIN: Thank you so much for that nice 5 introduction. Clearly the tables are turned. Mary Schapiro is 6 the chairman and I'm the witness. Usually it's the other way 7 around, so she has her chance to get even with me for a few 8 tough questions; but, in all seriousness, I want to thank her 9 and all the commissioners for the fine work you do at the 10 Securities and Exchange Commission. This is one of those rare 11 moments in our history where your work is so critically 12 important to maintain, and in some cases even restore the 13 integrity of our markets, which are a critical part of the 14 growth of the American economy. So thank you for all that you 15 do in that regard. 16 I guess it was five years ago that I made my first 17 trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo and I went to a city 18 called Goma. I'd never been there before and I didn't know what 19 to expect. I traveled all over Africa and seen a lot of things. 20 I find it to be the most profound and inspiring place that I've 21 ever visited. But I wasn't prepared for what I found at Goma. 22 Imagine, one of the poorest places on earth: people 23 literally starving, dying of disease, malaria and AIDS cutting 24 short lives of far too many, all in the shadow of an active 25 volcano; and then visit small hospitals, completely overtaxed. 0087 1 Look at the roadside and find women by the dozens sitting in the 2 dust praying that they'll get a chance to get into that hospital 3 for a surgery that they need for what's known as obstetric 4 fistula, which is a terrible problem to have for a woman, and 5 usually occasioned by a gang rape or a pregnancy too son, 6 leaving that women incontinent and eventually being shunned by 7 her family and tribe. 8 She comes with others and waits by the side of that 9 dusty road hoping that she can get into the one hospital that 10 might take her. If there are repeated surgeries and there 11 usually are, because these are really horrible situations, she 12 is released from the hospital and goes to the end of the line 13 and starts all over again, waiting for the second, third, fourth 14 and fifth surgery. 15 You see; the reason this has become such a rampant 16 problem in that part of the world is that this is a nation with 17 all of its problems that is ravaged by war. It's a war where, 18 sadly, rape is a major weapon. The United National calls the 19 Democratic Republic of Congo and that section the rape capital 20 of the world. The unspeakable things that happen to the women 21 and girls in that country in the name of this war we've 22 recounted at some of our committee hearings. 23 But looking into their desperate faces as they're 24 waiting for help and imagining what they have seen, what they 25 have been through, what they have lived through, is something 0088 1 you're not likely to forget. I took some time just a year ago 2 when I went with Sen. Sherrod Brown to visit some of the refugee 3 camps. These are people who've been displaced by this war and 4 they live a life which is unimaginable. 5 Most of them are trying to survive on this 6 solidified, molten ash, which cuts like glass; raising children, 7 trying to find some simple place to hollow out an area where you 8 can pitch a tent and call it home, thousands, thousands of 9 refugees from this war. The things that are fueling this war 10 are legendary and historic. 11 They go back to the Rwanda genocide and tribal 12 conflicts. But, sadly, what we found was that what's fueling 13 this war more and more is pursuit of precious minerals, minerals 14 which are abundant in this part of the world and are worth a lot 15 of money. There's slave labor, warring militias and victims by 16 the thousands as they fight for the exploration and the 17 production of these minerals: tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold. 18 Why are these so valuable? Because of our insatiable appetite 19 for iPads and BlackBerries and cell phones that use these 20 minerals. 21 I came back from the first trip with Sen. Sam 22 Brownback, opposite political party, but a close ally in this 23 fight, who is now the governor of Kansas. And he said: "We have 24 got to alert the American business community and American 25 consumers to the fact that our demand for products that contain 0089 1 these minerals could, could inadvertently be fueling this war 2 and leading to this terrible suffering. 3 There is a lot of suffering around this world, a lot 4 in Africa. The refugees with Somalia you see on the news, but 5 sadly for the last 20 years this part of the world has been one 6 of the most deadly on earth. The death, the rape, the 7 destruction that's going on has to bear heavily on anyone with a 8 conscience. 9 The purpose of this amendment that you're 10 considering now as you go through rulemaking is to appeal to the 11 conscience of our business and corporations to ask them to take 12 special steps to try to determine the origin of these minerals 13 and whether they're being mined in a legitimate and safe way. 14 Now I understand that this is a challenge. We're in the middle 15 of a sparsely populated area of the world, and I understand that 16 you can't track commerce there as easily as you might on the 17 computers in the United States. But I do believe, having spoken 18 to many corporate leaders, that they are intent on doing the 19 right thing. 20 They do not want on their conscience that they are 21 part of what is fueling this terrible war and this mass rape in 22 the Democratic Republic of Congo. As you make this rule, I hope 23 you feel as I do. We are willing to work with corporations and 24 business leaders who in good faith will come forward and try to 25 identify as validly as they can the sources of these minerals 0090 1 and to spell out the efforts they are taking to try to reduce 2 the likelihood that these memos are going to lead to even 3 further death and suffering in this part of the world. 4 Most major corporations have a Department of 5 Corporate Responsibility. This is a question of corporate 6 responsibility. I won't delve into this whole debate about 7 whether a corporation is a person, a citizen, a voter or 8 anything like that, but I do believe having spoken to the 9 leaders of some of the most outstanding corporations in our 10 country that they want to do the right thing. 11 I think you can show them that path, a reasonable 12 path that will not only give them a clear conscience in the way 13 they conduct business, but have a measurable, positive impact on 14 this part of the world. For those of us who enjoy these 15 products every day, I'd like to enjoy it with a clear conscience 16 that the person, the company, the corporation that made the 17 product did everything reasonable and humanly possible to avoid 18 using minerals in these products, which have led to such 19 terrible devastation and suffering. 20 It's a tough task we've given you. I have checked 21 with my staff and I don't think the SEC has ever had anything 22 quite like this that they've been challenged with. But I hope 23 that you'll spend a little extra time and I hope that you'll put 24 a little more effort into it with the knowledge that there are a 25 lot of people halfway around the world who wouldn't recognize 0091 1 any of us, but are sincerely counting on people with good values 2 and a good faith effort to try to stop this suffering. Thank 3 you so much. 4 (Applause.) 5 MR. MCDERMOTT: Good afternoon. I'm Jim McDermott, 6 a congressman from Seattle. And I work with Sen. Durbin and a 7 strong bipartisan group of other legislators on the conflict 8 minerals provision that became part of the law called the 9 "Dodd-Frank Act." 10 I want to thank the SEC for holding this roundtable, 11 and also thank all of its participants. You are here to help 12 make sure this regulation works for everyone. I've looked at 13 many of the submissions on the proposed rule. The interest in 14 addressing this issue is intense, and it is clear that many 15 companies want to do the right thing. 16 I first went to Africa in 1961 and I've been back 17 dozens of times since. In the late 1980s I worked in the Congo 18 for the State Department, and the last time I was back in 19 Eastern Congo and Rwanda was this last August. We think the 20 black market for minerals in Central Africa is a problem that 21 can be solved and that the customers and sellers of those 22 minerals can do business in a way that does not fuel the war, 23 and sexual violence that has been such a curse in Central Africa 24 for the last 15 years. 25 I think people agree the rule for reporting needs to 0092 1 meet the goals of informing investors and the public, creating 2 some basic governance over the use of these minerals, while at 3 the same time being practical and affordable for companies to 4 comply with. For this law to work, the reporting standards have 5 to be common sense and rely on the practices that so many 6 companies already have in place today. 7 That was our intent. There are many examples of 8 what due diligence means for international manufacturers when 9 they follow other regulatory requirements. All multinational 10 corporations follow due diligence standards when they import 11 goods into their country and when they meet consumer product 12 safety requirements. 13 The formula for how a company complies with these 14 regulations is not new and has worked well in many areas of 15 international supply chains, even the most complex ones. With 16 some agreed-upon standard, like the ones created by the OECD, 17 the bigger companies will do some site visits. They will do 18 comparative analysis, and they will work to remediate problems. 19 The smaller companies will piggyback on top of their work. 20 Companies have told us how this kind of social compliance 21 reporting works around the world today and we're confident it 22 will work here today. 23 In short, companies who want to do due diligence 24 will make a concerted effort to know what is happening in their 25 supply chain to get the knowledge required in the law. This due 0093 1 diligence is not perfect or exact. Companies will not be able 2 to guarantee that every grain of metal in every part of every 3 product they manufacture is conflict free. That would be 4 impractical and unachievable. 5 And it is not the goal of this law. This kind of 6 reporting has to allow companies to follow the same practices 7 that so many companies have in place today, like the due 8 diligence they do to make sure they're not using child or forced 9 labor in their supply chain and that they are adhering to 10 international transshipment, safety and security rules. 11 Many companies we are talking to who already do this 12 kind of compliance think the business know-how they get from 13 their transparency work is hugely valuable. With greater supply 14 chain knowledge they can cooperate more efficiently. They can 15 make better source of decisions, better capacity decisions, and 16 improved productivity. Many companies see this work as much 17 more than good citizenship and risk mitigation. It is a better 18 way to compete. 19 By doing practical due diligence, companies will be 20 able to see systemic changes and problems in the mineral trade. 21 And this will prevent the kind of wide-scale abuse that fuels 22 war. By doing practical due diligence, companies can keep a 23 black market from flourishing. I'm confident that investors and 24 the public will know the difference between companies that make 25 a good effort and those who do not. 0094 1 In congress we have been very encouraged to see how 2 quickly the mine to smelter program is moving along for tin and 3 tantalum. On April 1st there were no clean conflict minerals 4 coming out of the Congo. In September there were 550 tons a 5 month of tin and coal tin, cleanly bagged and tagged, coming out 6 of Congo and Rwanda. It is all being brought up by industry and 7 the smelters are about to start their audits. 8 In just six months, Congo and Rwanda together are 9 already back to producing almost 25% of the volume that was 10 coming out of Central Africa in 2008. They have 500 clean mines 11 in production, and over 14,000 miners are mining clean minerals, 12 and the clean supply program is moving quickly into other 13 neighboring countries like Burundi and Uganda. And that is just 14 the progress since April. In a year or so the DRC and its 15 neighbors could be close to their own level of production, and 16 all of it done transparently and in better conditions. 17 A clean mine to smelter supply of minerals is no 18 longer just a trial. It's happening in Central Africa now. 19 There's huge progress here, and there's a lot more work to be 20 done. We are very concerned about the impact that breaking the 21 black market has had on the livelihoods of many Congolese, 22 especially in North and South Kebo. But breaking up a multi 23 billion-dollar black market was going to cause destruction; and 24 where you're seeing that a clean market is replacing it. 25 Just last week South Kebo had its first mines 0095 1 approved for bagging and tagging and with a practical and solid 2 rule in place, we think progress on the ground is going to move 3 even faster. We in congress want to thank you for taking your 4 time to participate in the roundtable, to bridge the differences 5 on the reporting and audits of the reports. Everyone wants to 6 get to the same place: transparency, shareholder knowledge, 7 consumer choice and real market forces helping the people of the 8 Congo and Central Africa. 9 Thank you for taking this time and your good work to 10 think over this problem in depth. Thank you. 11 (Applause.) 12 MS. CROSS: All right. Welcome back everyone. Our 13 next panel is going to continue our discussion on what would 14 need to be done under the rule, how can minerals be tracked in 15 the supply chain. In addition we will discuss reporting under 16 the rule. 17 The staff is joined for this panel by Brian Croteau, 18 who is the deputy chief accountant of the Commission. Let me 19 introduce the panelists for this panel. We have Susan Baker, 20 Portfolio Manager and Research Analyst, ESG Research and 21 Shareholder Advocacy at Trillium Asset Management; Benedict 22 Cohen, Chief Counsel, Litigation, the Boeing Company; Darren 23 Fenwick, Senior Manager of Government Affairs, Enough Project; 24 Lawrence Heim, Director, Elm Consulting Group International LLC, 25 and Independent Environmental Health, Safety and Sustainability 0096 1 Consulting Practice; Tim Mohin, Director of Global Corporate 2 Responsibility, Advance Micro Devices; Kay Nimmo, Manager, 3 Sustainability and Regulatory Affairs, ITRI, Ltd., where she is 4 responsible for ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative; Jennifer 5 Prisco, Legal Counsel, Global Supply Chain, TE Connectivity; 6 Michael Reese, Director, Materials Management Corporation, a 7 consulting firm that serves the precious and non-ferrous 8 minerals industries; and Darrel Schubert, Partner, National 9 Office, Ernst & Young, LLP. 10 Now I'd like to give each of the panelists an 11 opportunity to make brief opening remarks or a statement. Why 12 don't we just start in the order that I just went through 13 starting with Susan Baker? 14 MS. BAKER: Thank you. I am pleased to have the 15 opportunity to make a statement on behalf of Trillium Asset 16 Management to this roundtable. In 1982 Trillium became the 17 first independent money management firm to integrate 18 environmental, social and governance factors and risks into the 19 investment decisionmaking process. 20 Today we are investment advisors for a broad range 21 of foundations and faith-based institutions, endowments, as well 22 as individual clients with $1 Billion in assets under 23 management. This discipline of sustainable and responsible 24 investing has grown exponentially over the last decade. As a 25 member of U.S. SIF, which is the forum for sustainable and 0097 1 responsible investments, we notice that they published in 2009 a 2 trends report which noted that SRI, socially responsible 3 investing assets, topped $3 Trillion or in terms of total USS, 4 that's one in nine dollars invested in the U.S. 5 As such, we are a key and growing constituency in 6 the investment field. I'd like to thank the Commission for 7 holding this roundtable and convening a diverse group of 8 stakeholders. All of us here sharing the common goal of 9 preventing the exploitation of conflict minerals for the purpose 10 of financing human rights violations in the Democratic Republic 11 of Congo. 12 As fiduciaries whose long-term view of capital 13 appreciation analyzing and integrating the environmental and 14 social governance data into our investment decisionmaking 15 process is necessary and prudent; however, meaningful reporting 16 is not always available or clear and concise. As a result, 17 Trillium has worked in collaboration with many organizations to 18 look at and improve supply chains by engaging corporations on 19 risks in their global supply chain. 20 Similarly, we have engaged public policy issues and 21 have submitted comment letters in collaboration with investor 22 groups and multi stakeholder initiatives over the past 14 months 23 pertaining to SEC 1502 and the proposed rules to Section 1502. 24 Excuse me. We believe that sourcing of minerals from conflict 25 zones exposes issuers and their shareholders to reputational, 0098 1 regulatory, litigative and operational risks. 2 Therefore, a high level of disclosure, as stated in 3 the law, will provide better protection for investors from these 4 risks. In our view, the SEC has done a satisfactory job 5 drafting rules which protect investors. By addressing a 6 humanitarian crisis through a disclosure approach that seeks 7 clarity and uniformity, the interest of long-term investors are 8 better protected. 9 To that end we support the proposed rules drafted 10 for Section 1502. These disclosures will allow investors to 11 evaluate supply chain policies and practices and identify 12 leaders who successfully minimize these risks. We have been 13 encouraged in our dialogs with companies by the innovation with 14 which they expect to achieve disclosure. And we have been 15 particularly interested in those, including GE and AMD, who have 16 indicated that they are looking at ways to adopt protocols used 17 to monitor their supply chain for compliance with EU's REACH and 18 RoHS regulations to the disclosures provisions for conflict 19 minerals. 20 Essentially, they're using the same framework and 21 adopting it to the conflict mineral provisions. Additionally, a 22 common reporting template recently developed by the electronic 23 industry citizenship coalition, EICC, gives companies a cross of 24 broad range of industry sectors the framework for tracking 25 conflict minerals in their supply chain. So I'd like to make 0099 1 just a few specific comments here and then elaborate if I can 2 during the discussion on tracking and reporting. 3 Issuers' disclosure under the regulation should be 4 sufficiently complete to allow investors to clearly understand 5 the basis on which the issuers have determined the origin of 6 conflict minerals. If they state that no conflict minerals 7 originated in the DRC or adjoining countries, the due diligence 8 process has to clearly define and demonstrate what led them to 9 the statement. We recommend the rules make reference to 10 specific due diligence standards that are aligned with 11 international initiatives, such as OECD guidance. 12 We believe reporting standards should maintain 13 consistency with the statutory language and apply equally to all 14 four conflict minerals. Knowing that the OECD has started 15 developing a gold supplement, a protocol, this give us reason to 16 believe that special conditions should not be given to any 17 mineral. To provide special conditions for any mineral weakens 18 the intent of the disclosure rules. 19 And in recognition of the materiality of the data we 20 would prefer that the rules requiring disclosure be filed 21 instead of furnished in the annual report on form 10K, form 20F 22 or 40F of relevant issuers. We realize there are costs 23 associated with tracking, chain of custody, but we feel the 24 benefits far outweigh the effort. What is measured often does 25 not count in corporate decisionmaking. 0100 1 We believe responsible and ethical supply chain 2 management should be of paramount importance to manufacturers of 3 products that contain conflict minerals. And, actually, as 4 stated aptly by an issuer who was saying that exploitation of 5 the minerals is reduced in conflict-free systems will in fact be 6 self-funding. And to quote: "In terms of an issuer doing 7 compliance reporting, this just becomes part of our business 8 cost." 9 In closing and on behalf of Trillium I'd like to 10 thank you for this opportunity to address the Commission on this 11 important rulemaking process. We appreciate that the time and 12 thoroughness that the SEC has taken that fair and meaningful 13 rules are promulgated. We look forward to prompt issuance of 14 the rules, which will thereby reduce uncertainty in the 15 marketplace and better equip companies to engage their supply 16 chains. Thank you. 17 MR. COHEN: Thank you very much for holding this 18 roundtable and offering me the opportunity to speak on behalf of 19 the Boeing Company, the World's largest aerospace company and 20 one of the United States' largest exporters. Any discussion of 21 the proposed rule must start with the recognition that the 22 ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the Democratic Republic of 23 the Congo is intolerable, and that governments, international 24 organizations, the business community and NGOs have the 25 responsibility to work collaboratively to end it. 0101 1 Boeing has been a leader in seeking solutions to 2 this crisis. We publicly endorse congressional action to 3 address human rights violations and atrocities in the DRC. We 4 were the first, though by no means the last, major aerospace 5 company to join the OECD's pilot program on implementation of 6 their due diligence guidance, which as you know entails a 7 binding commitment to comply with the guidance. 8 Collectively, the aerospace industry has achieved a 9 level of participation in the OECD pilot program second to none. 10 Boeing also led the establishment of the aerospace industries 11 association's subcommittee on conflict minerals, a working group 12 dedicated to establishing best practices in implementing both 13 the SEC's final rule and the OECD guidelines. Boeing 14 participates regularly in the EICC-GeSI workshops both here and 15 overseas. 16 We have established a wide-ranging, internal working 17 group, spanning all affected stakeholders in the company to 18 address our internal implementation challenges, and we will 19 carefully consider participation in other industry or 20 public-private initiatives to address this issue. We are fully 21 committed to complying with both the SEC rule and the OECD 22 guidelines, and to doing our part to address the horrific human 23 rights violations that gave rise to Section 1502 of the Act. 24 For the past 10 months our supply chain management 25 professionals have carefully assessed the SEC's proposing 0102 1 release in the challenges we and other downstream manufacturers 2 of complex end products will face in implementing the final 3 rule. In so doing, we have also consulted extensively with our 4 peers in the aerospace industry and the broader manufacturing 5 community. Five broad conclusions arise from this assessment. 6 First, the rules should incorporate a multi-year 7 phase-in period. This is a difficult request to make, given the 8 hundreds or even thousands of severe human rights violations 9 that occur daily in the region. But industry believes that 10 objective constraints exist, which neither the Commission, nor 11 the OECD nor registrants, either individually or collectively 12 can waive. These constraints virtually dictate such a phase-in 13 period. 14 First, the several elements of the compliance 15 infrastructure, which congress and the OECD clearly contemplated 16 are not yet mature, though they are maturing. The OECD 17 guidelines were only finalized in May of this year; and the 18 year-long OECD pilot program, dedicated to establishing the 19 parameters of OECD compliance, got underway just last month. 20 The supplement to the guidelines on gold has yet to be replaced. 21 The State Department Conflict Minerals Map called 22 for by Section 1502, when released this summer, was so heavily 23 caveated as to be of very limited use for due diligence 24 purposes. Likewise, various initiatives covering the mine to 25 smelter segment of the supply chain, the certified smelter 0103 1 program and the smelter to end product manufacture segment of 2 the supply chain are in various stages of maturity, but none are 3 currently mature. 4 Conversely, the internal compliance architecture for 5 registrants and the vast universe of non-registrant suppliers 6 who will nevertheless be required by end product manufacturers 7 to comply is still maturing. Large, sophisticated manufacturers 8 like Boeing, with its 10s of thousands of direct and indirect 9 suppliers, will face significant challenges due to the depth, 10 scope and fluidity of our supply chains and the staggering 11 complexity of our products. 12 For example, we lack the ability to unilaterally 13 impose new contract terms and flow down requirements on our 14 suppliers and can only include such terms as we let new 15 contracts or renew existing ones. Since normally contracts run 16 for three to five years, we will not be able to ensure that all 17 our supplier contracts contain appropriate flow down clauses for 18 a number of years. 19 Likewise, smaller, less sophisticated and capable 20 participants at all points in the supply chain will face 21 converse challenges in attempting to familiarize themselves with 22 and resource the new requirements. Yet, if the Commission 23 promulgates its final rule this year without a phase-in period, 24 companies like Boeing will be reporting on our activities in 25 fiscal year 2012 in the absence of critical compliance guidance, 0104 1 the equivalent of trying to simultaneously assemble and fly an 2 airplane. Such an effort will impose large costs, an unfair 3 stigma on registrants, without benefit to Congolese victims. 4 Industry is prepared to undertake measurable steps during any 5 phase-in period, which will not only begin to yield significant 6 benefits to the Congo during the phase-in period, but will 7 ensure that when the rule is fully effected we will be task 8 organized to carry it out. 9 Second, it will be critical for the Commission's 10 final rule to retain the reasonable country of origin threshold 11 determination. Such a standard fully comports with the language 12 and structure of Section 1502 and the intent of its drafters, 13 who understood that perfect certainty with respect to the origin 14 of all conflict minerals in our modern supply chain is 15 unattainable at virtually any price. Rather, it reflects the 16 understanding that registrants can indeed comply with the letter 17 and spirit of the Act by making a reasonable, risk-based, good 18 faith determination based on the totality of their 19 circumstances. 20 Such a determination could rest on such factors as 21 the existence of flow down clauses in the company's supplier 22 contracts, company policies, and the use of consensus best 23 practices and participation in an industry-wide, public, private 24 or international initiatives. Such approaches are routinely 25 used to achieve other vital government and social objectives, 0105 1 including protection of customer safety and health, quality 2 assurance, environmental protection, and protection of national 3 security in classified technology. In the context of conflict 4 minerals the collective effect of industry-wide deployment of 5 these and other compliance techniques, in combination with 6 ongoing governance initiatives in the DRC and adjoining 7 countries will yield genuine benefit to the victims of violence. 8 Third, the Commission's final rule should include 9 for some period of time an intermediate category of 10 indeterminate country of origin. The Commission clearly has the 11 legal authority to adopt such a category under the Supreme Court 12 "Chevron" decision. Because in Section 1502, congress addressed 13 only one category of registrant: those who knew that their 14 products contained conflict minerals which originated in DRC or 15 adjoining countries, who are required to file a conflict 16 minerals report as specified in the Act. 17 Congress did not direct the treatment of 18 registrants, who are genuinely unable to state with sufficient, 19 reasonable certainty to make a reasonable country of origin 20 finding. Under Chevron, such silence provides the Commission 21 with the delegated authority to adopt a reasonable rule that 22 serves the overarching purposes of the Act. Clearly, a 23 regulation that for an indefinite period of time rewarded 24 companies for not knowing the supply chain nor making any effort 25 to do so would be patently unreasonable and an abuse of the 0106 1 Commission's discretion. 2 However, it would be a reasonable exercise of the 3 Commission's discretion to provide a time-limited, indeterminate 4 origin category subject to mandated steps that a registrant 5 would have to follow to attain the ability, either to make a 6 reasonable country of origin determination, or to ascertain that 7 its products did contain DRC-derived conflict minerals, thereby 8 subjecting it to the conflict minerals reporting requirement. 9 Such a rule would serve the humanitarian policy purposes, 10 animating Section 1502 by promoting an aggressively greater 11 understanding of registrant supply chains. Significantly, this 12 approach was endorsed by the OECD in its own submission to the 13 SEC. 14 Fourth, the Commission should ensure that its 15 compliance regime is consistent with the OECD guidelines. 16 Nothing in the guidelines is inconsistent with any requirement 17 of Section 1502. The State Department, presumably in the 18 exercise of its responsibility under Section 1502 to provide 19 guidance to commercial entities seeking to exercise due 20 diligence, has endorsed the guidelines in their totality, as 21 have the affected governments in the region and dozens of other 22 countries. Although important aspects of their implementation 23 are a work in progress, they clearly now represent and will 24 continue to represent consensus best practices agreed by the 25 stakeholders. 0107 1 Fifth, the final rule must reflect the reality that 2 no manufacturer of complex end products can as a practical 3 matter map the conflict minerals embedded in the thousands of 4 suppliers in its supply chain to the mine, or achieve a chain of 5 custody such that it could positively know the origin of the 6 conflict minerals in each of the millions of piece parts in its 7 end products. In part, this simply reflects the decades old 8 trend towards enhancing the flexibility and resilience of the 9 supply chain, a trend whose importance was illustrated by 10 industry's response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. 11 Our supply chains must be able to shift at a 12 moment's notice to address small scale disruptions, like a fire 13 at a critical supplier's facility, as well as large scale 14 disruptions like Fukushima; and, of course, to reflect changes 15 in price or quality of inputs. As a result, any supply chain 16 map of conflict minerals would be out of date as soon as it was 17 released. In addition, the unfeasibility of such mapping also 18 reflects the length of the supply chain from a mine to the 19 manufacture of our highly complex end products, such as an 20 airliner or fighter jet, as well as the staggering number of 21 piece parts involved in such products. 22 To give only a few examples, Boeings defense 23 business, which represents only one-half of the company's total 24 business, acquired well over 190 million piece parts from almost 25 8,000 direct suppliers last year. Our commercial aircraft 0108 1 business had almost 2,000 direct suppliers. Each of our major 2 first-tier direct suppliers may have hundreds or thousands of 3 direct suppliers itself, and many of those indirect suppliers 4 will have a comparable number of suppliers resulting in an 5 indirect and direct supply chain numbering in the 10s of 6 thousands. 7 Our defense business performed over 600,000 purchase 8 order transactions last year and competed over a quarter of 9 those, meaning that we likely had a new supplier and/or new sub 10 tiers resulting from those competitions. Each of our 747 11 aircraft incorporate some six million parts. Our new 787 12 Dreamliner contains some 3.5 million parts. Each FA18 figher 13 jet we make contains over 98,000 part numbers, and a much larger 14 number of piece parts. 15 There is little commonality between the parts used 16 on our defense or commercial products; e.g., there is little 17 commonality in the parts procured for 747s and 737s, and even 18 less commonality in the parts procured for 747s, and for example 19 FA18s. Any unreasonable requirements involving so large a 20 number of suppliers and parts could cost the aerospace industry 21 hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars. 22 And it is important to note that these costs will 23 have to be expended by some actor or actors in the supply chain. 24 It is possible that much of this expenditure and effort would 25 be undertaken by our major subcontractors, those who, for 0109 1 example, supply us with engines or landing gear. But those 2 expenses would be passed on to us and ultimately our customers 3 in the case of the FA18 and the Department of Defense. 4 Importantly, the OECD guidelines explicitly 5 recognize both the complexity of modern supply chains and the 6 limited leverage end product manufacturers have on remote tiers 7 of the supply chain. The supplement on tin, tantalum, tungsten 8 specifically cites to the fact. "The fact that internal control 9 mechanisms, based on tracing minerals in a company's possession, 10 are generally unfeasible after smelting with refined metals, 11 entering the consumer market as small parts of various 12 components and end products. By virtue of these practical 13 difficulties, downstream companies should establish internal 14 controls over their immediate suppliers and may coordinate 15 efforts through industry-wide initiatives to build leverage over 16 sub suppliers, overcome practical challenges, and effectively 17 discharge the due diligence recommendations contained in this 18 guidance." 19 In closing I'd like to acknowledge the leadership 20 Sen. Durbin and Cong. McDermott, the representatives of our 21 headquarters stake and the headquarters of our commercial 22 aviation, have shown on a critical, humanitarian crisis, and to 23 again thank the Commission for its invitation to participate in 24 this roundtable. 25 MR. FENWICK: Thank you. I would also like to take 0110 1 this opportunity to add my voice to the voices of thanks to the 2 SEC for holding this roundtable. There are a couple of points 3 that I want to address and then into my remarks, which I will 4 keep at the minimum timeframe requested. 5 I think there's an impression that's been created 6 from the last panel that there's no standard for gold. And so I 7 do want to point out, and I want the Commission to know that the 8 EICC process has already begun to audit 21 gold refiners. And 9 so we're not saying that there needs to be one worldwide gold 10 standard, which I also think has sort of been at odds with the 11 flexibility that companies are requesting. 12 So, additionally, I would say that in terms of 13 manufacture, we do believe that if a company puts their name on 14 a product, then they are a manufacturer. And if a DVD blows up 15 in your house, then the person is going to be looking to the 16 name of the manufacturer for a law suit, potentially. And 17 mining as well, I would also like to add that we believe and as 18 we have put in our comments that mining is manufacturing. 19 We previously addressed the issue, but we do believe 20 that mining is more than just taking things out of the ground. 21 And just a couple of other things, just to say that congress in 22 enacting Dodd-Frank 1502 made certain findings and determined 23 that issuers should disclose certain information. And so this 24 information is supposed to provide transparency on the use of 25 conflict minerals that it financed and continue to finance a 0111 1 decade long conflict in the region. 2 So with that in mind, we believe that to effectuate 3 Section 1502, the SEC must promulgate strong rules in addition 4 to what we've submitted in our comments on several points; and 5 one point being, for example, recycled and scrap material. We 6 strongly agree with the Commission's approach as defined in the 7 proposed rule to recycle materials. We believe that such an 8 approach is consistent with industry efforts on this issue, 9 including the conflict-free smelter program, reasonable standard 10 of care. 11 An issuer has due diligence and reasonable country 12 of origin inquiry should be conducted, we believe under 13 reasonable care standard that requires more than just a passive 14 acceptance by the filer of the information provided by the 15 suppliers. On the cost issue -- and some commentators have 16 commented on this -- we do believe that some industry 17 associations' estimates of cost of compliance are a bit 18 inflated. 19 We believe some of these estimates don't accurately 20 reflect what the requirements of 1502 are and what 1502 requires 21 is very limited and focused. And so, for example, we've had 22 some industry associations that have argued that it's going to 23 cost several hundred thousand dollars, and using Apple as an 24 example -- that they're an electronics giant who has identified 25 142 smelters that provide them with tin, tungsten, tantalum and 0112 1 gold in their products. Now, if we think of contractual 2 obligations, for example, there was one proposal that it would 3 cost $50 per hour on several hours. 4 So, for example, with taking that into account and 5 looking at the 142 suppliers of Apple, that comes out to about 6 $14,200. So these are just some key points that we do believe 7 that we think the Commission to take into account in developing 8 its rule, and I look forward to kind of expounding in more 9 detail on what I've just outlined, because I understand it's a 10 bit rushed. But I do in particular want to take the opportunity 11 to thank John Fieldsend, Felicia Kung and Paula Dubberly for all 12 of the work that you all have done throughout this process. I 13 know it's long and I know it's arduous, and there are a lot of 14 people with a lot of opinions. So thank you. 15 MR. HEIM: As with everyone else on the panel I also 16 would like to thank the Commission for having me appear and make 17 a few comments. With my background as fairly much a 18 technical-environmental guy, I'm a little out of my element here 19 in this policy setting. So kind of bear with me as I bumble and 20 stumble through my discussion. But with my background I'm here 21 to talk a little bit about the technical-environmental health 22 and safety auditing perspective, and what practitioners in this 23 part of the audit program, what's our experience and what are 24 our thoughts. 25 I've gone through a bit of this myself as a bit of 0113 1 disclosure. My firm was one of the original CFS audit firms. 2 We withdrew from that relationship at the end of December, but 3 we certainly do have experience and understanding in the CFS 4 program. But through the process, what we've done is we've had 5 numerous conversations with customers, with clients, and with 6 other companies who have contacted us with questions. And so 7 we've got a number of projects that are ongoing. 8 The comments that I'm going to bring forward kind of 9 reflect a number of those discussions that we've had through the 10 process over the past 18 months or so. Perhaps the most 11 important thing that I'd kind of like to emphasize is we've had 12 discussions in the previous panel, and there's going to be more 13 discussions in this panel on the idea of audits being such a key 14 element of credibility in this program. 15 There's a couple of audit schemes that are out there 16 that I think everybody here is probably very well aware of. You 17 have OECD and their due diligence guide, and it references some 18 audit, an auditor competence guidelines. If there's nothing 19 else that I impress upon the commissioners and the staff today, 20 I'd like for you all to recognize one element of this. Those 21 standards as they exist currently establish the lowest common 22 denominator globally for auditor qualifications in the 23 environmental health and safety arena. And yet the global 24 supply chain of three T and G are resting on the shoulders of 25 that lowest level of auditor competence. 0114 1 So, if there's nothing else you take away from this 2 comment, I'd like for you all to think about that. You know. 3 There's no question that the emotional nature of the issue is 4 driving zero tolerance. Nobody wants to have any association 5 with the atrocities. Every company, every client, every person 6 I speak to, and certainly as personally we have absolutely 7 nothing but a desire to get as far away from this as possible. 8 But, at the same time that zero tolerance is driving 9 things toward, driving processes toward unreasonable standards. 10 And what I mean by that is I've had instances where there've 11 been questions about at an atomic level trying to convince folks 12 -- certain people after an audit -- that the atoms, individual 13 atoms in a particular product were conflict free. 14 That's not reasonable. At the same time, this as an 15 audit is the critical linchpin in this process of credibility, 16 the audit pushing towards this level of absolute certainty is 17 therefore driving companies to try to develop management systems 18 to manage to the atomic level, and that's not reasonable. It's 19 not achievable. So, again, as the audits are such a linchpin of 20 this process, it's important to understand reasonable assurance 21 versus absolute certainty. 22 And how the desire to pass an audit and what that 23 means in the overall business context, relative to customer 24 demands -- contractual requirements, et cetera -- it's important 25 to understand how that level of audit specificity is driving 0115 1 management systems developments, costs and expectations, at a 2 very unreasonable level within company structures. And, with 3 that, I will conclude my comments. 4 MR. MOHIN: Good afternoon. I'd like to thank the 5 Commission and especially the staff for inviting me to speak on 6 behalf of AMD on this very important rulemaking. 7 AMD is a semiconductor design innovator. Our 8 primary products are microprocessors, motherboard chipsets, 9 imbedded processors, graphics processors that are used in 10 notebook computers, desktops, tablets, servers, work stations 11 and embedded applications. We also license graphic technology 12 to the Microsoft XBox and Nintendo Wii game consoles. 13 Along with my colleague from Enough on my left, Andy 14 has co-chaired the multi stakeholder group of companies, 15 socially responsible investors and NGOs with the goal of finding 16 common ground for this rule. And we have provided consensus 17 recommendations to the SEC on three, separate occasions, with 18 about 25 organizations from across that spectrum endorsing each 19 submittal. 20 AMD is also an active member of the Electronics 21 Industry Citizenship Coalition, or EICC that we've heard a lot 22 about today, which has developed a conflict-free smelter program 23 and other infrastructure that's going to be essential as we 24 implement this rule. We also actively participate in the 25 Information Technology Industry Council, which has also 0116 1 submitted comments to this rule. 2 So I want to keep my opening remarks very brief. 3 I'd like to make three main points. First, for years the DRC 4 has been plagued by conflict and human rights abuses. The 5 intent behind this legislation and the SEC-proposed rule is 6 laudable to break that linkage between these abuses and the 7 minerals trade. AMD has a long history of corporate 8 responsibility, and thus we've worked hard with other 9 stakeholders to find that common ground with the goal of finding 10 and formulating an effective policy for this rule. 11 Second, and of particular importance to AMD and 12 other companies is that this rule is efficient. For example, 13 since just about all products are complex aggregations of many 14 different components, the only way to comply with this rule is 15 to survey all of the suppliers for each of those components that 16 contain one of the four minerals. This proposed rule would tie 17 the reporting requirements to a company's fiscal year; and, 18 since reporting companies may have different fiscal years, their 19 suppliers would have to collect all the information at different 20 times of year to support their customers' compliance. 21 This is in addition to the suppliers own reporting 22 to the SEC. What this means is that the impact of this rule 23 will ripple down the supply chain every quarter, exponentially 24 multiplying the cost, but adding very little in terms of due 25 diligence. It would be far more efficient if the SEC were to 0117 1 synchronize the reporting requirements so that the supply chain 2 could respond only once per year. 3 Third, this rule, while an important part of the 4 solution, is not sufficient to resolve the human rights abuses 5 in the DRC. The problems in the DRC region are complex and 6 deeply ingrained, and while tracking materials through the 7 supply chain is one element, a sustainable solution requires a 8 coordinated approach. This is why the AMD supports the State 9 Department's recently announced public-private alliance, focused 10 on conflict free sourcing in the DRC region. 11 And, particularly, we'd like to recognize the 12 leadership of Under Secretaries of State Hormats and Otero for 13 their work to bring regional and global stakeholders together 14 for this purpose. AMD will also continue to support 15 collaborative industry efforts, such as the EICC and GeSI 16 conflict free smelter program and supply chain due diligence 17 efforts. No single company, government agency, or NGO can 18 achieve this outcome by working on their own. But by working 19 together we can help the DRC region develop a sustainable 20 conflict free minerals trade. 21 I'd like to close by again thanking the 22 commissioners and the staff. The goal of this legislation is to 23 alleviate some of the worst human suffering in the world. It's 24 imperative that we all work together towards this goal. Thank 25 you. 0118 1 MS. NIMMO: Good afternoon. I'm here to provide 2 input from the global tin industry perspective, provide some 3 information on concerns from the upstream industry, and 4 particularly our experience of implementing due diligence in 5 Africa through the ITSCI supply chain project. So I want to 6 raise just three particular points about stocks, recycling, and 7 generally the impacts in Africa. 8 Firstly, then, we believe an exemption is essential 9 for both existing unsmelted minerals and refined metal stocks 10 currently held by industry by investors, and also, for example, 11 even in the U.S. Government stockpile. Current tin stocks could 12 be valued to around $7 Billion at the moment. Currently, they 13 would be generally with a non-specific mine origin and 14 potentially conflicted and unsaleable. In order to prevent a 15 market disruption and financial losses on this material, we are 16 asked that disclosure rules only apply to mineral mined and 17 ingot produced at a certain future date after release of the 18 rules. 19 Secondly, we believe that recycling should be 20 encouraged and not penalized. Requiring auditing and conflict 21 mineral reporting for secondary material is a disincentive to 22 the reuse of resources that goes against almost every other 23 regulatory policy. About 35% of tin is recycled each year from 24 a huge range of sources by a complex, international network of 25 traders, consolidators, and treatment plants. It's not feasible 0119 1 to track back to the original metal used, let alone the original 2 mine, and we consider reasonable inquiry to be sufficient. So 3 admission of a conflict minerals report shouldn't be required in 4 the same way that it's not required for non DRC-mined material. 5 And, thirdly, I want to talk about Africa. The 6 ITSCI project helps to implement OECD due diligence by providing 7 traceability, risk assessment, and audit. The artisanal miners 8 and the upstream industry have contributed around $4 Million so 9 far to make this work possible. We've worked with hundreds of 10 government agents to make the project the success it's had so 11 far, now covering around 98% of Rwandan minerals and more than 12 1,000 individual mine pits in Katanga where you've already seen 13 improved governments, increasing revenues and retained 14 livelihoods. 15 I see the representatives of the government of the 16 DRC are also here today, and we can recognize their support in 17 this project. Conversely, the impact of the embargo in areas 18 which Dodd-Frank aimed to help and where ITSCI is not operating 19 are severe. You've heard the description of Goba by Sen. 20 Durbin; and, certainly things have not improved from that 21 description. 22 As a result of the embargo, we have hundreds of 23 thousands of paid miners out of work or displaced, moving from 24 tin to gold mines, 80% unemployed, loss of tax revenue, 25 increasing theft, smuggling, delay in several mining investment 0120 1 projects that were previously planned, less access to schooling 2 and healthcare, and we could go on. Unfortunately, a major 3 roadblock to reversing that situation is the growing popularity 4 of consumers buying Congo-free material and conflict mineral 5 reporting-free material. 6 It is essential that SEC finds ways to create 7 incentives to continuing buyer engagement. It must also 8 carefully match the start if reporting with feasible time 9 schedules for developing due diligence structures. A new 10 phase-in of at least two or three years for reporting will allow 11 the ITSCI project to continue and expand. SEC must also confirm 12 the reliability of the OECD due diligence guidance, and converge 13 and clarify the understandings of armed groups, conflict-free 14 definitions, and such like. 15 In particular, we need to ensure that the DRC 16 conflict free label can only be used on minerals that are 17 actually purchased from the DRC; not from elsewhere. So 18 Dodd-Frank aims to control a tiny fraction, maybe three percent 19 of the global tin supply. To be effective, the final rules must 20 be properly focused to avoid the general embargo while promoting 21 buyer engagement in the DRC, and accounting for the general, 22 upstream issues, such as stocks and recycling. 23 We hope the final rules will make the most of the 24 opportunity that Dodd-Frank provides to make a difference, 25 support development, and not just drive companies out of Africa. 0121 1 MS. PRISCO: Good afternoon. My name is Jennifer 2 Prisco, and I am legal counsel for the global supply chain at TE 3 Connectivity, a $12.1 Billion global electronics manufacturer 4 with about 100,000 employees around the world, manufacturing 5 approximately 500,000 different electronic products, many of 6 which contain scant amounts of conflict minerals. These 7 products, which principally are in form connectors, cables and 8 switches, are also in most every electronic product that's 9 manufactured today. 10 On behalf of TE I want to thank the SEC for holding 11 this roundtable discussion. TE Connectivity takes very 12 seriously its corporate responsibility to protect human rights 13 and not contribute to conflict. As such, we commit to adopt, 14 widely disseminate and incorporate in our supply agreements our 15 policy on responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict 16 affected in high risk areas, and to commit to refraining from 17 any action which knowingly contributes to the financing of 18 conflict minerals. 19 We support an approach to the enforcement of Section 20 1502, which enables companies to conduct meaningful due 21 diligence and provide reliable, simply stated reports on whether 22 or not their products are conflict free. As such, conflict free 23 should be by definition products switched to the extent 24 discernable by reasonable interpretation of commercially 25 practicable due diligence do not appear to have originated from 0122 1 conflict mines. 2 By taking care to define this term for purposes of 3 the SEC rule, companies like TE shall be able to state with 4 comfort and affirmity that their products are conflict free, 5 based on the availability of information to them. This is a 6 winning approach for all stakeholders. For the Congolese and 7 concerned consumers it moves us toward the transparency required 8 to highlight bad actors and effectively combat human rights 9 abuses in the Congo. 10 For companies, it provides the means to execute 11 effective and reasonable due diligence without incurring 12 excessive costs that impact our competitiveness in global 13 markets. Finally, a rule based on these principles is aligned 14 with the SEC's stated mission to protect investors, maintain 15 fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital 16 formation, due to its economically reasonable, responsible, yet 17 socially meaningful impact. 18 We hope that today's roundtable moves us in this 19 direction and again we appreciate the opportunity to 20 participate. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you. 21 MR. RIESS: My name is Mike Riess, and my company is 22 Materials Management. We've been consultants in all aspects of 23 the precious metals industry for over 30 years, and I'd like to 24 talk briefly about collecting information in the gold industry. 25 I think it addresses the question of reasonable due diligence. 0123 1 The gold business is some 3,000 years old; and, 2 through all that time, it's been split into the visible business 3 and the other one. That's the one that believes that gold is 4 for bribing the border guard. In the visible part, you have 5 bullion banks, traders, refiners, processors, and you have an 6 array of consumers, such as jewelers, electronics industry, 7 automobile manufacturers, pharmaceutical and chemical companies, 8 and they all have specialized quality requirements. 9 The visible part of the business is governed by the 10 "Bank Secrecy Act's" anti money laundering, customer due 11 diligence standards. So the regulatory framework and the 12 management systems that are required are already in place to 13 handle the conflict minerals regulations. Their business is 14 leveraged and it relies on a range of financial institutions, 15 banks, futures brokers, traders, insurance companies, so it has 16 to keep good records. And the business is intensely competitive 17 and the profit margins are very small. These companies have no 18 choice but to be very much customer oriented. 19 Other than the bullion banks, there are only a few 20 precious metal companies that report to the SEC, but they'll 21 bend over backwards to accommodate their customers, many of who 22 do come under SEC regulation. They can be counted on to gather 23 the information and to produce the records that their customers 24 need to comply with the law. The less visible gray market is a 25 different world. It operates informally and it flies under the 0124 1 regulatory and the tax radar. 2 Recordkeeping is minimal. There is no customer 3 loyalty and if they buyer asks too much, there are hundreds of 4 other outlets. The gray market, unlike the visible market, will 5 not be a reliable source of information. The rub is that the 6 gray market is an important raw material source for the 7 legitimate market. And at the points that they meet, the volume 8 of metal exchange is large and the transfers are complicated. 9 Ultimately, I venture to say that all the gold used 10 by the companies under SEC regulation passes through legitimate 11 refiners, and to a lesser extent through secondary processors, 12 also legitimate. They're the ones that are best situated to 13 document and to track supplies back to their origins. The 14 refiners and the legitimate part of the gold business are 15 working actively with the OECD and the EICC. Industry groups 16 such as London Bullion Market Association, Responsible Jewelers 17 Council, World Gold Council, all have issued due diligence 18 indications and guidelines, and they all endorse third party 19 audits. 20 Unlike the other conflict minerals, gold is a 21 monetary commodity. Its market is unique and it's complex, and 22 it's very mature. If the regulations are going to be realistic, 23 I do hope the Commission adopts these industry initiatives in 24 guiding the trade. Thank you. 25 MR. SCHUBERT: Good afternoon and thank you for the 0125 1 opportunity to provide five perspectives on the examination of 2 non-financial information and the independent private sector 3 audit that must accompany a conflict minerals report. 4 My name is Darrel Schubert and I am a partner at 5 Ernst & Young's national professional practice group. I also 6 currently serve as the chair of the auditing standards board o 7 the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. I want 8 to take this opportunity to than the Commission and staff for 9 hosting this roundtable to gain additional perspective. 10 So, appreciating the challenges the Commission must 11 resolve before issuing a final rule as mandated by Dodd-Frank, 12 in my opening remarks, I would like to briefly discuss the 13 examination of non-financial information and how that process is 14 similar to but also different from the audit of traditional, 15 financial statements. In March of 1986 the ASB issued a series 16 of attestation standards addressing the examination of 17 non-financial information. 18 We've used the standards to examine and report on a 19 wide range of non-traditional subject matters from investment 20 returns reported by mutual fund advisors to security and privacy 21 controls asserted by service providers to compliance with laws 22 and regulations. These attestation standards that serve the 23 public and the professional well and were adopted by the PCOB as 24 interim standards in April 2003 are attestation standards also 25 used by the GAO in performing attestation engagements under the 0126 1 government auditing standards. 2 While the term "examination" is used in describing 3 an attestation engagement, be assured that the process is the 4 same as a financial statement audit. Just as the audit of 5 financial statements includes a robust risk assessment process, 6 including an understanding of internal control and then the 7 development of an audit strategy to obtain reasonable assurance 8 that the financial statements are in accordance with GAAP, so do 9 the attestation standards for non-financial information require 10 the same robust process. 11 Similarly, an examination performed under the 12 attestation standards requires the auditor to obtain a 13 reasonable assurance basis for the opinion expressed. Another 14 similarity between an audit and an examination conducted in 15 accordance with our attestation standards is that the auditor 16 must be independent of the subject matter and the issuer. 17 Therefore, management is required to take full responsibility 18 for the subject matter, whatever that may be, in the 19 presentation of that subject matter. 20 An independent audit cannot be integral to 21 management's process in reaching its assertions. Our 22 responsibility is to report on whether the subject matter is 23 fairly presented, based on suitable criteria. Where an 24 attestation examination and an audit differ, isn't in the 25 process or in the responsibilities or in the level of assurance 0127 1 obtained by the auditor, but rather the subject matter and the 2 criteria used to assess its presentation. In an audit of 3 historical financial statements the entity's financial 4 statements represent the subject matter, and the criteria are 5 generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. In an 6 attestation examination the subject matter and the criteria 7 vary; however, having the subject matter and criteria clearly 8 defined is a must. 9 As we discussed in our comment letter dated March 10 1st, the AICP has concerns that the SEC's proposed rule on 11 conflict minerals was not clear about the subject matter or 12 objective of the examination; nor was it clear about what 13 criteria management would use in preparing and presenting a 14 subject matter. As to the conflict minerals report, the subject 15 matter might be management's description of their procedures and 16 controls in performing their due diligence process with the 17 auditor expressing an opinion that the procedures described were 18 performed without providing any opinion on whether the 19 effectiveness of such procedures or their compliance with any 20 published standards. 21 At the other end of the spectrum, the subject matter 22 may be whether management's conclusions about the source and 23 chain of custody of the conflict minerals are appropriate, that 24 is whether the company's products are DRC conflict free or are 25 not conflict free. These are just two examples of the several 0128 1 alternative objectives that were identified in our response to 2 the rule proposal. As we mentioned, each of these objectives or 3 subject matters would present different challenges, and because 4 each would require different examination procedures, some would 5 be more costly than others. Therefore, having the subject 6 matter or the objective of the examination clearly defined in 7 the final rule is essential before we can say how we would 8 perform the examination and how much the examination would cost. 9 Also critical to the examination are suitable 10 criteria against which to assess the prior presentation of the 11 subject matter. Suitable criteria must have each of the 12 following attributes: Objectivity, measurability, completeness 13 and relevance. Without clear, suitable criteria, management 14 will not know the rules for how to prepare or present the 15 subject matter. And without clear, suitable criteria, the 16 auditor will not be able to examiner and report on whether the 17 subject matter is fairly stated. 18 Finally, I want to briefly touch on use of experts 19 in these types of engagement, because some of these engagements 20 do involve non-traditional subject matters. The CPA 21 professional has a public duty not to accept an engagement, if 22 the CPA doesn't think he or she has the appropriate skills or 23 competencies. 24 Generally, when we're asked to examine a report on a 25 subject matter that is outside our normal skills and competency, 0129 1 for example, examining and reporting on greenhouse gas 2 admissions, the attestation standards direct the auditor to 3 engage and make the use of specialists who would be able to 4 assist and advice the auditor on the appropriate procedures to 5 perform. However, we recognize there may be instances where the 6 subject matter and criteria are so far outside the CPA skill set 7 that we have a duty not to accept the engagement. 8 I cannot tell you whether we're at that point with 9 conflict minerals, because I stated the subject matter and 10 criteria weren't clear from the SEC's proposed rule. In 11 summary, I feel confident that our attestation standards provide 12 excellent standards for use by CPAs when asked to examine or 13 audit non-traditional information, such as conflict minerals. 14 However, I cannot over emphasize the importance of 15 having the subject matter and criteria clearly defined by the 16 SEC in its final rule. Unless the objective and subject matter 17 is clearly articulated, and unless management and the auditor 18 are confident that there are suitable criteria to measure 19 present, and examine subject matter against, it will not be 20 possible for a CPA to conduct the engagement. 21 In conclusion, I want to thank Commissioner 22 Schapiro, the other commissioners, and the SEC staff for the 23 opportunity to appear before you this afternoon, and I'd be 24 happy to answer any questions you may have about the auditor 25 examination process or her comment letter. 0130 1 MS. CROSS: Thank you very much for the very helpful 2 opening remarks. Before we get started with our questions, I 3 wanted to see if anyone had comments they wanted to make based 4 on what was discussed in the prior panel, for example, on the 5 definitions or any of the other topics from the prior panel. 6 This panel we're going to be talking about the due 7 diligence process and the reporting process. So if there are 8 things you wanted to say about necessary functionality or 9 contract to manufacture, this is your chance. Yeah. Go ahead. 10 MR. FENWICK: Thank you. I think I just wanted to 11 say in Enough's submission we have outlined -- and I won't 12 rehash for you -- what we believe the definition of "necessary 13 to the functionality of" should look like, definition of 14 "necessary" in particular. And, as well, the multi stakeholder 15 group companies, investors and NGOs, have come up with four 16 different bullet points of what we also believe that that would 17 include. 18 And I think I would also mention for some of the -- 19 and stop me if part of what I'm about to say is about to be 20 covered here, but in terms of a reasonable country of origin 21 inquiry, as was mentioned in the last panel, I think there are a 22 number of ways to do this. And I think from our perspective, as 23 most commentators, a lot of commentators have acknowledged, that 24 the choke point in the supply chain is the smelter. And so the 25 idea -- smelter refiner -- and the idea is to have a process, as 0131 1 we have said in our multi stakeholder submission, to have a 2 process by which the filer can determine the origin of the ores 3 at the smelter level. 4 Now we understand that, of course, reporting is 5 going to be uneven in the first years. We acknowledged that 6 point. But what we're going to be looking for in particular 7 with respect to reasonable country of origin inquiry is what 8 steps are you taking to determine where the minerals in your 9 products originate. And so I just wanted to kind of reiterate 10 that point and try to make it -- I think it's an important point 11 that needs to be made, because it's an important component of 12 this process. 13 MR. COHEN: Thanks. I just wanted to reiterate our 14 company's view, our industry's view, that the remedial purposes 15 of the Act can be served very fully and completely served by 16 something less than perfect knowledge and a complete mapping of 17 the supply chain of complex manufacturers all the way back to a 18 smelter or a refiner. And I think that the evidence for that is 19 the reaction, the immediate and startling reaction which 20 occurred upon the enactment of the Dodd-Frank legislation on a 21 virtual overnight, virtual complete embargo. Indeed there's 22 some risk, I think; not that there will be under compliance and 23 insufficient disinvestment in conflict-affected mines, but a 24 risk of over compliance and inappropriate disinvestments. 25 What we believe is that the combination of flow-down 0132 1 provisions, industry best practices, codes of conduct and 2 internal organizing of the companies at the downstream end of 3 the supply chain, pushing that upstream towards our first tier, 4 our second tier, our third tier, while in combination with the 5 smelter certification program and the other initiatives that are 6 going on in the ground in terms of the mine to smelter segment 7 of the supply chain, that is going to achieve substantially al 8 the desired effects of the statute without the incredible 9 expense, delay and complexity of attempting to trace the 10 conflict minerals that might be present in each of the hundreds 11 of millions of piece parts that are acquired every year by a 12 company like mine. 13 MS. NIMMO: Yeah. I just wanted to agree with the 14 lady from AngloGold Ashanti where she was convinced that mining 15 is not manufacturing. I think that's a pretty well-accepted 16 point of view and perspective in number of regulations; and, 17 we've talked about the REACH regulation's been mentioned before. 18 Ores and concentrates are not covered in the REACH regulation, 19 because they recognize the natural substance and are not 20 transformed into manufacturing product until the point of the 21 smelter. I think that would be a very well-recognized concept. 22 I'd also want to comment on this point of view that 23 the smelter is the place where the controls should be placed. 24 So that means the smelter is aware, most all the mineral must go 25 to be treated, but it's not the easiest or the best way, or the 0133 1 most effective place to control conflict minerals. That is at 2 the point of mining in the region or the point of export from 3 the region, because if we can control conflict minerals on the 4 ground, all traceability from that point onward is not 5 necessary. 6 MR. MOHIN: I just want to jump in on the question 7 of necessary for functionality of the project. I think the 8 Commission got it absolutely right when you excluded the machine 9 tools that make a product. It would be next to impossible to 10 trace those back; and, as my colleague Sandy Merber said, a lot 11 of those are kept in use for quite a long time. 12 In addition, the entire conversation about de 13 minimis from panel one I think concluded with the keep it simple 14 rule, because this is not a toxicity based rule as the 15 restriction on hazardous substances was, where you had a reason 16 to set a de minimis level. This is about protecting people from 17 human rights abuses. And so not only would it make it more 18 difficult to implement, but I don't think it's the right policy 19 in this case. 20 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Prisco? 21 MS. PRISCO: Thank you. I wanted to make a couple 22 of comments too with regard to necessary to the functionality. 23 I think that when the rule was first -- when the law was first 24 put together, you know, I think it was the intention that we 25 find a way to identify where there are large amounts of these 0134 1 materials, the three Ts and gold, being used in certain 2 products, because it would be those manufacturers that would be 3 able to go back through the supply chain and use their 4 purchasing power to find out where they were ultimately sourced 5 from. 6 I think that if we start getting into a conversation 7 where we're looking at each product and we're trying to discern 8 whether the metal that that product contains is necessary to the 9 alternate functionality of that product, I think it's an 10 entirely gray area. I think it's something that the average 11 person wouldn't be able to identify, you getting questions 12 relative to engineering and chemistry. 13 I think that, rather, it's more or less a question 14 of how concentrated the metal percentage in a given product is, 15 and I think it opens the door for a de minimis component to the 16 rule to say this is only going to be applicable where large 17 amounts of these metals are being used; and, as I said, it makes 18 a lot of sense because those companies who are purchasing metals 19 in large quantities for the purpose of their manufacturing 20 operations are much better poised to penetrate upstream the 21 supply chain in order to find out exactly where those metals are 22 coming from. 23 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Riess? 24 MR. RIESS: I guess my comments are directed at the 25 de minimis question, or at least indirectly. I want to point 0135 1 out that the world production of gold is something like 4,000 2 tons, that the mine component of that is very roughly 2500, and 3 that the DRC produces some six to ten tons. So it's a very 4 small, it's a fraction of one percent in terms of all 5 production. 6 The amount of that gold that comes to the United 7 States is de minimis, because the trade pattern is essentially 8 to Dubai and the Emirates, and then along down to India. So in 9 terms of establishing reasonable standards as to how much gold 10 or the likelihood of gold coming from the DRC and being consumed 11 here should be taken into account in formulating the regulation. 12 MS. DUBBERLY: Okay. Let's now turn to the supply 13 chain, please. What in particular do you think can or must be 14 done in order to track minerals and a product in order for an 15 issuer to determine if they came from the Democratic Republic of 16 Congo or an adjoining country? And then, further, what steps 17 are necessary to determine whether minerals from those countries 18 contributed to armed conflict? To further illuminate these 19 questions, perhaps you could address the OECD guidelines in your 20 answer. The proposed rules did not specify the due diligence 21 required. 22 The proposing release, however, indicated that an 23 issuer whose conduct confirmed to a nationally or 24 internationally recognized set of due diligence standards or 25 guidance would provide evidence that it used due diligence. 0136 1 Several commentators suggested that the due diligence guidance 2 developed by the OECD or the United Nations group of experts on 3 the DRC should be referenced in the rule. 4 Do you believe that the final rule should require 5 use of a specific due diligence standard? If so, which standard 6 or standards? If the final rules require a specific standard, 7 would that facilitate compliance with the statutory requirement 8 that the conflict minerals report be audited? In other words, 9 if you tied the due diligence to one of those standards, does 10 that make the audit more cost effective? 11 MR. FENWICK: So I would just say from our 12 perspective I've heard a lot about flexibility and not being 13 prescriptive, and we understand that point. And I think one of 14 the points that I wanted to reiterate is we have said in our 15 multi stakeholder submission that we have said that due 16 diligence should be OECD or something comparable to 17 understanding that these things can develop over time. I think 18 that the OECD due diligence guidelines, U.N. group of experts 19 guidelines, are the only things that are out there right now. 20 And so we've heard guidance being requested from commentators in 21 a number of submissions about providing examples, as on the last 22 panel, I think, that what was providing an example of how some 23 of these things could be done. 24 So I think the Commission should say that this is an 25 example, or as one of my other multi stakeholder colleagues 0137 1 mentioned, using the OECD as sort of a safe harbor and the due 2 diligence within that. And so I will say in terms of we think 3 the OECD is very thorough in terms of the information that has 4 to be assessed, and it specifically addresses different actors 5 in the supply chain. And so to a point that was mentioned 6 earlier in terms of the smelter being the choke point, it is 7 not, and we are not asking companies to go run around the Congo 8 and go to the mines. 9 What we are saying is that, and what the OECD says 10 is that you identify the choke point in the supply chain. You 11 got to the smelter. You assess the smelter's due diligence, and 12 the smelter, as a part of their due diligence, is to show you a 13 bundle of information about origin, documentation, tax 14 documentation, et cetera, to one, determine where the origin of 15 the minerals have come from that have been purchased, but also 16 to whether there's supporting conflict. 17 And so I will also say that I think there are a 18 number of ways that can be accomplished. So we are also not 19 saying, and I will agree with my colleague from Boeing, that we 20 do agree that companies can rely on, for example, the smelter 21 validation program, conflict-free smelter program, and use that 22 as a way to say, hey, there are about a hundred smelters that 23 produce only these materials. So what we are going to do then 24 is we're going to participate in this audit, and then we're 25 going to contractually pass that down and obligate suppliers to 0138 1 comply, or tell suppliers to comply. 2 And then we do a risk management approach based on 3 supply chains, based on the level of the material. We do a risk 4 management approach to determine compliance, but we do believe 5 that there has to be a follow-up along the way; and so it can't 6 just be the sort of back to the point of sending an e-mail. So 7 I think I got everyone right. Okay. Thanks. 8 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. We'll go Mr. Riess, Mr. 9 Cohen, then Ms. Nimmo and Ms. Prisco. 10 MR. RIESS: I just wanted to suggest that the 11 comment that was made before about limited leverage on the lower 12 tiers of the supply chain should be taken into account, 13 irrespective of which standard you apply. OECD seems to be the 14 one that's coming into general acceptance, but it's the ability 15 to perform given the available information from the lower tiers 16 of the supply chain, I think is a very pertinent point. 17 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Mr. Cohen? 18 MR. COHEN: Thank you. Yes, I think that my 19 colleague from GE and I think my colleague from the Enough 20 Project hit it pretty exactly in saying there needn't be a 21 trade-off where the Commission has to decide rigidly where we're 22 going to say you have to use the OECD guidelines or some other 23 standard, and nothing but that, or just leaving it completely 24 free form. You can have the best of both worlds by explicitly 25 stating that the OECD guidelines and the larger OECD guidelines 0139 1 for multinational enterprises that were just revised and issued 2 earlier are a safe harbor; that companies performing due 3 diligence in accord with those guidelines will in fact be 4 performing due diligence and a reasonable country of origin 5 inquiry sufficient for these purposes. 6 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Nimmo? 7 MS. NIMMO: I think from the upstream industry side, 8 we certainly support of the OECD due diligence guidance. 9 Obviously, there's been a number of difficult circumstances that 10 we're trying to work in in those areas, and it's really 11 appropriate to have clear guidance on what isn't acceptable in 12 which areas. So we certainly support and use the OECD guidance, 13 particularly annex 2, to define sort of responses to presence of 14 armed groups in certain areas or other human rights abuses. 15 What's also important is to try and link what's 16 required by that OECD annex to the definitions of what is 17 conflict-free or what is not conflict-free under the "Dodd-Frank 18 Act," and have been some discussions with the OECD about that. 19 And I think it would be useful if you also speak to them and try 20 to define and match-up the kind of definitions that you can use 21 under the Dodd-Frank in relation to the OECD annex too. 22 And, when it comes to armed groups, we still have a 23 particular problem understanding exactly what's necessary. We 24 have the States Department map, which is not terribly specific, 25 and had a number of disclaimers and waivers on which his company 0140 1 shouldn't use it for their due diligence practices. We have a 2 DRC government map, which is slightly different to the State 3 Department map. We have a reference to the Human Rights reports 4 in Dodd-Frank, which if you look at them refers back to 5 instances that occurred in 2008 or 2009, and are very 6 non-specific and not very helpful. 7 So we have different definitions in each of those. 8 We have different definitions in the conflict-free smelter 9 program, and its number of pieces of confusion which you're not 10 really assisting in getting back to working on traceability in 11 those conflict regions. 12 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Ms. Prisco, then Mr. 13 Mohin and Ms. Baker. 14 MS. PRISCO: Thank you. I think that this issue was 15 one of the most complicated and critical of all the issues and 16 considerations with regard to the rulemaking. The due diligence 17 standard set forth for the OECD are something that TE finds to 18 be reasonable under the circumstances. I think as a first tier 19 approach, they're very solid. 20 I think that the rule should go a little further in 21 defining, however, the precise level of commercial 22 reasonableness that due diligence can take into consideration in 23 its exercise. For example, if the party was to look to relevant 24 trade documents, smelter validation programs, they had certain 25 contractual obligations as a risk management strategy. 0141 1 I think those are the kinds of things that need to 2 be called out specifically to create a good due diligence 3 framework, because as my colleague to my left stated, it is all 4 over the map. No one really knows what it will take to comply, 5 but at the same time, we can't ask for too much, because we can 6 only ask for the types of information that a company can go out 7 and get today, which we hope will increase over time. But as a 8 reasonable matter, it's just not presently available. 9 So if a company exercises commercial practicable 10 efforts or commercial reasonable efforts, or some sort of 11 articulation of that approach, I think that should be 12 satisfactory, and I think they should be able to report with 13 confidence if they discern, based on that level of due 14 diligence, that their supply chain is conflict free. 15 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Mohin? 16 MR. MOHIN: To your question can a company figure 17 out if the minerals in its product supported armed groups, no 18 single company working alone can do that. That's just beyond 19 the scope of most companies, and you're looking at some fairly 20 large companies. And, of course, there's much smaller companies 21 that are subject to the rule, but, working together we can. 22 Through the EICC and GeSI effort and our 23 conflict-free smelter program, which is based on the 24 internationally recognized OECD guidelines we've heard so much 25 about, we can figure out which smelters are sourcing clean 0142 1 materials or conflict free materials, and which ones are not. 2 We've also through the EICC and GeSI process figured out a 3 standardized way to track our products all the way back to the 4 smelter. 5 AMD has started its own pilot to look at how this is 6 done, and the results are still coming in; but, surprisingly, 7 we're getting some pretty good information back. So it is 8 complicated. It is new, but it's something that we can 9 absolutely do. And I would draw the analogy Susan Baker did in 10 her opening remarks to the restriction on hazardous substances 11 rule that came out of the European Union a few years ago. Also 12 complex, also focused on electronic products, although this 13 one's broader, but it had six different materials, and it had 14 concentrations in each material. 15 We had to figure that one out. It took a lot of 16 work; but over the years of implementation, we now have some 17 processes and systems that worked fairly well, and we're looking 18 at how to modify those to use them for this particular rule as 19 well. 20 MS. BAKER: I wanted to comment briefly on the OECD 21 due diligence guidance, and I believe that you should specify to 22 the extent possible the steps that would continue a due 23 diligence process. And I believe from an investors perspective, 24 the transparency and disclosure around that process is critical, 25 and too often we see voluntary industry standards that are used, 0143 1 but they're not as robust and not as transparent as other 2 independent processes. So again, I think you have some 3 latitude, but I encourage you to hone in on the disclosure in 4 transparency. 5 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. Many commentators have 6 written in suggesting that gold be treated differently from 7 other conflict minerals. Does the fact that the OECD has not 8 yet completed development of standards for gold mean that the 9 reporting requirements for gold should be delayed? And, if you 10 think so, from what period of time? 11 MR. RIESS: My understanding is that those 12 guidelines are supposed to come out in a month or so. So I 13 don't think we have that long to wait. 14 MR. FENWICK: Yes, I agree with that as well. The 15 guidelines are coming out and it is our belief that there's no 16 room within the statute to treat things differently. And there 17 have been some particular mention of some of the difficulties 18 with gold and sort of the visible side and the invisible side, 19 and we sort of understand some of the challenges, and certainly 20 some of the challenges in all of this. 21 But I think one of the key things that we're going 22 to be looking at is again in judging companies and their 23 progress is the effort that they're undertaking, and so we don't 24 in any way want to incentivize or disincentivize a very robust 25 effort. And, obviously, some people are going to get a lot 0144 1 further than others. And I will also just add to that the 2 London Bullion Metals Association in their submission, which is 3 a key point and the key actor in the gold chain, has also asked 4 that the Commission adopt the OECD due diligence guidelines as 5 well. 6 MS. DUBBERLY: Okay. Go ahead. 7 MS. NIMMO: Yeah. I mean I'd just like to comment 8 that I don't really believe that the gold supply chain is 9 particularly any more complex, certainly, in the tin supply 10 chain. Tin is used in hundreds of thousands of different 11 application, in coating in small amounts in a number of 12 different products: ceramics, metals, chemicals, textiles, 13 everywhere. 14 In fact, they're probably -- you mentioned that it's 15 used in may different places in the same way that gold is, has 16 the same approximate level of recycling as well. So I don't 17 think it's particularly a larger challenge than any other metal. 18 MS. PRISCO: I think with gold there is some extra 19 complexity, only because of its value and the fact that it often 20 rests in exchanges, so that the commingling of gold that's 21 caused, once it's placed within an exchange, it makes it 22 extremely difficult, if at all possible to trace back. So, 23 again, whether or not you include gold with the three Ts at the 24 initial implementation of the rule, that will be dependent on 25 how the due diligence standards flow out, if it's done in a way 0145 1 that it allows for gold, you know, the gold due diligence to 2 evolve over time, as perhaps the world adapts to this law, and 3 then they try to find ways to comply with it and create that 4 traceability. But, as of right now, because gold exists in 5 exchanges throughout the world, we don't have any way to look 6 beyond that, and we have virtually no traceability as to gold 7 whatsoever. 8 MS. NIMMO: So I really just need to reply to that 9 as well. Tin, obviously, also is held in exchanges. It's the 10 same type of market, commodity market or material. Metal on an 11 exchange will have some kind of -- produce an identification and 12 assay, and it looks like a production date certificate, for 13 example. So I'd be surprised that gold couldn't be traced also 14 through exchanges. 15 MR. CROTEAU: Okay. Thank you, and good afternoon. 16 So we'd like to now turn our attention to the independent 17 private sector audit of the due diligence report that's required 18 by the statute. And we had a number of commentators who 19 suggested that the Commission clarify in the rule what the audit 20 objective is. So, for example, the audit objective could be 21 tied to management's due diligence process and controls, to 22 management's conclusions or to both. 23 Also, if the rule works require that management's 24 due diligence follow a certain standard, such as OECD, as we've 25 been discussing, the audit objective could focus on whether or 0146 1 not the company's due diligence procedures were in conformance 2 with those standards. So do panelists have any views about the 3 appropriate scope and objective of the independent private 4 sector audit? And, in particular, if the Commission were to 5 require management to follow a framework, including one such as 6 OECD, would an audit of whether the procedures, management's 7 procedures, were designed in conformity with this framework be 8 likely to be appropriate and result in a cost effective audit? 9 MR. COHEN: Thank you. I think that's really quite 10 a critical point, and the scope in particular. I think that it 11 is extraordinarily important in terms of having an efficient 12 audit process, which is not crushing in its expense, to have it 13 focused on the design of the process rather than the content of 14 the report. 15 I think the points were very well made in the 16 submission by AICPA, where they laid out five, different, 17 potential audit objectives, of which the latter three, including 18 an audit of the actual contents of the report were described as 19 being extraordinarily expensive and burdensome. And so I think 20 that yes, clearly a focus on the process rather than on the 21 contents would be critical. 22 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Heim and then Mr. Fenwick? 23 MR. HEIM: I think it's important to start off with 24 a clarification of what it is we're really talking about 25 relative to this audit, because in the number of conversations 0147 1 I've had over the past, however many months with however many 2 companies, there's a great deal of confusion as to, first off, 3 not only what it is we're auditing, but where does the audit 4 fall in the process, because we've had these things called CFS 5 audits, which is part of the process. We're talking about some 6 audits within ITRI, and that chain from the mouth of the mine up 7 to the smelter. 8 There's other audits that are now being discussed 9 within the public-private partnerships, and then we have this 10 thing called the audit within the conflict minerals report. So 11 I think it's important that we a) recognize that, and b) clarify 12 that the discussion today is that audit of the conflict minerals 13 report itself, which is a singular element of the process. In 14 terms of what we've had discussions with and some of the actual 15 proposals we put forth, it's our view that it is a management 16 systems audit. 17 It is not an audit more related to the outcome or 18 the results. It's about assessing the existence of the 19 processes, how well they are implemented and communicated 20 throughout the organization, whether or not the data for making 21 decisions exists, and is used throughout the organizations, and 22 then made available through not only the organization itself, 23 but also through the supply chain. So we view it basically, 24 again, coming at it from the more traditional, environmental 25 health safety management system approach, it's what we call a 0148 1 management systems audit. And so for us, the content of the 2 report is on that element. 3 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Fenwick and Mr. Mohin? 4 MR. FENWICK: Thank you. So it's been brought to my 5 attention from the drafters, at least -- and I'll say this on 6 the outset. And I believe that this has also been communicated 7 to some staff in terms of who should conduct the audit, so I'll 8 just throw this in really quickly, because this touches to the 9 expense. There isn't an expectation that these audits have to 10 be conducted by accountants or audit firms, but someone who's 11 knowledgable with the issue, but is still independent. 12 So having said that, though, I think for our 13 expectation in terms of -- and I'm throwing this out there, so 14 don't shoot me yet -- in terms of what we expect of the audit, 15 agree with my colleague to my right and also to the left to the 16 point that we do believe there needs to be a review of the 17 descriptions of the filers, the procedures and systems and 18 controls, management controls in place within the report. Now, 19 I would go a step further to say -- I shouldn't say I would 20 like, but one of the things I think that we would want to see 21 also is if we'd want the auditor to say, okay. Well based on 22 the systems that GE, for example, has in place, a reasonable 23 person in a similarly situated, could come to the same 24 conclusions, so not judging the actual systems that were used, 25 but just sort of making sure that the company is actually living 0149 1 up to the systems they themselves put in place. So that's 2 clear, I hope. 3 MR. MOHIN: Just very quickly, I think my colleague, 4 Mr. Heim, to the left, described this very well. There are two 5 audits involved here. There's the audit of the report, which is 6 specifically called out in the legislation, and just to agree 7 with Mr. Fenwick, that audit is of the report. So it really 8 should be on management's description of procedures and 9 controls, and, essentially, verifying that those procedures and 10 controls were followed. 11 The second audit is the audit of the smelter, and I 12 think we get these things confused all the time. In the case of 13 the EICC-GeSI process that I mentioned before, that is a group 14 process, an industry process whereby many of the companies that 15 subscribe to that process will be using that same audit 16 information. That's a much more detailed audit that gets into 17 the manifest, and so on, of that actual smelter. So there are 18 differences. 19 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Schubert? 20 MR. SCHUBERT: Thank you. As you mentioned and as 21 Mr. Cohen mentioned, the AICPA comment letter listed five 22 different possibilities for an examination; and, obviously, as 23 you went down that comment letter, they got progressively more 24 difficult for a CPA to do because the subject matter was moving 25 from the processes and controls of management to the content of 0150 1 the supply chain. 2 In your question, Brian, did you ask about an audit 3 or an examination of the processes and controls? And that would 4 fall under the purview of a CPA under the attestation standards. 5 With regard to suitable criteria, you know, the OECD due 6 diligence guidance, I've learned a lot about conflict minerals 7 in the last week and a half that I didn't note prior to this, 8 and I spent some time with this. I'm not prepared to say that 9 it is or is not suitable criteria, because I don't know. There 10 is some concern about whether it would be subject to consistent 11 interpretation, but it is as others have mentioned. It is the 12 best thing that's out there right now from the standpoint of 13 criteria to do this type of an examination on. 14 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Nimmo? 15 MS. NIMMO: I'd actually say there's four different 16 types of audit. You have the Dodd-Frank audit, the CFS smelter 17 audit, which doesn't audit upstream, the ITSCI audit, which 18 you'd have to audit between the mine and smelter; and then 19 there's also over government audits, regional government audits, 20 also planned, which we can partly converge with. So there's a 21 number of audits, actually. 22 I think that is also one of the problems and issues 23 that certainly separately needs to be dealt with. This is how 24 concept that people are focusing on auditing, the zero tolerance 25 question that Lawrence mentioned earlier, and really moving away 0151 1 from the actual issue and dealing with the actual issue, and 2 putting in practical solutions on the ground that will actually 3 come back and help implement the original aims of Dodd-Frank. 4 MR. CROTEAU: Thank you. Just one follow-up point 5 so the "Dodd-Frank Act" is clear that the audit is to be 6 conducted using GAO standard. We've heard a couple people 7 mention the use of attestation standards, which are one of the 8 standards under the GAO standards. Performance audits are 9 another set of standards. 10 Those audits could be performed by accountants and 11 non-accountants, versus attestation standards are generally only 12 performed or allowed to be performed by accountants. And given 13 that the nature of this type of audit wondered if panelists had 14 particular views on the use of the performance standards, which 15 would enable both accountants and non-accountants to perform 16 these audits. 17 MR. SCHUBERT: Brian, I'll comment, because I think 18 I'm expected to comment on that one. The performance audit 19 standards are part of the "Yellow Book," and they're not 20 something I have any personal familiarity with, having never 21 used. But they are an audit that's at the same level, requires 22 the same level of assurance on the auditors part for reaching an 23 opinion. 24 My understanding from discussions with individuals 25 in the industry is that the reporting under the performance 0152 1 audit standards might differ greatly, that one of the selling 2 points of the attestation standards is that you would have some 3 consistency in the form of reporting, so that investors or 4 whoever's reading the report would understand what they're 5 getting, was that the performance audit standards, the reports, 6 could differ depending on the individual that's performing it. 7 But those standards do require the same level of independence as 8 the attestation standards when they're done under the government 9 auditing standards. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Fenwick and Mr. Heim? 11 MR. FENWICK: Yes. I think the crux, and just so 12 I'm clear, I think the crux is auditors versus non-auditors; 13 accountants versus non-accountants. So I think just in line 14 with the other comment, yeah. I mean from our perspective, 15 again, as long as there's not a conflict of interest and someone 16 sufficiently understands the issue, then accountant versus 17 non-accountant, sure. 18 MS. CROSS: I'll weigh in quickly, I think, just to 19 get the panel thinking about this. One of our concerns is to 20 make sure that the costs are kept reasonable, and it's just 21 totally on a back of the envelope thought. If there are more 22 people who can do the audit, then there's more competition and 23 there's presumably cost come-down, one would think. 24 So we have been thinking, and also there's nothing 25 inherent about this that would lead one to think that 0153 1 accountants need to do it, but at the same time there is concern 2 that if there isn't a particular standard that you're auditing 3 against, that this could be very difficult to implement. So if 4 you're hearing the questions from us, they are along the lines 5 of do you need a standard, for example, OECD, so that you have 6 something to judge against. 7 If a company doesn't have to do a particular 8 standard, then what do you audit against? And so that could 9 lead one to meet a standard like that; and, second, if it's a 10 test, then only the accountants will be able to do it under the 11 current GAO standards. So does that lead one to want to go down 12 the performance audit path so that more people can do it, 13 accountants and non-accountants depending on independence? 14 And those are issues that we've been discussing 15 quite a bit internally, so you have the sort of perspective 16 we're coming from. I think maybe that might help to generate 17 more discussion. 18 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Heim, then Mr. Cohen. 19 MR. HEIM: Well, apparently, you're reading my cheat 20 notes just now. Yes, although we are not CPAs. We've been 21 doing environmental management systems audits for, you know, 20 22 plus years, 25, 26, whatever. So we're quite familiar with 23 audit standards. We began taking a look at "Yellow Book" as 24 soon as we were aware of the law and it was passed. And we 25 began looking at, relative to traditional environmental health 0154 1 and safety auditors, what are the big differences -- where are 2 the gaps -- and whether or not as practitioners we would be able 3 to support these efforts; and there is a big difference. 4 There's quite a big difference, but where we did 5 ultimately come down to was performance audits. And so in our 6 discussions with clients, we've kind of landed on the 7 performance audit as what we think seems to make sense. And, 8 you're correct. We do believe that the competitive market will 9 be opened up quite widely if it was something that was not 10 limited to CPAs having to perform that particular element of 11 implementation. 12 MR. COHEN: First of all, I should just say that we 13 deeply appreciate your desire to contain our audit costs, and we 14 urge all of you to hold that thought firmly in mind. 15 (Laughter.) 16 MR. COHEN: I would also ask, though -- obviously, 17 GAO will do what it will do and is independent in our view. 18 Whether since both a performance audit and an attestation 19 engagement are permissible and do have defined scope under GAO's 20 "Yellow Book;" whether you might not engage with them in an 21 attempt to elicit a possibility, you could allow both. Each has 22 advantages and weaknesses. So allowing both to be used, would 23 perhaps be the best of both worlds. 24 MS. CROSS: And you can rest assured we are talking 25 to GAO. I don't want you to think we're doing this in a vacuum. 0155 1 We're having discussions with them about what kind of an audit 2 would be appropriate. 3 MS. DUBBERLY: And on this question I don't want to 4 necessarily put people on the spot here, but if you happen to 5 have, one of the things we're having a hard time grappling with 6 is costs of audits. So if anybody has follow-up estimates on 7 potential cost, that would be useful for us. 8 MS. CROSS: Particularly for the different kinds. 9 So if there's a performance audit, if you have a standard, for 10 example, OECD versus don't have a standard. I mean we do. 11 We're grappling with what would the audit be if you don't have a 12 standard. 13 MS. DUBBERLY: So, you know. If it's just of the 14 report, it's hard to do an audit of the report that's an audit 15 of controls if there's no standard. 16 MR. HEIM: I think your last comment is exactly 17 right. You know, as we've struggled at times with developing 18 proposals for clients who have requested this of us, we have our 19 audit process that we believe is correct and that would meet 20 1502 and that it would be aligned with the current proposal of 21 the regulations as well. But whether that's going to be what is 22 ultimately the final standard, certainly, we don't now yet. 23 If there are substantive changes in that, then 24 that's obviously going to impact scope and impact cost. The 25 other thing about that is obviously we develop our costs and 0156 1 scope based on our costing structure, which is quite a bit 2 different than what the big four cost structure is. 3 So that's another element of pricing that goes into 4 it. But there does need to be some kind of acceptable stake in 5 the sand, if you will, for a standard, because authorize -- and 6 we've already run into this in certain situations where there 7 are in a proposal situation, we're up against firms who really 8 don't understand what the scope is. And so their cost structure 9 for what they're bringing forward to the client is massive, 10 because it's so broad. 11 We bring a narrower focus based on our experience, 12 and it's significantly less. So the question is why is there 13 this large gap in scope. Why is there a large gap in cost 14 differential between the two audit standards, and the answer is 15 well, because we don't really know what the audit standard is 16 just yet. 17 MS. CROSS: So I guess I'll move on to the next 18 topic, unless anybody wants to talk more about audits. The 19 proposed rule would classify an issuers' conflict minerals from 20 recycled or scrap sources as DRC conflict-free, but such an 21 issuer would be required to disclose that its conflict minerals 22 were from recycled or scrap sources, and submit a conflict 23 minerals report, discussing the due diligence exercise and 24 determine that the conflict minerals were from recycled or scrap 25 sources, as well as have that report audited. 0157 1 It appears that most commentators agree that there 2 should be an alternative reporting scheme for conflict minerals 3 from recycled or scrapped sources, but commentators disagreed 4 with the requirements of any such scheme. Some commentators 5 argued that the reporting alternative should not require an 6 issuer with conflict minerals from recycled or scrapped sources 7 to provide a conflict minerals report, or an independent private 8 sector audit. 9 Other commentators agreed with the proposed rules, 10 that the alternative reporting scheme should require a conflict 11 minerals report and an audit. Should the recycled or scrap 12 reporting require issuers to submit a conflict minerals report 13 and an audit? Should the scheme require only a conflict 14 minerals report, but not require an audit? If so, what should 15 the conflict minerals report entail? 16 MS. DUBBERLY: Ask Mr. Fenwick. 17 MS. CROSS: Mr. Fenwick will start. 18 MR. FENWICK: So from our perspective, as I 19 mentioned in our comments, we do agree with the Commission's 20 proposal that our conflict minerals report should be submitted 21 for or furnished/filed for recycled or scrapped minerals, and it 22 should be audited. I think the reason for this is we are aware 23 of potential loopholes that that can come through recycled and 24 scrap sources. And I think it's consistent, quite honestly, 25 with what the conflict-free smelter program is doing, because as 0158 1 they conduct their audits, they're also looking at recycled 2 sources to make sure that recycled sources match the definition 3 that EICC conflict-free smelter program came up with. 4 And so what I would say was important is in the 5 report is to be able to say, okay, this is how I know what scrap 6 and recycled source is. And so it would be helpful if there was 7 a definition, and I know one has been submitted. I think we 8 submitted one and then another commentator has also submitted 9 one, so that there's something, too. But I think it's important 10 for filers to just say, okay. This is recycled or scrap. It's 11 going to be DRC conflict-free; and, if it's going to be, tell us 12 just that -- yes, this meets the definition of being recycled 13 and scrapped -- or just how do you know it's recycled and 14 scrapped. 15 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Heim, Ms. Prisco and Ms. Nimmo? 16 MR. HEIM: I think, first off, again it's important 17 to recognize that there may be some misunderstanding about what 18 it gets you if you claim a material scrap or recycled material. 19 There's a sense out there by some companies that it's a complete 20 exclusion from the applicability of the regulations and the law; 21 and, obviously, that's not the case. As the proposal is 22 written, it gets you a somewhat more streamlined report and due 23 diligence process that you have to implement, but it's not an 24 exclusion. 25 As a parallel and perhaps a contrast, and I think we 0159 1 discussed our initial meeting a number of months ago, EPA has 2 spent a couple of decades trying to define scrap in various 3 applications. And they do it within the context of whether or 4 not it's a solid waste or hazardous waste. And, you know, they 5 spent two decades trying to define this and they're still 6 continually refining that. 7 So I think it is a rather complex question. Whether 8 or not it should be subject to the full due diligence and 9 conflict minerals reporting, I believe that's a little too 10 onerous for that. It seems to me that once you define a 11 material scrap that you can verify through a reasonable inquiry, 12 or even perhaps some level -- I don't necessarily want to use 13 the word "audit," but some kind of evaluation, and can 14 reasonably rely on that evaluation. You say, yes, this does 15 meet the definition of scrap under the 1502 regulations. 16 It seems to me that it's appropriate for that 17 process to end right there. I don't see any value, and I have 18 not had any clients feel that there's any value in continuing to 19 move the process forward. It's unnecessary expenditures and 20 efforts. 21 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Prisco? 22 MS. PRISCO: I'm inclined to agree. I think that 23 once you identify that a certain percentage of your metals are 24 recycled metals that that percentage of recycle should be exempt 25 from further exploration. And, verification of that, I think, 0160 1 could be as simple as asking your first tier supplier -- in our 2 case or in other cases further down the line. 3 By asking that supplier to provide you with some 4 sort of certification from the scrap hauler or the source from 5 where those metals were received. I'm not sure that there are 6 any products out there that use 100% recycled metals. I'm not 7 an engineer, but I think from a purity standpoint that's 8 impossible. So I think all you're doing is allowing for the 9 small percentage of recycled metals that are present in products 10 to not trigger any reporting requirements associated with those 11 metals. And, you know, if anything, I think there's a 12 tremendous amount of environmental responsibility tied with 13 recycling, so we don't want to discourage that. 14 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Nimmo and then Mr. Riess? 15 MR. RIESS: The percentage of scrap recycled 16 material is more like 40%, a solid 40%. It's not at all 17 impossible to go to a refiner that can attest to the fact that 18 they're doing 100%. Others cannot or would not; but, I would 19 point out that the accumulation process of recycled material was 20 one of consolidation of greater and greater amounts, probably at 21 least through three stages, and at each one there's a blending 22 process. So I would think that to look for confirmation, audit 23 type confirmation beyond the refiner level would be fairly 24 unrealistic as applied to scrap. 25 MS. NIMMO: Yeah. I'd just like to agree with those 0161 1 comments. You know. If you're looking for recycled tin, you'd 2 have to also audit proper smelters, lead smelters, steel works. 3 You'd have to practically audit the entire metal business in the 4 entire world. It's really not feasible to even begin that 5 process. No. So you have to recognize here that you can't 6 eliminate the risk of some material coming back as recycling. 7 But, you know, we already know that most of the 8 conflict minerals that are still being traded is going to other 9 markets anyway, so you're not going to eliminate that just by 10 introducing audits or conflict mineral reporting on recycled 11 material. And also you should be quite careful about relying on 12 definitions of recycled material, because it's not just about 13 recovering end of life consumer products. Just buying products 14 is industrial waste -- is a catalyst -- and things like that, 15 which doesn't really come under the definitions that have been 16 put forward. 17 So it will be very difficult and complex, and know 18 people in the EU have been discussing for many, many years. 19 When end of life products become waste -- when they become 20 secondary materials -- and there's a very complex number of 21 definitions that say you really should maybe try and avoid 22 getting into. 23 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Mohin. 24 MR. MOHIN: Just very quickly, because I think we're 25 kind of lining up here that materials as reclaimed end user, 0162 1 post-consumer, or scrap should be exempt from the rule. As my 2 colleague, Ms. Nimmo, said, "There's not much benefit to the end 3 purposes of this legislation to track and trace that material;" 4 however, we feel strongly that the issuer should undertake 5 reasonable inquiry with regard to how, if determined, that 6 material is recycled or scrap, and make that inquiry available 7 and disclosed. This law is after all a disclosure law, and 8 people should show their cards when they're determining that 9 their material is recycled or scrap. 10 MS. DUBBERLY: All right. Okay. Unless anyone else 11 has any comments on that, I'd like to focus on the actual 12 reporting and logistics involved in submitting a report. 13 Section 1502 states that a person must disclose annually whether 14 its conflict minerals originated in DRC countries, and if so 15 submit to the Commission report. 16 Under the proposed rules, issuers would be required 17 to submit their conflict minerals information in their annual 18 report. Several commentators suggested that issuers need more 19 time to gather and organize their conflict minerals information, 20 so that the conflict minerals information should not be required 21 until a longer period of time than issuers have to file their 22 forms 10K, and should be included, therefore, in a different 23 form. 24 If you believe issuers need more time, how many days 25 after the end of the reporting period should the final rules 0163 1 require an issuer to submit its conflict minerals information? 2 And, should the Commission use a new annual reporting form for 3 that submission? 4 MR. COHEN: Thank you. Our view is that we 5 definitely will need more time, particularly early on, but 6 foreseeably for a number of years, because of the novelty of 7 this issue. And we think that we would have a lot of challenge; 8 we're a year-end company. We'd have a lot of challenge in 9 getting reported if we had to submit a conflict minerals report 10 and audit a conflict minerals report. 11 Obviously, we'd like to avoid that with a reasonable 12 country of origin inquiry. But if we did, we think that we or 13 any complex OEM would have a lot of trouble in meeting that 14 deadline; and, so, we would recommend that this be a new 8K 15 item. You could specify, I would think, May or June would be a 16 reasonable timeframe; and, certainly, I don't think that the 17 investors of a market particularly are concerned about the 18 difference between hearing in February and hearing May or June; 19 but that, I think, would be considerably reasonable. 20 And I know the 8K is supposed to be event driven. 21 But for, say, on pay for example, the requirement before the 22 next annual report, before a certain amount of time, before the 23 next annual meeting shows that it can be used for things other 24 than special events. 25 MS. DUBBERLY: Do you pick 8K because you want 8K, 0164 1 or how about some new form? 2 MR. COHEN: A new form. 3 MS. DUBBERLY: You just keep saying some form other 4 than 18K. 5 MR. COHEN: Yes. 6 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Prisco and then Mr. Mohin? 7 MS. PRISCO: I agree that there should be a delay in 8 the requirements to file the report; you know, based on the 9 complexities as my colleague from Boeing noted. But also I 10 think it should be not an addendum to the full report, but 11 rather it should be something filed independently. So even if 12 we don't take exception to the time requirement, I think that we 13 should have something separate and apart from the bulk report 14 that's filed, say in February. And I'm concerned, mostly, from 15 the representations that will made in that report, you know. 16 In the beginning, notwithstanding any framework that 17 would come out for reporting these things, there's going to be a 18 lot of ambiguity in the process. There's going to be sources 19 that are relied upon that might ultimately be unreliable; and I 20 think that there should be sort of some instruction by the SEC 21 or some sort of words of caution to the investment community to 22 the fact that there isn't 100% accuracy behind the reporting 23 based on all of the complexities and the unknowns. 24 MR. MOHIN: Yeah. I'd like to agree and build on 25 the comments from Mr. Cohen and Ms. Prisco. This is a 0165 1 disclosure law, so we have to be clear that the ultimate outcome 2 here is putting information out for the public to evaluate 3 whether companies have done due diligence. And in my opening 4 remarks, I made a strong case that, first of all, the disclosure 5 needs to be synchronized so as to reduce cost, rippling down the 6 supply chain, each time a company's fiscal year is triggered, 7 because company's have different fiscal years. 8 I do agree that it ought to be in a different form. 9 I think there's different stakeholders and different levels of 10 certainty around the information as we learn how to do this. 11 And that would in my mind lead you to another form of reporting. 12 And then on the timing question, we have suggested in formal 13 comments to the SEC that there be a phase-in, and that phase-in 14 should have a predetermined period of time where companies could 15 submit an indeterminate determination. It's going to take 16 companies time to figure out the origin of these materials. 17 If all we have available as companies to disclose is 18 conflict or non-conflict, I think most conservative people would 19 say, well, we can't determine if it's non-conflict, so we have 20 to say "conflict." If there were a third way, an indeterminate 21 determination that would allow companies to disclose, in fact, 22 what they had done, so that stakeholders could evaluate that 23 information, I think that would be a wonderful way to take a 24 little pressure off but still provide information to 25 stakeholders to evaluate companies' progress. 0166 1 MS. DUBBERLY: Thank you. We'll go to Mr. Fenwick, 2 then Ms. Baker and then Mr. Cohen. But just before we go, maybe 3 as people could -- if folks could maybe also think on Mr. 4 Mohin's comment about companies, everybody have the same 5 reporting period right now. If you file a 10K, we have 6 companies that have various different fiscal year end. 7 And so some companies may end up sort of doing a 8 constant due diligence check, which of course will add to the 9 cost. And, if everybody has the same filing period, let's say 10 it was calendar year-end. So it was a reporting period ending 11 in a calendar year-end. Would that cause particular problems 12 for any issuers? It seemed to us this wasn't tied to your 13 financial statement reporting. So if you had a different 14 calendar year-end, just if anybody had any thoughts on that as 15 well. Mr. Fenwick? 16 MR. FENWICK: So as my colleague at the end of the 17 table said, he was the auditor, so he felt compelled to speak. 18 I'm the NGO, so I felt compelled to speak, and I know that this 19 is really geared towards the issuers and also to the investors. 20 So I will say, as vaguely as possible, that we want to see 21 timely and accurate disclosures. 22 So I'm going to be the person who's sifting through 23 all these reports. So as long as it's timely and as long as 24 it's accurate, then, you know, I leave that to -- I defer to any 25 comments my colleague has from the investing community. This 0167 1 isn't the subject of the comment, but I feel compelled to say my 2 colleague, my multi stakeholder colleague, had me up to the 3 point of indeterminate origin; so we definitely oppose that as 4 being included. 5 I mean I should say that, you know, we understand 6 the challenges and some of the issues, to be clear, but we don't 7 think, one, that there is precedent in the law for that to 8 happen. So maybe there are other ways to work around that. The 9 other piece, though, I think, is that we certainly don't want to 10 incentivize violators to just automatically fall into that 11 category and not do everything that they can do to know where 12 the minerals and the products are coming from. 13 MS. BAKER: Yes. I would just like to say that we 14 do as investors agree with the synchronized timing of 15 information an d think that having one date when all companies 16 begin exercising due diligence of their minerals would offer 17 integrity and consistency throughout. And so we would support 18 that idea. 19 In that case, then, we would probably see disclosure 20 data in a 10K and also an 8K. I'm very leery of having a 21 separate report that is not tied to the filing disclosure 22 information that we will see in either the 10K or an 8K. So I 23 believe that we should see that continue to be described as an 24 exhibit to the filing that's synchronized by the calendar year. 25 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Heim? 0168 1 MS. BAKER: I had one more comment. I'm sorry. 2 And, finally, I really just would like to say that companies 3 already can ask for extensions on their filings, and they seem 4 to be generously granted. 5 Not that we want to discourage companies or dissuade 6 them from doing the reporting that they feel they could do if 7 they had more time; but, essentially, the law is asking for your 8 best efforts; are not asking for protection or asking for your 9 best efforts of disclosing whether it's conflict free or non-DRC 10 conflict-free. And if everyone's using that same terminology, I 11 think we're on the right path. 12 MR. HEIM: I'd like to point out a little bit about, 13 you know, I can't comment to the type of report or the location 14 of the report. That's not really what my expertise is. But I 15 do think it's important, relative to the overall timing of 16 implementation, to spend a minute, to kind of explain a little 17 bit about the reality of what's happening today. 18 We've heard a lot about various types of reports and 19 requests being pushed through the supply chain in order to 20 gather the information. Well, the reality is what's happening 21 today is these first tier suppliers, most of which get these, 22 and they're coming in all forms. Some of them are coming 23 through the EICC standard reporting template, which is an 24 excellent effort at trying to reduce the impact and the burden 25 on suppliers who are trying to figure out how to report this 0169 1 information; and, you know, what is it that they need to look 2 at. 3 That's an excellent effort, but not everybody is 4 adopting that. I've got clients who are getting e-mail 5 requests, letters, phone calls, a wide variety of formats, forms 6 and contents. I'm even seeing some clients who are getting 7 conflict minerals requests for minerals that are not conflict 8 minerals. They're outside the scope of the 3T and G. Okay. So 9 what's happening now is first-off these requests are coming in. 10 And sometimes the first-year suppliers are able to look at this, 11 and they say, yeah, we can answer some of these questions. And 12 they'll answer them and they'll get them back. 13 More frequently than I think perhaps is recognized, 14 these suppliers look at it and they say "We don't have any idea 15 how to answer these questions. We don't even really know what 16 these questions mean, but we'll pass it on to our supplier, 17 because this impacts their material that we're buying from them. 18 And so these are getting pushed down through the supply chain 19 several levels. 20 What that means is delays, delays in the issuers 21 getting the information flowing up through the supply chain to 22 them. That's what's happening right now. That's exacerbated by 23 the point that Irma from Kraft, I believe, made earlier, which 24 is the fact that there's still a lot of companies who don't know 25 about this requirement. They don't know about the law. They 0170 1 don't know about the regulation. 2 Keep in mind this regulation is geared toward 3 publicly traded companies. It's geared toward and specifically 4 applicable to issuers and registrants. If you are a privately 5 held company, then why would I necessarily pay a whole lot of 6 attention to what SEC is doing, because I don't have to answer 7 to SEC. I do answer to my customers, but I may not be paying 8 attention to rulemaking under SEC, because I'm a privately held 9 company and I have a couple million dollars a year in sales. 10 But my customers are going to drive this down to me. 11 I don't know that yet. There's a lot of that lack 12 of awareness in lower levels of the supply chain that exists. 13 That's creating delays in responsiveness to the information 14 request as well. And, finally, another element that's creating 15 delays in being able to move forward with this and getting the 16 information comes to this whole point about absolute certainty. 17 There's a great deal of fear in the lower levels of 18 the supply chain. With the audits that are driving toward, you 19 know, in some cases atomic level expectations of certainty, 20 companies are trying to manage and figure out how to build 21 management systems to deal with that level of certainty, and 22 that's causing delays, because companies don't know how to 23 implement unreasonable parameters such as that. 24 MS. CROSS: Okay. Thank you very much. I wanted to 25 ask one more quick question and then we'll do the wrap-up. The 0171 1 last question I had is that we understand the significant amount 2 of these minerals are stockpiled or in the pipeline right now. 3 Should there be a transition rule for stockpiled materials? 4 MR. COHEN: Thanks. I think my colleague, Ms. 5 Nimmo, is going to speak to this more knowledgeably than I, but 6 I did want to simply add a detail to a point she made earlier 7 about stockpiling, which is that both we and the Department of 8 Defense operate weapons systems for decades on end, sometimes 40 9 years, 50 years, sometimes longer. 10 They undergo modifications during that period of 11 time, but what it means is that government and industry 12 stockpiles for our DOD customer can contain articles that are 13 decades old, and tools as well, specialty tools. So that's a 14 particular circumstance that would make it quite excruciating if 15 we had to attempt to trace those minerals to the point of 16 origin. 17 MS. DUBBERLY: Ms. Nimmo and then Mr. Fenwick. 18 MS. NIMMO: I mean we're really talking about the 19 two different types of materials, so we have unsmelted 20 concentrates, which may be largely in the supply chain 21 approaching the smelter. A lot of the tin materials, for 22 example, will come from artisanal minors, from maybe half of the 23 tin is coming from artisanal minors where they don't really have 24 records of when the material was mined. So we can't say the 25 date of mining is this or that. 0172 1 It can take, sometimes, up to a year just to 2 transport the material from the mines to the smelter. You know. 3 We have material from Rwanda arriving at a moment that was 4 produced in mines in January. So it takes that time to actually 5 transport the minerals through just the upstream part of the 6 supply chain. So there certainly needs to be at least a period 7 of time, something like a year, for that material to be moved 8 out and through the smelter. 9 And then we have metal stocks, as they say, held by 10 different people: investors, warehouses, and also customers' 11 producers; you know. The requirements of the NME, the Metal 12 Exchange, for example, was that metals should be able to be 13 stored indefinitely. There may be metal in there from any time 14 in the past, so you really need to know a future date, at what 15 point these regulations should start to apply. 16 MR. FENWICK: Yeah. I think we've been having 17 conversations about this issue as well, and I think, you know, 18 we've heard some. We're definitely going to get back to the 19 Commission with some comments, we think, around this issue. But 20 I just wanted to say that some good points have been raised. I 21 mean there's a truth to the fact that if something is stockpiled 22 out of the region, and it's being held somewhere else, does it 23 really get at what the intent of the law is. 24 And, certainly, if it's already been purchased and 25 it's already left the region, then there is a question about the 0173 1 knowledge of those materials actually having an impact or 2 benefit. So I will say that we are open to some idea of having 3 some sort of an amnesty or maybe some sort of a date for new 4 minerals, et cetera; but, again, we'll submit some comments to 5 that point. 6 But I do think one of the things we would expect to 7 see on that, and we even included this in our submission, is 8 just the statement that if there is this date for the 9 regulations, or we're saying for stockpiles that there was some 10 statement to say that yes, in fact. These are stockpiled 11 materials, and we know because they were purchased, et cetera, 12 et cetera. It's just something to confirm, so it's not going 13 create a whole everybody falls into this category. 14 MS. DUBBERLY: Mr. Riess and then Ms. Prisco. 15 MR. RIESS: In the case of gold there are very large 16 stockpiles in vaults all over the world; and, it would be 17 unrealistic to not grandfather those stocks. For the most part 18 the bars are marked with dates, along with purities and other 19 information. There's some unbranded gold in exchanges; and that 20 should probably be treated as scrap. 21 MS. PRISCO: I think as a practical matter there are 22 -- I mean in our case, especially, we have inventory that we've 23 manufactured, you know, a few years ago, just because it doesn't 24 have a shelf life. There's situations where there's probably a 25 lot of product that's already been manufactured that will 0174 1 ultimately be sold that was done before these rules were 2 considered. So I would encourage you to think about that and to 3 maybe provide some guidance on, you know, what would trigger the 4 reporting of the passing of inventory to a customer, perhaps 5 based on the date of manufacture or some other record. 6 MS. CROSS: So this has been a tremendously -- I'm 7 sorry. We have one more. I apologize. 8 MR. MOHIN: Sorry. I just want to say that 9 obviously there needs to be an effective date for stockpiled 10 materials, because it's not only impractical to trace their 11 origin, but it would not further the intent of the law or the 12 rule, and I think we all know that. 13 I think the question you're asking is so what should 14 we set as the date. And, you know, I would like to submit that 15 any material mined after the effective date of the rule should 16 be subject to the rule. 17 MS. CROSS: Thank you. Before I close, I don't know 18 if anyone from the Commission has anything they'd like to say. 19 With that, I want to thank everyone for their extremely helpful 20 input today. I think we learned a lot. As I mentioned, the 21 comment period as reopened in connection with the roundtable. 22 We've received some estimates of cost throughout 23 this process. It would be very helpful to get more precise 24 information about costs, in particular one of the various 25 components of the cost estimates, and how would various possible 0175 1 approaches the Commission could take in implementing the statute 2 in a manner consistent with its terms impact the possible cost. 3 So if you have comments to that affect, we'd appreciate them. 4 Again, I want to thank you very much for your 5 participation today, and we look forward to working with you in 6 the future. 7 (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the meeting was 8 adjourned.) 9 * * * * * 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0176 1 PROOFREADER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 In the Matter of: ROUNDTABLE ON CONFLICT MINERALS 4 File Number: 3-01118 5 Date: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 6 Location: Washington, D.C. 7 8 This is to certify that I, Susan Davis, 9 (the undersigned), do hereby swear and affirm that the 10 attached proceedings before the U.S. Securities and 11 Exchange Commission were held according to the record and 12 that this is the original, complete, true and accurate 13 transcript that has been compared to the reporting or 14 recording accomplished at the hearing. 15 16 _______________________ _______________________ 17 (Proofreader's Name) (Date) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0177 1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 I, Jon Hundley, reporter, hereby certify that the 4 foregoing transcript of 175 pages is a complete, true and 5 accurate transcript of the testimony indicated, held on 6 October 18, 2011, at Washington, D.C. in the matter of: 7 ROUNDTABLE ON CONFLICT MINERALS. 8 9 10 11 I further certify that this proceeding was recorded by 12 me, and that the foregoing transcript has been prepared 13 under my direction. 14 15 Date:____________________________ 16 Official Reporter:________________________________ 17 Diversified Reporting Services, Inc. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 0178 1 2 3 Diversified Reporting Services, Inc. 4 1101 Sixteenth Street, N.W. 5 2nd Floor 6 Washington, DC 20036 7 8 9 In the Matter of: ROUNDTABLE ON CONFLICT MINERALS 10 File Number: 3-01118 11 Date: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 12 Location: Washington, D.C. 13 14 This is a letter to inform you that we do not 15 release our tapes and notes. I do maintain 16 them for a period of one (1) year. 17 18 Sincerely, 19 _________________________ 20 Jon Hundley 21 22 23 24 25